The Archive of Public Administration outside Public Administration

Abstract When elected officials gain power, do they use it to provide more constituent service or affect policy? The answer informs debates over how legislator capacity, term limits, and institutional positions affect legislator behavior. We distinguish two countervailing effects of increased institutional power: shifting priorities and increased capacity. To assess how institutional power shapes behavior, we assemble a massive new database of 611,239 legislator requests to a near census of federal departments, agencies, and subagencies between 2007 and 2020. We find that legislators prioritize policy work as they gain institutional power (e.g., become a committee chair) but simultaneously maintain their levels of constituency service. Moreover, when a new legislator replaces an experienced legislator, the district receives less constituency service and less policy work. Rather than long‐serving and powerful elected officials diverting attention from constituents, their increased capacity enables them to maintain levels of constituency service, even as they prioritize policy work.

Abstract Building a strong and effective state requires revenue. Yet, in many low‐income countries, citizens do not make formal payments to the state or forego engaging with the state altogether due to vulnerability to opportunistic demands by state agents. We study two randomized interventions in Kinshasa, Democratic Republic of the Congo, designed to empower citizens in their negotiations with opportunistic state agents: one provided information about statutory payment obligations, the other offered protection from abusive officials. We examine the effects not only on citizen payment amounts (intensive margin effects) but also on whether citizens start making formal payments, or any payments, to the state (extensive margin effects). We find that protection, and to a lesser extent information, had clear extensive margin effects, increasing the share of citizens making formal payments and engaging with the state. These findings show how empowering citizens can help countries transition away from a low‐revenue, low engagement equilibrium.

How do candidate selection processes shape policy outcomes? Studying Tanzania’s initial single-party legislative elections, I assess how electing candidates preferred by party elites affected policy implementation, which emphasized rural development during this period. Leveraging the deterministic assignment of ballot symbols—which was orthogonal to candidate characteristics but had large electoral effects—finds that their election substantially increased the supply of salient local public goods. Assembling novel candidate-level data, I document that elites prioritized candidates’ national prominence while voters prioritized their local ties. Rather than representing misaligned incentives, the results are consistent with elites, in an incipient regime, more quickly understanding which characteristics would matter for candidates’ performance in office. Beyond highlighting novel conditions under which elite-led candidate selection facilitates responsiveness, the results underscore the distributive consequences of candidate selection even in nondemocratic settings.

Abstract Do men negatively respond when women first enter an occupation? We answer this question by studying the end of one of the final explicit occupational barriers to women in the U.S.: in 2016, the U.S. military opened all positions to women, including historically male-only combat occupations. We exploit the staggered integration of women into combat units to estimate the causal effects of the introduction of female colleagues on men’s job performance, behavior, and perceptions of workplace quality, using monthly administrative personnel records and rich survey responses. We find that integrating women into previously all-male units does not negatively affect men’s performance or behavioral outcomes, including retention, promotions, demotions, separations for misconduct, criminal investigations, and medical conditions. Most of our results are precise enough to rule out small detrimental effects. However, there is a wedge between men’s perceptions and performance. The integration of women causes a negative shift in male soldiers’ perceptions of workplace quality. The decline is driven by units integrated with female officers, likely arising from female officers increasing men’s awareness of workplace problems or from men’s dissatisfaction from working with women in positions of authority—even though men in such units show some performance gains. If male-dominated workplaces are reluctant to incorporate women due to expectations that men will become less productive, our paper provides evidence to weigh against that notion.

This paper studies, through a randomized field experiment involving community health workers in Pakistan, if public sector organizations can improve worker performance by investing in their mission motivation. The findings reveal that training aimed at strengthening mission motivation improves workers' performance in their core responsibility of monthly household visits, as well as in multiple tasks performed during and outside these visits. This holistic improvement in performance leads to improved health outcomes for children in the communities served by these workers. These results highlight the importance of promoting organizational missions as a strategy to improve public sector performance in low-income countries. (JEL C93, I11, J13, J24, L31, M53, O12)

We assess the US Clean Air Act standards for fine particulate matter (PM 2.5 ). Using high-resolution data, we find that the 2005 regulation reduced PM 2.5 levels by 0.4 μg/m 3 over five years, with larger effects in more polluted areas. Standard difference-in-differences overstates these effects by a factor of three because time trends differ by baseline pollution, a bias we overcome with three alternative approaches. We show that the regulation contributed to narrowing Urban-Rural and Black-White PM 2.5 exposure disparities, but less than difference-in-differences suggest. Pollution damages capitalized into house prices, however, appear larger than previously thought when leveraging regulatory variation. (JEL D63, K32, Q52, Q53, Q58, R31)

How do wealthy families preserve their fortunes across generations? A historic peak in wealth inequality in the United States has inspired research on how economic elites benefit from markets, tax rates, and legal entities. However, the ongoing practices through which families maintain their fortunes across generations are less understood. Using six months of ethnographic observations at a wealth manager for the top 0.1 percent, as well as interviews with the manager’s clients and a wider sample of managers, I argue that wealthy families adopt what I call “bureaucratic practices”—activities like meetings, presentations, and signing documents—to preserve wealth intergenerationally. After erecting legal entities such as corporations, trusts, and foundations, wealth managers help wealthy families implement bureaucratic practices. These practices, which privilege bureaucratic form over substance, constitute a crucial behavioral layer atop the legal infrastructure, facilitating a greater degree of wealth preservation compared with using entities alone. Thus, preserving wealth at the top should be understood not merely as a set of discrete transfers from parents to children, but as an enduring multigenerational process of professional socialization that introduces new behaviors into family life.

Partisans are divided on policing policy, which may affect officer behavior. We merge rosters from 99 of the 100 largest local U.S. agencies-over one third of local law enforcement agents nationwide-with voter files to study police partisanship. Police skew more Republican than their jurisdictions, with notable exceptions. Using fine-grained data in Chicago and Houston, we compare behavior of Democratic and Republican officers facing common circumstances. We find minimal partisan differences after correcting for multiple comparisons. But consistent with prior work, we find Black and Hispanic officers make fewer stops and arrests in Chicago, and Black officers use force less often in both cities. Comparing same-race partisans, we find White Democrats make more violent crime arrests than White Republicans in Chicago. Our results suggest that despite Republicans' preference for more punitive law enforcement policy and their overrepresentation in policing, partisan divisions often do not translate into detectable differences in on-the-ground enforcement.

Abstract Can norm‐based information campaigns reduce corruption? Such campaigns use messaging about how people typically behave (descriptive norms) or ought to behave (injunctive norms). Drawing on survey and lab experiments in Ukraine, we unpack and evaluate the distinct effects of these two types of social norms. Four findings emerge: First, injunctive‐norm messaging produces consistent but relatively small and temporary effects. These may serve as moderately effective, low‐cost anti‐corruption tools but are unlikely to inspire large‐scale norm transformations. Second, contrary to recent studies, we find no evidence that either type of norm‐based messaging “backfires” by inadvertently encouraging corruption. Third, descriptive‐norm messages emphasizing corruption's decline produce relatively large and long‐lasting effects—but only among subjects who find messages credible. Fourth, both types of norm‐based messaging have a substantially larger effect on younger citizens. These findings have broader implications for messaging campaigns, especially those targeting social problems that, like corruption, require mitigation of collective action dilemmas.

This paper uses the gradual expansion of the European railway network to investigate how this key technological driver of modernization affected ethnic separatism between 1816 and 1945. Combining new historical data on ethnic settlement areas, conflict, and railway construction, we test how railroads affected separatist conflict and successful secession as well as independence claims among peripheral ethnic groups. Difference-in-differences, event study, and instrumental variable models show that, on average, railway-based modernization increased separatist mobilization and secession. These effects concentrate in countries with small core groups, weak state capacity, and low levels of economic development as well as in large ethnic minority regions. Exploring causal mechanisms, we show how railway networks can facilitate mobilization by increasing the internal connectivity of ethnic regions and hamper it by boosting state reach. Overall, our findings call for a more nuanced understanding of the effects of European modernization on nation building.

Middle Eastern and North African (MENA) Americans are politically visible yet institutionally invisible, long categorized as “white” by the U.S. government despite neither self-categorizing nor racially assigned as such. Most forms—across public and private sectors—still lack a “MENA” category option. What are the political consequences of institutional invisibility? Across two survey experiments and in-depth interviews, I find that exclusion from official identity categories triggers the experience of categorization threat, a psychological response rarely linked to political behavior. When MENA Americans experience categorization threat, they respond by expressing opinions on politics in ways that attempt to signal and assert their MENA identity and, to a lesser extent, Person of Color (POC) identity. Such identity assertion demonstrates that bureaucratic categorization influences expressions of public opinion on politics, not simply how people self-categorize. Researching the effects of category exclusion on public opinions creates opportunities for more accurate and democratic scholarship.

For governments procuring innovation, one choice is whether to specify desired products (a conventional approach) or allow firms to suggest ideas (an open approach). Using a US Air Force R&D grant program where open and conventional competitions were held simultaneously, we find that open awards increase both commercial innovation and technology adoption by the military. In contrast, conventional awards have no positive effects on new technology but do create more program lock-in. We present evidence that openness matters over and above inducing differential selection, for example, of less well-established firms. These results suggest benefits from open approaches to innovation procurement.

Slow public service delivery and corruption are common problems in low- and middle-income countries. Can better management information systems improve delivery speed? Does improving the delivery speed reduce corruption? In a large-scale experiment with the Bangladesh Civil Service, I send monthly scorecards measuring delays in service delivery to government officials and their supervisors. The scorecards increase on-time service delivery by 11 percent but do not reduce bribes. Instead, the scorecards increase bribes for high-performing bureaucrats. A model where bureaucrats' reputational concerns constrain bribes can explain the results. When positive performance feedback improves bureaucrats' reputations, the constraint is relaxed, and bribes increase. (JEL D73, D83, H83, O17)

Are application hassles, or “ordeals,” an effective way to limit public program enrollment? We provide new evidence by studying (removal of) an auto-enrollment policy for health insurance, adding an extra step to enroll. This minor ordeal has a major impact, reducing enrollment by 33 percent and differentially excluding young, healthy, and economically disadvantaged people. Using a simple model, we show adverse selection—a classic feature of insurance markets—undermines ordeals’ standard rationale of excluding low-value individuals since they are also low-cost and may not be inefficient. Our analysis illustrates why ordeals targeting is unlikely to work well in selection markets. (JEL D82, G22, H75, I13, I18)

Abstract Our study analyses 6 million civil judgments in China from 2014 to 2018, documenting gender disparities that disfavour female litigants. We investigate the impact of an open justice reform that mandated courts to broadcast legal proceedings live on a centralized online platform. By exploiting variations in its implementation across courts and over time and employing both difference-in-differences and Bartik IV approaches, we find that gender disparities in chances of winning decrease as broadcast intensity increases. Analysis of the textual content of judicial decisions provides further evidence that these changes in judicial outcomes stem from altered judge behaviours (i.e. attention and effort) under enhanced judicial transparency. Our results demonstrate how information technology shapes judges’ conduct, underscoring its broader potential to improve accountability in public institutions.

Welfare programs place burdens on citizens to document their vulnerability through means-tested regulations in the United States, but theories of the welfare state do not necessarily account for mismatches between residents’ eligibility and their legibility to state infrastructure. Focusing on housing instability during the COVID-19 pandemic, we explain how Chicago residents who were eligible for emergency rental assistance programs (ERAPs) were unable to render their vulnerability and survival strategies legible to formal bureaucratic systems. This meant that despite the extensive federal funding allocated to state and municipal ERAPs during the pandemic, many people who were behind on rent did not even apply for support. Based on 76 in-depth interviews with low-income renters and 25 interviews with people working with these programs in Chicago, we document three mismatches between renters’ survival strategies and the requirements of formal bureaucratic systems of categorization. First, we illustrate how people who informally leased apartments in Chicago struggled to properly document their housing instability and the administrative burdens they faced in doing so. Second, because of acute housing precarity and fear of eviction, some renters prioritized their rent over other needs and then could not translate their vulnerability into ERAP eligibility. Third, we explain how undocumented Chicagoans often avoided ERAPs because of the perceived risks associated with becoming legible to the state. Being unable or unwilling to access aid created a cascade of other precarious conditions.

This article examines China’s efforts to accelerate its economic rise using technology absorption policies, or measures that condition foreign market access on technology transfers to domestic firms. I argue bureaucratic fragmentation and China’s position in global value chains (GVCs) constrain its bargaining power over foreign investors, limiting the use of tech absorption policies even in highly strategic industries such as semiconductors. Case studies and analysis of a new industry-level dataset from 1995-2015 suggest centralizing reforms facilitated increased use of tech absorption policies in strategic industries over time. However, China’s reliance on foreign firms to drive export growth and associated employment undercuts tech absorption efforts in strategic industries in which it occupies an intermediate position in GVCs. My findings show how regulatory institutions and GVCs shape the political economy of bargaining over technology transfer between states and firms, and how position in production networks influences the strategic choices behind China’s rise.

Why are some governments more effective in promoting economic change than others? We develop a theory of the institutional sources of economic transformation. Institutions can facilitate transformation through two central mechanisms: insulation and compensation. The institutional sources of transformation vary across policy types, whether policies impose costs primarily on consumers (demand-side policies) or on producers (supply-side policies). Proportional electoral rules and strong welfare states facilitate demand-side policies, whereas autonomous bureaucracies and corporatist interest intermediation facilitate supply-side policies. We test our theory by leveraging the 1973 oil crisis, an exogenous shock that compelled policymakers to simultaneously pursue transformational change across industrialized countries. Evidence from the generalized synthetic control method, case studies, and discourse network analysis support our hypotheses. The findings have important implications for contemporary transformations, including climate change policy and low-carbon transitions.

International organizations (IOs) are mandated to address some of the most important global challenges under intense budget scarcity. In recent years, they expanded their funding base through a greater reliance on earmarked voluntary contributions by member states and non-state actors. Critics warn that earmarked funding creates an important trade-off: IOs can do more with earmarked funding, but have less control over what they do and do it less well. In this registered report, we probe how staff evaluate different types of earmarking through a novel elite survey experiment with staff from six UN organizations. We show that staff prefer earmarking for their own area of work over other types of earmarking. However, these preferences do not affect the funding amount they deem as appropriate or the overheads they expect their organization to charge. Our study provides important insights for debates on the resourcing of IOs and the motivations of international bureaucrats.

Abstract Mob vigilantism—the punishment of criminal suspects by groups of citizens—is widespread throughout the developing world. This paper sheds light on the relationship between state capacity and citizens’ choice between reliance on the state and vigilantism. I implemented a field experiment in South Africa that randomly varies the capacity of police to locate households. Findings from surveys conducted several months later suggest households that have become legible to police are more willing to rely on police and less willing to participate in vigilantism. An additional information experiment points toward increased fear of state punishment for vigilantism rather than improved police service quality as the likely mechanism. The broader implication is that citizens’ willingness to cooperate with capable state institutions need not reflect satisfaction with state services. Such cooperation can also be due to the state's ability to limit citizens’ choices by ruling out informal alternatives like vigilantism.

Abstract Why and when do cities vote for the left? The emergence of the urban–rural divide in the United States in the 1930s is inconsistent with canonical theories of cleavages. This paper introduces an explanation: agglomeration effects. The provision of government services is more efficient in urban environments because of nonrivalries, economies of scale, and access costs. If the public sector in cities is more efficient, and voters face a trade‐off between taxation and government spending, urban voters support more spending. When redistribution is salient, one should observe an urban–rural electoral divide. As predicted by a formal model, more‐urban locations faced lower costs of providing public services and shifted toward the Democrats as the party implemented the New Deal. In addition, urban voters were more supportive of government spending. In the United Kingdom, the urban–rural divide also accompanied the rise of redistributive politics. Agglomeration effects influence preferences for redistribution and create political cleavages.

In contrast to the expansive work on how community policing affects citizens’ attitudes toward police, existing research says little about how community policing affects officers’ attitudes toward citizens. We examine officer-facing outcomes using an experiment in the Philippines, in which a random subset of a province’s 705 officers were assigned to intensive community policing activities for seven months. Treatment officers saw improved understanding of citizen concerns, but did not develop greater empathy or trust toward civilians, nor an increased sense of accountability for citizen-facing misconduct. We build from the experiment to develop an inductive theory of bureaucrat-citizen contact, relying on qualitative observations and exploratory analyses of heterogeneous effects. We propose that contact with citizens is only likely to improve attitudes among frontline bureaucrats who are not ex-ante embedded in their communities. Moreover, contact may have negative effects when it reveals threats to bureaucrats’ personal safety.

How can public agencies become more responsive to marginalized citizens? We develop a theory of bureaucratic responsiveness as the product of resources, representation, and recognition. While material investments and inclusion of marginalized personnel are insufficient in passive forms, they can be jointly activated through institutional recognition : organizational dynamics that enhance a social group’s visibility and ascribe value to efforts to meet their needs. We illustrate this in the domains of policing and gender, examining station-level Women’s Help Desks in India. Combining a large-scale experiment and sustained qualitative research, we reveal how the desks—when staffed by female officers—increased police responsiveness to women’s cases. This occurred as female personnel actively used help desk resources to build professional standing while supporting women. These gains, however, were constrained by patriarchal norms that limit reporting and prosecution of gender-based violence. Our findings illuminate possibilities and challenges of institutional change in unequal settings.

In recent decades, affective polarization and partisan animosity have risen sharply in the United States. To what extent have these trends affected hiring decisions? I examine partisan biases in hiring by considering the case of school district superintendent appointments: chief executives of local U.S. elementary/secondary education systems. I analyze mixed-methods data on a decade of hiring outcomes in Florida and California from 2009 to 2019. Despite rising polarization, the data consistently show that partisan affiliation is not a primary factor in these hiring decisions. Quantitative analyses reveal no significant relationship between changes in board partisan composition and superintendent hiring outcomes within school districts. I find no relationship between board-level partisan composition and superintendent exits. Qualitative findings show hiring decisions are primarily shaped by evaluations of candidates’ interpersonal skills and competence, even among board members with strong partisan views on other policy issues. Board members discuss a strong commitment to building consensus in their selections. While I cannot rule out very small effects, these results show that school boards do not routinely prioritize applicants from their own political party. This study advances research on affective polarization and social closure by demonstrating the contingent nature of partisan affiliation on decision-making and by providing evidence of a strong respect for professionalism in a critical U.S. public sector setting.

Children spend years in foster care, and bureaucratic hurdles can unnecessarily prolong their stays. The Mi Abogado program was introduced in Chile to enhance legal aid for foster children and accelerate family reunification. In a novel approach, the Chilean government randomized the introduction of the program for children living in institutions to evaluate effects on child well-being. Using registry data, we find the program significantly reduced the duration of foster care without increasing subsequent maltreatment and placements. The exposure also decreased criminal justice involvement and improved school attendance. Results suggest that strengthening foster care services can cost-effectively improve child well-being. (JEL I21, I31, J13, K36, O15, O17)

Abstract Central states have often relied on local elites to implement policies in peripheral areas. These strategies may allow otherwise weak states to impose their directives, but they can also be inefficient, particularly when a single elite commands total control over local politics ( monopolist capture ). We argue that weak states can overcome this equilibrium by creating new subnational positions with distinct appointment rules from existing ones ( balancing ). We evaluate our argument leveraging a natural experiment and novel data on 12,000 sub‐municipal units from turn‐of‐the‐twentieth‐century Peru. We exploit as‐if random variation in population‐based appointment rules for a justice of the peace, the chief institution through which monopolist capture was established. We provide evidence that the Peruvian government responded to monopolist capture by creating local‐level executive positions (lieutenant governors). We further demonstrate that this balancing allowed the state to conduct a 1902 education census, which was otherwise opposed and often blocked by entrenched elites.

Political decentralization is often undermined by elite capture of the local state. In unequal contexts, contemporary accounts highlight that local executives lack de facto political authority because they are sidelined by unelected elites. This article investigates one purported institutional remedy: direct elections. Direct elections are promoted as a tool of democratic deepening that empowers local executives by disrupting elites’ hold on political institutions. Exploiting a quasi-experiment in rural Maharashtra, India, I find that direct elections increase the de facto authority of local executives. However, I find no evidence of disrupted elite dominance. Instead, I argue that direct elections shift the mode of elite capture from informal to formal channels. I use over two years of qualitative fieldwork, original survey and administrative data, and a vignette experiment to substantiate these claims. This study underscores the limitations of reforms to bring democracy “closer to the people” in contexts of entrenched elite dominance.

Oversight, scholars argue, allows Congress to control the executive agents it empowers to implement law. Yet the tools of oversight are rather limited and debate continues as to how much influence oversight provides. How well can members of Congress motivate bureaucratic performance? To measure the efficacy of oversight, we create a new dataset matching oversight efforts to a bureaucratic deficiency Congress has sought to reduce since the early 2000s: improperly made payments to contractors and clients. We estimate the effect of congressional hearings, one of the most important tools of congressional oversight, as well as correspondence, appropriation committee reports, statutes, and executive action. We find that hearings lead to subsequent declines in improper payments. The magnitude of the effect, however, is small relative to the scope of the problem, suggesting strong limits on the efficacy of oversight. Our findings imply that America’s elected officials struggle to effectively manage implementation of policy.

A growing literature finds high returns to firms with legislative connections. Less attention has been paid to returns from bureaucratic connections and to organizations beyond for-profit firms. Using data recording the first postbureaucracy position occupied by all former civil servants in Japan, I reveal a bifurcated job market for former bureaucrats. High-ranking officials from elite economic ministries are more likely to join for-profit firms, where they generate returns such as increased government loans and positive stock market reactions. Lower-ranking officials are more likely to join nonprofits linked to government ministries, which receive higher-value contracts when former bureaucrats are in leadership roles. These patterns suggest that while firms wish to hire bureaucrats who can deliver tangible benefits, ministries also shape revolving door pathways by directing benefits to ensure long-term career value for civil servants. These findings reframe revolving door dynamics as the result of both firm-driven demand and bureaucratic incentives.

Only 15% of African households possess a formal title for their agricultural land, despite the widespread availability of titles and their documented benefits. Local politics combine with national land regimes to explain this empirical anomaly. I combine 170,216 household-level observations of titling across 22 African countries with a novel geospatial measure of land values and the returns to agricultural investment. Households in areas with high returns to potential agricultural investment title more. However, in countries with centralized land tenure regimes, strong customary institutions attenuate this relationship; in countries with decentralized land regimes, strong customary institutions reinforce it. I use a case study in Côte d’Ivoire, including an original survey of 801 households and 194 customary elites, to trace these mechanisms at work. This research documents granular variation in the uptake of land titles, illustrates how local politics explain this variation, and outlines conditions under which customary elites impede development.

As elected officials and citizens struggle to understand the increasingly polarized political landscape in the United States, some have pointed to the introduction of “gavel-to-gavel” camera coverage in legislative bodies as driving the downward trajectory of these institutions. Advocates of increased transparency suggest cameras empower voters, producing more moderate behavior among legislators, whereas opponents suggest cameras encourage partisanship and dysfunction. Previous research offers mixed conclusions, in part, because of a focus on national legislatures where the introduction of cameras occurs only once. Using an original dataset of the adoption of gavel-to-gavel coverage in state legislative chambers, we examine whether cameras are associated with a range of chamber- and individual-level outcomes. The findings suggest that there are no systematic impacts from the introduction of gavel-to-gavel coverage. Normative concerns about cameras in legislatures may be overstated, an important finding given their proliferation in public proceedings since the COVID-19 pandemic.

This article introduces a novel empirical method for estimating the ideological orientations of U.S. regulatory agencies across different presidential administrations. Employing a measurement model based on item response theory and analyzing data on planned regulations from the Unified Agenda and the president’s discretionary review of those regulations, as implemented by the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, the study provides dynamic estimates of agency ideal points from the Clinton through the Trump administrations. The model uses NOMINATE ideal points of presidents to link the estimated agency ideal points to legislative ideal points. The resulting estimates correlate positively with existing measures of agency ideology, highlight controversial regulators, and demonstrate that agency ideologies shift over time due to emerging issues that divide the parties. The study also finds that agencies located ideologically closer to the president are more productive, as evidenced by their regulatory output.

Is national policy more responsive to the preferences of white Americans than to those of people of color? To answer this fundamental question, we examine how well federal lawmaking reflects the preferences of 520,000 Black, Latino, Asian American, and white citizens from 2006 to 2022. Average racial gaps in responsiveness are small regardless of issue area. However, white voters are significantly advantaged when Republicans control the government. Respondents’ class, age, and ideology cannot explain this disparity. Respondents’ partisanship explains some, but not all, of it. To further investigate, we analyze roll call votes in Congress, focusing on the Senate—the pivotal lawmaking institution. Similar patterns emerge: Republican Senators better represent white (versus Black or Latino) constituents. Moreover, Black-white disparities are larger in states where Black Americans comprise more of the population. This suggests a role for white racial attitudes, and, indeed, we find that state-level white racial resentment predicts Black-white representational disparities.

Abstract A prominent literature on pre-modern warfare and institution-building holds that intense military competition in pre-modern Europe encouraged institutional innovations—for example, centralized bureaucracies and monopolies on coercion—that empowered rulers and enhanced state capacity, with salutary effects on long-run political development. States that adopted these innovations were more likely to survive, whereas those that did not succumbed to invading armies. Yet links between geopolitical competitiveness and capacity building are largely theorized and tested based on the European historical experience. A broader view of that period reveals a more complicated picture. The dominant mode of warfare throughout much of medieval and early modern Eurasia, Inner Asian cavalry warfare (IACW), favored succession institutions that selected for competent military leaders at the expense of long, secure reigns and cumulative capacity-building potential. I explore these links between IACW, succession practices, and rule duration with a novel dataset of over 300 Eurasian dynasties.

Research shows that bureaucrats’ performance is shaped by their personal characteristics, such as public service motivation, cognitive ability, grit, and Big Five personality traits. What impact do these traits have on citizen assessments of service delivery and governance? To test this question, we randomly assigned police officers to villages during a community-oriented policing program in the Philippines. This program involved meetings between police officers and community leaders—citizens who serve as key conduits between the population and the state. We find that community leaders’ assessments of individual officers were meaningfully affected by officers’ personal traits, but those traits mattered less for assessments of broader institutional efficacy. These findings suggest that bureaucrats’ traits can improve public service provision by shaping how citizens approach encounters with specific government representatives. However, they place limits on the suggestion that exceptionally positive (or exceptionally negative) bureaucrats can shape attitudes toward state institutions more generally.

We conducted a nationwide field experiment in China to evaluate the direct and indirect impacts of assigning firms to public or private citizen appeals when they violate pollution standards. There are three main findings. First, public appeals to the regulator through social media substantially reduce violations and pollution emissions, while private appeals cause more modest environmental improvements. Second, public appeals appear to tilt regulators’ focus away from facilitating economic growth and toward avoiding pollution-induced public unrest. Third, pollution reductions by treated firms are not offset by control firms, based on randomly varying the proportion of treated firms at the prefecture level. (JEL D22, L82, P28, P31, Q52, Q53, Q58)

We use newly digitized records from the post office to study the effects of strengthened state capacity between 1875 and 1901. Exploiting the implementation of the Pendleton Act—a landmark statute that shielded bureaucrats from political interference—across US cities over two waves, we find that civil service reform reduced postal delivery errors and increased productivity. These improvements were most pronounced during election years when the reform dampened bureaucratic turnover. We provide suggestive evidence that reformed cities witnessed declining local partisan newspapers. Separating politics from administration, therefore, not only improved state effectiveness but also weakened the role of local politics. (JEL D24, D73, H83, J45, L82, L87, N41)

Abstract Electoral support for far‐right parties is often linked to geographies of discontent. We argue that public service deprivation, defined as reduced access to public services, plays an important role in explaining these patterns. By exploiting an Italian reform that reduced access to public services in municipalities with fewer than 5,000 residents, we show that far‐right support in national elections increased in municipalities affected by the reform compared to unaffected ones. We use geo‐coded individual‐level survey data and party rhetoric data to explore the mechanisms underlying this result. Our findings suggest that concerns about immigration are exacerbated by the reform, and that far‐right parties increasingly linked public services to immigration in their rhetoric after the reform. These demand and supply dynamics help us understand how public service deprivation shapes geographic patterns in far‐right support.

How does the representation of women in international organizations affect the implementation of gender mainstreaming policies? Many international organizations have adopted policies to prevent gender discrimination in their operations, but their implementation is often lackluster. We argue that these shortcomings appear due to a combination of institutional incentives and an underrepresentation of women in their staff. We test the argument in the case of the World Bank, drawing on highly disaggregated staffing data, an instrumental variable strategy, and an elite survey experiment. Our results show that most staff incorporate at least shallow gender mainstreaming in their projects. Deeper implementation of gender mainstreaming is more likely when women staff supervise projects, hold positions of authority, and are more represented as coworkers. These results contribute to understanding the disconnects between talk and action on mainstreaming policies and inform debates on representation in global governance.

This paper studies the role of fiscal capacity in European state consolidation. Our analysis is organized around novel data on the territories and cities of the Holy Roman Empire in the early modern period. Territories implementing an early fiscal reform were more likely to survive, increased in size, and achieved a more compact extent. We provide evidence for the causal interpretation of these results and show key mechanisms: revenues, military investments, and marriage success. The imposition of Imperial taxes, quasi‐random in timing and size, increased the benefits of an efficient tax administration on the side of rulers, driving the implementation of fiscal centralization. Within territories, Chambers became the dominant administrative institution, tilting the consolidating states toward absolutism.

Air pollution in South Asia is a health emergency, responsible for 2 million deaths every year¹. Crop residue burning accounts for 40-60% of peak pollution during the winter harvest months^2,3. Despite being illegal, this practice remains widespread^4,5. Any solution to curb the problem necessitates government action at scale. Here we study whether leveraging the incentives of bureaucrats tasked with controlling burning can mitigate this phenomenon. Using a decade of wind, fire and health data from satellites and surveys from the Demographic and Health Surveys Program, we show that crop burning responds to bureaucrat incentives: fires increase by 15% when wind is most likely to direct pollution to neighbouring jurisdictions, and decrease by 14.5% when it pollutes their own. These effects intensify with stronger bureaucratic incentives and capacity. We also find that bureaucrat action against burning deters future polluters, further reducing fires by 13%. Finally, using an atmospheric model, we estimate that one log increase in in utero exposure to pollution from burning raises child mortality by 30-36 deaths per 1,000 births, underscoring the importance of bureaucrat action. Contrary to the growing beliefs that the problem of crop burning is intractable^6,7, these findings highlight specific ways in which existing bureaucrats, when properly incentivized, can improve environmental management and public health outcomes.

Governments increasingly use RCTs to test innovations, yet we know little about how they incorporate results into policy-making. We study 30 U.S. cities that ran 73 RCTs with a national Nudge Unit. Cities adopt a nudge treatment into their communications in 27% of the cases. We find that the strength of the evidence and key city features do not strongly predict adoption; instead, the largest predictor is whether the RCT was implemented using pre-existing communication, as opposed to new communication. We identify organizational inertia as a leading explanation: changes to pre-existing infrastructure are more naturally folded into subsequent processes.

We study the effects of competition by state-owned firms, leveraging the decentralized entry of public pharmacies to local markets in Chile. Public pharmacies sell the same drugs at a third of private pharmacy prices, because of stronger upstream bargaining and market power in the private sector, but are of lower quality. Public pharmacies induced market segmentation and price increases in the private sector, which benefited the switchers to the public option but harmed the stayers. The countrywide entry of public pharmacies would reduce yearly consumer drug expenditure by 1.6 percent. (JEL D22, I18, L32, L65, O14)

Abstract We examine how fiscal legibility, the ability of central authorities to observe local conditions for the purposes of taxation, shapes political centralization and state development. When rulers lack information about the periphery, they may benefit from ceding autonomy to tax‐collecting intermediaries to encourage fiscal performance. As information quality improves, rulers become better able to monitor and sanction local officials, allowing them to tighten control over taxation and establish more direct state presence. Centralization, in turn, encourages investment in improving fiscal legibility, leading to long‐term divergence in state development. We study the consequences of a technological innovation that dramatically improved the Spanish Crown's fiscal legibility in colonial Mexico: the discovery of the patio process to refine silver. We show that political centralization differentially accelerated in affected districts and that these areas subsequently saw disproportionate state investment in informational capacity, altering the trajectory of state development.

Abstract This article advances a novel argument about the policy output of international organizations (IOs) by highlighting the role of individual staffers. We approach them as purposive actors carrying heterogeneous ideological biases that materially shape their policy choices on the job. Pursuing this argument with an empirical focus on the International Monetary Fund (IMF), we collected individual‐level information on the careers of 835 IMF “mission chiefs”—staffers with primary responsibility for a particular member state—and matched them to newly coded data on more than 15,000 IMF‐mandated policy conditions over the 1980–2016 period. Leveraging the appointment of the same mission chief to different countries throughout their career, we find that individual staffers influence the number, scope, and content of IMF conditions according to their personal ideological biases. These results contribute to our understanding of the microfoundations behind IO output and have implications for the accountability and legitimacy of IOs.

Public sector audits are key to state capacity. However, they can create unintended distortions. Regression discontinuity analysis from Chile shows that audits lowered the use of auctions for public procurement, reduced supplier competition, and increased the likelihood of small, local, and incumbent firms winning contracts. Looking inside the black box of the audit process reveals that relative to comparable direct contracts, auctions underwent more than twice as many checks and led to twice as many detected infractions. These findings show that standard audit protocols can mechanically discourage the use of more regulated, complex, and transparent procedures involving more auditable steps. (JEL H57, H83, O17)

Abstract Ethnic identities around the world are deeply intertwined with modern statehood, yet the extent to which territorial governance has shaped ethnic groups is empirically unknown. I argue that governments at the national and subnational levels have incentives to bias governance in favor of large groups. The resulting disadvantages for ethnic minorities motivate their assimilation and emigration. Both gradually align ethnic groups with administrative borders. I examine the result of this process at subnational administrative borders across sub‐Saharan Africa and use credibly exogenous, straight borders for causal identification. I find substantive increases in the local population share of administrative units' predominant ethnic group at units' borders. Powerful traditional authorities and size advantages of predominant groups increase this effect. Data on minority assimilation and migration show that both drive the shaping of ethnic groups along administrative borders. These results highlight important effects of the territorial organization of modern governance on ethnic groups.

In many theories of electoral accountability, voters learn about an incumbent’s quality by observing public goods outcomes. But empirical findings are mixed, suggesting that increasing the visibility of these outcomes only sometimes improves accountability. I reconcile these heterogeneous findings by highlighting bureaucrats’ role in the production of public goods. In a simple model of electoral accountability involving a voter, a politician, and a bureaucrat, I show that accountability relationships yield distinct empirical implications at different levels of bureaucratic quality. To illustrate how this model rationalizes otherwise mixed or heterogeneous results, I develop a new research design—a theoretically structured meta-study—to synthesize existing findings. Meta-study evidence on the accountability of Brazilian mayors suggests that a common model of electoral accountability that allows for variation in bureaucratic quality predicts observed heterogeneity in politician and voter behavior and beliefs across multiple studies with distinct samples, treatments, and outcomes.

Abstract Well-functioning courts are essential for the health of both financial and real economies. Courts function poorly in most lower-income countries, but the root causes of poor performance are not well understood. We use field experiments with ongoing cases to analyse sources of dysfunction in Mexico’s largest labour court. We provide parties with personalized predictions for case outcomes and show that this information nearly doubles settlement rates and reduces average case duration. The experiment generates the first experimental evidence in live court cases that reducing information asymmetries results in a decrease in delay, an outcome predicted by many theories of bargaining. We also find that the information treatment is effective only when the plaintiff is present to receive it directly, suggesting agency issues between plaintiffs and their private lawyers. For most workers, the treatment appears to improve welfare, as measured by discounted payouts and ability to pay bills.

Abstract How do rulers soften resistance by local powerholders to state‐building efforts? This paper highlights a strategy of compensation, where elites receive government offices in exchange for relinquishing their localist interests, and become uprooted and integrated into the national political system as stakeholders. We explore this strategy in the context of the Northern Wei Dynasty of China (386–534 CE) that terminated an era of state weakness during which aristocrats exercised local autonomy through strongholds. Exploiting a comprehensive state‐building reform in the late fifth century, we find that aristocrats from previously autonomous localities were disproportionately recruited into the bureaucracy as compensation for accepting stronger state presence. Three mechanisms of bureaucratic compensation facilitated state‐building. Offices received by those aristocrats: (1) carried direct benefits, (2) realigned their interests toward the ruler, and (3) mitigated credible commitment problems. Our findings shed light on the “First Great Divergence” between Late Antiquity Europe and Medieval China.

Abstract Political elites must know and rely faithfully on the public will to be democratically responsive. Recent work on elite perceptions of public opinion shows that reelection‐motivated politicians systematically misperceive the opinions of their constituents to be more conservative than they are. We extend this work to a larger and broader set of unelected political elites such as lobbyists, civil servants, journalists, and the like, and report alternative empirical findings. These unelected elites hold similarly inaccurate perceptions about public opinion, though not in a single ideological direction. We find this elite population exhibits egocentrism bias, rather than partisan confirmation bias, as their perceptions about others' opinions systematically correspond to their own policy preferences. Thus, we document a remarkably consistent false consensus effect among unelected political elites, which holds across subsamples by party, occupation, professional relevance of party affiliation, and trust in party‐aligned information sources.

The allocation of decision‐making power is a critical choice that organizations make to mitigate agency problems and information frictions. This paper investigates the role of delegation for organizations where the agency problem is both pervasive and has potentially high welfare consequences: state‐owned enterprises (SOEs). I use a natural experiment in India to uncover the causal effects of granting SOE managers more autonomy over strategic decisions. Managers meaningfully exercise this autonomy, which results in greater value added, but also a reduced emphasis on outcomes valued by the government, such as a reduction in worker amenities (employee housing), and an increase in markups. Returns to autonomy are higher for firms with higher baseline incentive conflict.

How do radical reforms shape economic development over time? In 1790, the French Constituent Assembly overhauled the kingdom’s organization to establish new local capitals. In some departments, the choice of local capitals over rival candidate cities was plausibly exogenous. We study how changes in administrative presence affect state capacity and development in the ensuing decades. In the short run, administrative proximity increases taxation and investments in law enforcement. In the long run, capitals obtain more public goods and grow faster. Our results shed light on the dynamic impacts of state building following one of history’s most ambitious administrative reforms. (JEL D70, H41, H71, O18, O43)

Abstract Although most local elections are officially nonpartisan, a debate exists regarding how much ideology matters in local politics. I test the effects of national polarization toward policing at the local level using a conjoint survey experiment and novel observational data. I find that police union endorsements send clear ideological signals about mayoral candidates to voters and voters respond accordingly: liberal (conservative) respondents are significantly less (more) likely to vote for police union‐endorsed candidates. I create a new dataset of police union endorsements in every mayoral election in American cities with populations above 180,000 between 2011 and 2022. I find police union endorsements have significant negative effects on incumbent vote share in liberal cities at the same time as polarization occurs nationally. This evidence suggests that when national politics polarize on a local issue, ideology becomes an important component in local politics and that police union endorsements now inform about local candidate ideology.

Most research on biased public sector hiring highlights local politicians’ incentives to distribute government positions to partisan supporters. Other studies instead point to the role of bureaucratic managers in allocating government jobs to close contacts. We jointly consider the relative importance of each source of biased hiring as an allocation problem between managers and politicians who have different preferences regarding public sector hiring and different abilities to realize those preferences. We develop a theoretical model of each actor’s relative leverage and relative preferences for different types of public sector positions. We empirically examine our theory using the universe of payroll data in Kenyan local governments from 2004 to 2013. We find evidence of both patronage and bureaucratic favoritism, but with different types of bias concentrated in different types of government jobs, as our theory predicts. Our results highlight the inadequacy of examining political patronage alone without incorporating the preferences and leverage of the bureaucratic managers who are intricately involved in hiring processes.

Motivated by the recent anti-corruption campaign in China, this article develops a theory of corruption governance, in which political leaders face a strategic dilemma between boosting economic performance and maintaining officials’ loyalty to the regime. Corruption increases economic rent, which is necessary for maintaining the ruling coalition; however, corruption also erodes popular support for, and officials’ loyalty to, the regime. Political leaders may switch from a permissive model to a punitive model of corruption governance when the institutional loophole and accumulated social grievances due to corruption pose a sufficiently severe threat to the regime. These theoretical predictions are consistent with the empirical evidence of changing patterns of bureaucratic selection, anti-corruption investigations, and machine learning–based analysis of the annual work reports of city governments.

Governments often privatize the administration of regulations to third-party specialists paid for by the regulated parties. We study how the resulting conflict of interest can have unintended consequences for the distributional impacts of regulation. In Massachusetts, the party responsible for hazardous waste contamination must hire a licensed contractor to quantify the environmental severity. We find that contractors’ evaluations favor their clients, exhibiting substantial score bunching just below thresholds that determine government oversight of the remediation. Client favoritism is more pronounced in socioeconomically disadvantaged neighborhoods and is associated with inferior remediation quality, highlighting a novel channel for inequities in pollution exposure. (JEL D63, J15, K32, L51, Q53, R23)

Abstract How does legislature size impact public service provision? Despite the importance of institutional design for democratic governance, the effect of legislative features on citizen welfare remains little understood. In this article, we use a formal model to show that increasing legislature size improves public goods delivery. We argue that changes in bargaining costs depend on whether additional legislators share the executive's party affiliation: More opposition members reduce the equilibrium public goods provision, while more government‐aligned members increase it. We test this theory by exploiting sharp discontinuities in city‐council size in Brazil. We show that an additional city councilor has a 91% chance of belonging to the mayoral coalition, and this significantly improves primary school enrollment and infant mortality rates. To explore possible mechanisms, we surveyed 174 former city councilors and analyzed 346,553 bills proposed between 2005 and 2008. This article has implications for the design of representative institutions.

We leverage plausibly exogenous variation in regional exposure to corruption to provide causal estimates of the impact of local political corruption on terrorist activity for a sample of 175 countries between 1970 and 2018. We find that higher levels of corruption lead to more terrorism. This result is robust to a variety of empirical modifications, including various ways in which we probe the validity of our instrumental variables approach. We also show that corruption adversely affects the provision of public goods and undermines counter-terrorism capacity. Thus, our empirical findings are consistent with predictions from a game-theoretical representation of terrorism, according to which corruption makes terrorism relatively more attractive compared to peaceful contestation, while also decreasing the costs of organizing and carrying out terrorist attacks.

At the turn of the twentieth century, most cities in America featured a patronage-based system of governance, but over the next few decades, patronage was replaced by civil service. Civil service restructured the relationship between elected officials and government employees, with employees benefiting from a variety of new protections. Yet in studying this change, scholars have largely ignored the role local employees themselves might have played in the transformation. We argue that city employees stood to benefit from civil service, and in places where they had agency and clout, they were important drivers of its adoption. We collected a dataset for more than 1,000 municipal governments, determining whether and when they adopted civil service and whether their employees were organized in an occupational organization. Our analysis of these new data shows the influence of city employees was an important contributor to the spread of civil service in American local government.

Governments face many constraints in attracting talented managers to the public sector, which often lacks high-powered incentives. In this paper, we study how a civil service reform in Chile changed the effectiveness of a vital group of public sector managers: school principals. First, we estimate principal effectiveness by using an extension of the canonical teacher value-added model. Then we evaluate the effect of the reform on principal effectiveness using a difference-in-differences approach. We find that public schools appointed more effective managers and improved their students’ outcomes after increasing the competitiveness and transparency of their selection process. (JEL D73, H83, I21, J24, J45, O15)

Abstract Are banks sensitive to risk and reward in following global corporate transparency rules? Using a worldwide field experiment, this study evaluates competing predictions from expected utility, behavioralist, and institutionalist accounts. We incorporated a dozen companies around the world to make over 15,000 email solicitations asking for corporate accounts from 5000 of the world's internationally connected banks. Treatments randomize the risk profiles of different companies—by their countries’ association with corruption, terrorism, and tax evasion—and vary rewards by stating differing amounts of business revenues. The outcomes are the rates at which banks offer accounts and comply with rules on customer identification. The results suggest that banks are moderately responsive to risk—though not reward—but the magnitude of the effects is small, providing mixed evidence for conventional models and suggestive support for institutionalist accounts.

Abstract We introduce a typology of election administration harms and apply it to empirically study the consequences of ballot design. Our typology distinguishes between individual, electoral, and systemic harms. Together, it clarifies why ballot design can be a particular vulnerability in election administration. Using both ballot‐level and precinct‐level data, we revisit Florida's 2018 United States Senate race, in which Broward County's ballot design flouted federal guidelines and, according to critics, was pivotal to the outcome. We estimate that Broward's ballot design induced roughly 25,000 voters to undervote in a race determined by about 10,000 votes and that these excess undervotes were concentrated among low‐information voters. Broward's ballot did not, however, affect the outcome of the election. Nonetheless, flawed ballot designs are still concerning in an age of voter distrust. Given the risk that flawed ballots can cause systemic harm, we offer a roadmap for procedural reforms to improve ballot design.

Abstract Two of the founding principles of representative governments—the independence of elected representatives and popular accountability—are notoriously in tension. The more independent representatives are, the less citizens can exercise control over them. This article defends an institutional proposal—semi‐directed mandates—aiming to capture the main concerns of both advocates and critics of imperative mandates and to strike a better balance between independence and accountability than the one usually prevailing in contemporary representative governments. The proposal consists of (i) asking candidates or parties to put forward key priorities before the election; (ii) allowing voters to give a more specific mandate to their representatives, and (iii) allowing them to revoke the mandate in case of betrayal of key promises unless they can offer convincing justifications for departing from their mandate. More flexible than the traditional imperative mandate, this proposal also preserves the benefits of a partial division of political labor. It, therefore, seems better suited to the typical circumstances of mass democracies.

This article challenges the common assumption that the partisan identification of bureaucratic elites is fixed over time. Building on principal-agent and organization theory, we hypothesize that bureaucratic elites may respond to political turnover by adjusting their partisan identification toward that of their (new) elected principals. We test this prediction using data from the American State Administrators Project (ASAP) over the 1964–2008 period, which allows us to study the same US agency leaders (N=951 individuals) before and after partisan shifts in their agency’s elected principals. We find significant evidence that agency leaders remaining in office following a shift in the party in power on average reorient their partisan identity in response to such turnover events. These adjustments are stronger for agency leaders directly appointed by, or in more frequent contact with, their elected principals. Our results suggest a malleability of partisanship seldom attributed to bureaucratic elites in public and academic discourse.

How does politics affect, and possibly distort, how resources are allocated? I show that where the federal government provides public goods and financial assistance depends not only on who has power within Congress but also on the characteristics of their constituents. In a federal system like the United States, the central government provides resources by allocating grants to subnational governments based on demographic characteristics. Thus, to maximize funding for their states, members of Congress must also distribute funding to states with similar characteristics. Using panel data on education spending and a difference-in-differences design, I demonstrate that grants disproportionately benefit states represented by Senate committee chairs, but this benefit spills over to similar states. However, I find no evidence of committee influence over grants in the House. These findings contribute to our understanding of distributive politics and shed light on the consequences of allocating resources within a federal system.

Abstract Diversity can pose fundamental challenges to state building and development. The Tanzanian Ujamaa policy—one of post-colonial Africa’s largest state-building experiments—addressed these challenges by resettling a diverse population in planned villages, where children received political education. We combine differences in exposure to Ujamaa across space and age to identify long-term impacts of the policy. Analysis of contemporary surveys shows persistent, positive effects on national identity and perceived state legitimacy. Our preferred interpretation, supported by evidence that considers alternative hypotheses, is that changes to educational content drive our results. Our findings also point to trade-offs associated with state building: while the policy contributed to establishing the new state as a legitimate central authority, exposure to Ujamaa lowered demands for democratic accountability and did not increase generalized inter-ethnic trust.

What is the efficacy of redrawing school attendance boundaries as a desegregation policy? To provide causal evidence on this question, we employ novel data with unprecedented detail on the universe of Danish children and exploit changes in attendance boundaries over time. Households defy reassignments to schools with lower socioeconomic status. There is a strong social gradient in defiance, as resourceful households are more sensitive to the student composition of new schools. We simulate school assignment policies and find that boundary changes that reassign areas to a highly disadvantaged school are ineffective at altering the socioeconomic composition at the disadvantaged school. (JEL D31, H75, I21, I24, I28, R23)

Abstract Scholars increasingly recognize the plurality of leaders who exercise de facto authority in governing communities. But what limits different leaders’ power to organize distinct types of collective action beyond the law? We contend that leaders’ influence varies by activity, depending on the degree to which the activity matches the leaders’ geographic scope and field of expertise (“domain congruence”). Employing conjoint endorsement experiments in Kenya, Malawi, and Zambia, we test whether domain congruence predicts citizens’ willingness to comply with leader requests across different activities and examine the mechanisms that explain its importance. We find limits on leaders’ authority, that the concept of domain congruence helps predict the activities over which leaders have the greatest influence, and that leaders’ domain legitimacy may underpin the relationship between domain congruence and authority.

Governments across the Global South have decentralized a degree of power to municipal authorities. Are local officials sufficiently knowledgeable about how to execute their expanded portfolio of responsibilities? Past studies have focused on whether citizens lack the requisite information to hold local officials accountable. We instead draw on extensive fieldwork and a novel survey of small-town politicians in India to show that local officials themselves have distressingly low levels of procedural knowledge on how to govern. We further show that procedural knowledge shapes the capabilities of officials to represent their constituents and that asymmetries in knowledge may blunt the representative potential of these bodies. Finally, we show that winning office does not provide an institutionalized pathway to knowledge acquisition, highlighting the need for policy-based solutions. Our findings demonstrate the importance of assessing knowledge deficits among politicians, and not only citizens, to make local governance work.

We study the effectiveness of pay-and-chase lawsuits and upfront regulations for combating health care fraud. Between 2003 and 2017, Medicare spent $7.7 billion on 37.5 million regularly scheduled ambulance rides for patients traveling to and from dialysis facilities even though many did not satisfy Medicare's criteria for receiving reimbursements. Using an identification strategy based on the staggered timing of regulations and lawsuits across the US, we find that adding a prior authorization requirement for ambulance reimbursements reduced spending much more than pursuing criminal and civil litigation did on their own. We find no evidence that prior authorization affected patients' health.

Theories of political control of the bureaucracy place conflict between agencies and political principals, or between political principals themselves, at the center of bureaucratic politics. Important scholarship develops measures of agency ideology to characterize this conflict. However, much of what federal agencies do is not ideological. Furthermore, some agencies have ideological missions about which Republicans and Democrats often agree. In this short article, I develop a novel measure of partisan disagreement to illustrate variation in the magnitude of partisan conflict faced by 93 agencies. I show that this measure captures partisan conflict not revealed by estimates of agency ideology and that agencies with extreme ideology estimates may face low or moderate partisan conflict. I conclude that empirical tests of theories of political control of the bureaucracy should take a more realistic approach to characterizing partisan conflict faced by federal agencies.

We study the human capital effects of access to elite bureaucratic jobs in Taiwan, where performance on an examination determines entry into the civil service. Historically, quotas for successful applicants were set based on the 1948 populations of individuals’ native provinces in mainland China. This resulted in a higher probability of success on the exam—and, thus, greater access to elite positions—for descendants of certain migrant groups. These preferential quotas were replaced in 1962 with a uniform admissions policy. Using this variation, we find that the incentives created by preferential quotas increased human capital and improved long-run economic outcomes. (JEL D73, H83, J24, J45, M51)

Abstract Are corruption trials that involve the highest ranks in the public sphere and large private companies biased against some groups? Existing research predominantly focuses on corruption prosecutions of politicians, leaving unresolved the extent to which judges apply differential treatment when convicting and sentencing the political class compared to other defendants, including those in the private sector. To address this gap, we investigate judicial bias within Brazil's famous “Operação Lava Jato,” the largest corruption investigation carried out in history. Leveraging an original database that traces the trajectory of the universe of the 3154 cases of Lava Jato, we show that judges' sentencing decisions were not governed by a partisan logic. Instead, judges were more inclined to impose longer prison times and higher fines to elected politicians when compared to all other defendants, particularly those from the private sector. We interpret these findings as evidence of antipolitical class bias .

Private donors contributed more than $350 million to local election officials to support the administration of the 2020 election. Supporters argue these grants were neutral and necessary to maintain normal election operations during the pandemic, while critics worry these grants mostly went to Democratic strongholds and tilted election outcomes. How much did these grants shape the 2020 presidential election? To answer this question, we collect administrative data on private election administration grants and election outcomes. We then use advances in synthetic control methods to compare presidential election results and turnout in counties that received grants to counties with similar election results and turnout before 2020. While Democratic counties were more likely to apply for a grant, we find that the grants did not have a noticeable effect on the presidential election. Our estimates of the average effect on Democratic vote share range from 0.03 to 0.36 percentage points. Our estimates of the average effect of receiving a grant on turnout range from 0.03 to 0.14 percentage points. Across specifications, our 95% CIs typically include negative effects and all fail to include effects on Democratic vote share larger than 0.58 percentage points and effects on turnout larger than 0.40 percentage points. We characterize the magnitude of our effects by asking how large they are compared to the margin by which Biden won the 2020 election. In simple bench-marking exercises, we find that the effects of the grants were likely too small to have changed the outcome of the 2020 presidential election.

Do residency requirements change bureaucratic performance?We study the case of municipal police departments.While residency rules were popular in the 1970s, many cities and states abolished these policies in the 1990s and early 2000s.Drawing from an original survey and local archival sources, we hand collect data on the police residency laws of nearly 800 of the largest municipalities in the U.S. over the past three decades.We then test competing theoretical predictions about how these rules impact the racial composition of city police forces and the probability of fatal police-civilian encounters.Using a two-way fixed effects design, we find that residency requirements modestly improve police diversity, but fatal encounters are actually more likely when residency requirements are in place.This study provides the most credible evidence to date that residency rules do little to improve police performance and may not offer a particularly fruitful avenue for reform.

Democracy promises accountability via elections; bureaucracy promises coordination via hierarchy. Many scholars believe these properties conflict. We prove, however, that accountability is precisely what unifies democracy and meritocratic (Weberian) bureaucracy. Central to the concept of meritocracy are performance reviews. We prove that a review system where all individuals and groups are accountable must also be democratic. Thus, meritocratic hierarchy, accountability, and democracy are intertwined. But accountability in modern political systems confronts a significant issue. Such systems include many knowledge-intensive specialties, and since specializations are limited to some but not all members of an institution, the full accountability of democracies entails review of specialists by amateurs. We prove that modern political systems necessarily exhibit this tension. It is a hallmark of modern institutions rather than a problem to be solved.

Migrant labor exploitation is widespread in developed countries, which host growing populations of undocumented migrants. While denouncing by migrants is essential to prosecute exploitative employers, an undocumented community actively hiding from the state is unlikely to whistleblow. I consider an intervention providing migrant farmworkers in Italy information and incentives to report on their racketeers. I leverage the staggered rollout of the intervention to study its effects in a difference-in-differences framework. The intervention empowered migrants to whistleblow, increased the prosecution of criminal organizations responsible for racketeering migrants, and raised awareness among natives, who became more favorable toward immigration and parties supporting it. These findings highlight the conditions under which undocumented migrants can take political action for their socioeconomic advancement. Unlike other integration policies which have been shown to backlash, highlighting migrants’ vulnerability to exploitation might foster solidarity and more liberal immigration attitudes among natives.

This paper examines whether the civil service system protected state bureaucrats from political interference following a recall petition against the governor of Wisconsin. I find that most classified workers, who were covered by the state civil service laws, were paid equally by signing status following the public disclosure of the petition list. Conversely, signers in the unclassified service, a smaller set of government positions, were paid about 3 percent less annually relative to nonsigners in the postdisclosure period. These results indicate that the civil service insulated qualified bureaucrats, while uncovered workers faced retribution. (JEL D72, D73, H75, H83, J31, J45)

Abstract We develop a theory of policy advice that focuses on the relationship between the competence of the advisor (e.g., an expert bureaucracy) and the quality of advice that the leader may expect. We describe important tensions between these features present in a wide class of substantively important circumstances. These tensions point to the presence of a trade‐off between receiving advice more often and receiving more informative advice. The optimal realization of this trade‐off for the leader sometimes induces her to prefer advisors of limited competence—a preference that, we show, is robust under different informational assumptions. We consider how institutional tools available to leaders affect preferences for advisor competence and the quality of advice they may expect to receive in equilibrium.

Abstract The disadvantages experienced by minorities and lack of societal remedies are partly attributable to native‐majority citizens’ limited awareness of minority hardships. We investigate whether informing citizens about field‐experimental audits on ethno‐racial discrimination increases their recognition of the issue and support for equal‐treatment policies. Extending a largely US‐centric research frontier, we focus on beliefs about discrimination faced by Muslims in Denmark. To further comprehension, we test three types of framing: a scientist stressing credibility, a lawyer emphasizing the legal breach, or a minority expressing grief. Our survey experiment ( n = 4,800) shows that citizens are generally aware of discrimination and tend to overperceive its extent. Communicating audit evidence corrects misperceptions but does not change recognition or policy support, regardless of framing or initial misperception. Only combining priming, correction, and framing temporarily increases recognition and donations to support groups. These findings suggest that audit‐based awareness campaigns have limited immediate success beyond donations acknowledging minority hardships.

Abstract Housing shortages and rising rents have increased demands for affordable housing. In this paper, we examine whether electoral constraints can undermine local politicians' incentives to build public housing. Empirically, we draw on the full‐count census of all housing built in Germany, data on 19,685 local elections between 1989 and 2011, and an original survey. Using a difference‐in‐differences design, we demonstrate that incumbents are not rewarded, but rather experience moderate electoral losses after constructing new public housing. We then show that these losses are not primarily driven by homeowner opposition or native–foreigner competition. Instead, electoral punishment is largest in economically disadvantaged municipalities with relatively affordable housing, as voters prioritize spending in other local policy areas that are crowded out by public housing. Survey evidence demonstrates that electoral constraints emerge when voters' short‐term spending preferences conflict with municipalities' long‐term goals to provide affordable housing.

Abstract Formal presidential authority does not always translate into real influence over policy outcomes: The bureaucratic actors that are responsible for policy implementation have considerable discretion. Presidents, however, have tools to influence their behavior. In this paper, we focus on presidential control of intra‐executive information flows . We show how the President's power to persuade depends on inter‐branch relations and intra‐branch institutions. We develop a theory in which the President can shape information available to bureaucratic subordinates via both overt, legitimate channels as well as covert, illegitimate interventions. We find that the President's ability to persuade bureaucrats to pursue her preferred goals can be reinforced by higher bureaucratic independence or more aggressive external oversight. We also show how bureaucratic independence mediates how overseer motivations translate into oversight intensity. Our theory predicts that Congress' investigative resources should target more independent agencies under divided government and less independent agencies under unified government.

The US federal government routinely commissions policy research from the private sector, and this research, in turn, often forms an evidence base for future policy decisions. Given its potential to influence the policymaking process, I argue that the procurement power over research production is a previously unappreciated tool in the president’s policy arsenal. Focusing on federally funded policy research and using an original dataset of federal procurement from 2000 to 2019, I explore how government-funded research can enhance a president’s prospects for accomplishing political goals. The analysis shows that agencies that are prioritized by the president award larger research contracts. Further, new presidential administrations are more likely to discontinue research initiated by their predecessors. The implication is that policy research commissioned by the federal government is a commodity for the executive, harnessed in service of political agendas.

How does elite rhetoric emphasizing women’s presence in government affect perceptions that government substantively represents women? Building on past work on women’s representation and framing effects, this article tests how subtle changes in political communications spotlighting a group’s presence in government signal that government has prioritized the group’s welfare. We first draw on original panel data on federal employee gender between 1973 and 2020, showing that women remain underrepresented in the bureaucracy despite efforts by presidents to trumpet recent gains. In preregistered and replicated experiments, we show presenting statistics on federal agencies’ gender compositions in terms of women’s job shares (e.g., 20% of an agency’s jobs are “held by women”) rather than logically equivalent information emphasizing men (e.g., 80% “held by men”) increases beliefs that government represents women’s interests. Elites can impart the impression of substantive representation by arbitrarily altering rhetoric concerning descriptive representation.

Mobile instant messaging is widely used in governing circles today. This article considers the implications for political legitimacy, examining how far the technology encourages those in authority to act consistently with the obligations that come with their roles. It looks at several recent political scandals in which officeholders are alleged to have transgressed public norms with their use of instant messaging. It goes on to argue that the concerns raised are well grounded, as the affordances of the technology point to personalized, informal, and untransparent modes of rule. As the final section argues, that figures in public authority embrace the technology despite the scandals it can yield tells us something important about their political priorities, in particular their willingness to prize output over procedural legitimacy.

Abstract Public health systems are dominant in much of the world but often face fiscal constraints that lead to rationing of care. As a result, private sector healthcare providers could in theory beneficially supplement public systems, but evaluating the benefits of private alternatives has been challenging. We evaluate a private supplement to the free public health system for one of the world’s deadliest health problems, diabetes. We estimate enormous impacts of the private supplement, increasing the share of those treated who are under control by 69%. This effect arises through both improved treatment compliance and health behavior. We find diabetes complications fall in the short run, and that the net costs of this intervention are one-third of the gross costs. The returns to private care do not appear to reflect more productive delivery but rather more attachment to medical care, offering lessons for improving the public system.

Abstract After a drug obtains marketing authorisation, the usage depends on the regulation of off-label prescriptions for unapproved indications. We investigate the impact of off-label prescription regulation on physicians’ behaviour, patients’ health, treatment costs, and pharmaceutical firms’ pricing with a structural demand and supply model. Exploiting rich panel data on physicians’ activities and office visits in France over 9 years, we use a model of prescription choice and health outcomes with unobserved patient-level heterogeneity. We identify the demand for on-label and off-label drugs and the effect of prescription choice on health outcomes. On the supply side, we use a Nash-in-Nash bargaining model between the government and the pharmaceutical companies that allows the partial identification of the marginal costs of drugs. Counterfactual simulations show that when we remove off-label drugs from the choice set of physicians, substitution to on-label drugs at constant prices would lead to an increase of 15% in the expenditure on prescription drugs. If we allow bargaining adjustment on drug prices under a ban on off-label prescriptions, the ban would further increase the treatment cost, by 26%, without improving health outcomes.

Abstract The tendency for political appointees to assimilate into the bureaucratic agencies that they lead is a recurring source of tension between appointees and the executives who appoint them. This paper employs a formal model to explore how appointees come around to the views of the civil servants whom they oversee. We conceptualize a bureaucrat as providing a cheap‐talk message about privately known, policy‐relevant conditions to an appointee who uses that information to update her beliefs and set two types of policy. Though the bureaucrat's and appointee's preferences are aligned conditional on beliefs, the appointee's prior beliefs about the likelihood of various states of the world differ from the bureaucrat's. In equilibrium, truthful reporting and inducing belief convergence may be at odds and we identify when the bureaucrat will strategically choose to issue false reports. We apply the model's insights to the budget process and agency recommendations during the COVID‐19 pandemic.

The meritocratic recruitment of bureaucrats is thought to promote “Weberian” values through two distinct properties. The first concerns the use of examinations to sort aspirants on the basis of traits considered desirable for bureaucrats. The second relates to nondiscretionary selection, whereby recruits do not owe their position to a politician’s patronage, making them less likely to be captured. Using a lab-in-the-field experiment among aspirants to the Indonesian bureaucracy, I disentangle the relative importance of these mechanisms by manipulating how “public officials” are chosen from groups to perform tasks on behalf of others. I find no differences on tasks gauging commitment to Weberian values across public officials selected via the merit system or lotteries—although both perform better than those selected under patronage. Because both the merit system and lotteries are nondiscretionary, the results question examinations as the ideal tool for selecting bureaucrats.

Discriminatory treatment of minorities by bureaucrats remains a serious challenge. A dominant explanation argues that bureaucrats discriminate because of high workloads in public organizations, but few empirical studies test this outside the lab. In this study, I investigate whether workload matters for discrimination in a real-world public service context during the COVID-19 pandemic in Denmark in 2020. I document that unemployment services experienced a substantial increase in workload due to a 20% rise in unemployment and exploit the fact that the increase happened suddenly and spread asymmetrically. I use microlevel register data on bureaucrat–client interactions on more than 380,000 unemployed and examine whether bureaucrats provided fewer services to citizens of non-Western descent. The finding reveals that the substantial workload associated with the COVID-19 pandemic did not lead to increased discrimination. I discuss the special circumstances associated with the COVID-19 pandemic and the possible role of professional norms and access to information.

Abstract Recent scholarship has suggested that artificial intelligence (AI) technology and autocratic regimes may be mutually reinforcing. We test for a mutually reinforcing relationship in the context of facial-recognition AI in China. To do so, we gather comprehensive data on AI firms and government procurement contracts, as well as on social unrest across China since the early 2010s. We first show that autocrats benefit from AI: local unrest leads to greater government procurement of facial-recognition AI as a new technology of political control, and increased AI procurement indeed suppresses subsequent unrest. We show that AI innovation benefits from autocrats’ suppression of unrest: the contracted AI firms innovate more both for the government and commercial markets and are more likely to export their products; noncontracted AI firms do not experience detectable negative spillovers. Taken together, these results suggest the possibility of sustained AI innovation under the Chinese regime: AI innovation entrenches the regime, and the regime’s investment in AI for political control stimulates further frontier innovation.

We examine the impact of public sector salary disclosure laws on university faculty salaries in Canada. The laws, which enable public access to the salaries of individual faculty if they exceed specified thresholds, were introduced in different provinces at different times. Using detailed administrative data covering the majority of faculty in Canada, and an event-study research design that exploits within-province variation in exposure to the policy across institutions and academic departments, we find robust evidence that the laws reduced the gender pay gap between men and women by approximately 20–40 percent. (JEL I23, J16, J31, J44, K31)

Bureaucrats implement policy. How important are they for a state’s productivity? And do the trade-offs between policies depend on their effectiveness? Using data on 16 million public purchases in Russia, we show that 39 percent of the variation in prices paid for narrowly defined items is due to the individual bureaucrats and organizations who manage procurement. Low-price buyers also display higher spending quality. Theory suggests that such differences in effectiveness can be pivotal for policy design. To illustrate, we show that a common one—bid preferences for domestic suppliers—substantially improves procurement performance, but only when implemented by ineffective bureaucrats. (JEL D73, H57, H83, L14, P26)

We conduct a large-scale, nondeceptive field experiment to elicit preferences for government participation in China's venture capital and private equity market. Our main result is that the average firm dislikes investors with government ties. We show that such dislike is not present with government-owned firms and that this dislike is highest with best-performing firms. Additional results and surveys suggest that political interference in decision-making is the leading reason why government investors are unattractive to private firms. Overall, our findings point to the limits of a model of “state capitalism” that strongly relies on the complementarity between private firms and government capital to drive high-growth entrepreneurship and innovation.

Government regulations are often imperfectly enforced by public officials. In this study, we exploit the introduction of air pollution monitors in China to investigate whether real-time monitoring of policy outcomes affects the enforcement of existing regulations. Using assignment criteria established by the central government and new georeferenced data on local enforcement activities, we show that monitoring (i) increases enforcement against local firms, (ii) improves the targeting of enforcement, and (iii) reduces aggregate pollution. These effects are driven by officials facing performance incentives and are stronger when there is limited scope for data manipulation, suggesting that real-time monitoring improves top-down accountability. (JEL K32, L51, O13, P25, P28, Q52, Q53)

We test between cooperative and extractive theories of the origins of government. We use river shifts in southern Iraq as a natural experiment, in a new archeological panel dataset. A shift away creates a local demand for a government to coordinate because private river irrigation needs to be replaced with public canals. It disincentivizes local extraction as land is no longer productive without irrigation. Consistent with a cooperative theory of government, a river shift away led to state formation, canal construction, and the payment of tribute. We argue that the first governments coordinated between extended households which implemented public good provision. (JEL D72, H11, H41, N45, N55, Q15)

Abstract We study the consequences of populism for economic performance and the quality of bureaucracy. When voters lose trust in representative democracy, populists strategically supply unconditional policy commitments that are easier to monitor for voters. When in power, populists try to implement their policy commitments regardless of financial constraints and expert assessment of the feasibility of their policies, worsening government economic performance and dismantling resistance from expert bureaucrats. With novel data on more than 8,000 Italian municipalities covering more than 20 years, we estimate the effect of electing a populist mayor with a close‐election regression discontinuity design. We find that the election of a populist mayor leads to smaller repayments of debts, a larger share of procurement contracts with cost overruns, higher turnover among top bureaucrats—driven by forced rather than voluntary departures—and a sharp decrease in the percentage of postgraduate bureaucrats.

We explore how the Patent Office may improve the quality of issued patents on "secondary" drug features by giving examiners more time to review drug-patent applications. Our findings suggest that current time allocations are causing examiners to issue low quality secondary patents on the margin. To assess the merits of expanding ex ante scrutiny of drug-patent applications at the agency, we set forth estimates of the various gains and losses associated with giving examiners more time, including reduced downstream litigation costs and added personnel expenses, along with both the static gains and dynamic innovation losses associated with earlier generic entry.

Subjective performance evaluation could induce influence activities: employees might devote too much effort to pleasing their evaluator, relative to working toward the goals of the organization itself. We conduct a randomized field experiment among Chinese local civil servants to study the existence and implications of influence activities. We find that civil servants do engage in evaluator-specific influence to affect evaluation outcomes, partly in the form of reallocating work efforts toward job tasks that are more important and observable to the evaluator. Importantly, we show that introducing uncertainty about the evaluator’s identity discourages evaluator-specific influence activities and improves bureaucratic work performance. (JEL D73, H83, J45, M54, O17, O18, P25)

Abstract We estimate the push and pull factors involved in the outmigration of Jews facing persecution in Nazi Germany from 1933 to 1941. Our empirical investigation makes use of a unique individual-level data set that records the migration history of the Jewish community in Germany over the period. Our analysis highlights new channels, specific to violent contexts, through which social networks affect the decision to flee. We estimate a structural model of migration where individuals base their migration decision on the observation of persecution and migration among their peers. Identification rests on exogenous variations in local push and pull factors across peers who live in different cities of residence. Then we perform various experiments of counterfactual history to quantify how migration restrictions in destination countries affected the fate of Jews. For example, removing work restrictions for refugees in the recipient countries after the Nuremberg Laws (1935) would have led to an increase in Jewish migration out of Germany in the range of 12% to 20% and a reduction in mortality due to prevented deportations in the range of 6% to 10%.

Work requirements are common in US safety net programs. Evidence remains limited, however, on the extent to which work requirements increase economic self-sufficiency or screen out vulnerable individuals. Using linked administrative data on food stamps (SNAP) and earnings with a regression discontinuity design, we find robust evidence that work requirements increase program exits by 23 percentage points (64 percent) among incumbent participants. Overall program participation among adults who are subject to work requirements is reduced by 53 percent. Homeless adults are disproportionately screened out. We find no effects on employment and suggestive evidence of increased earnings in some specifications. (JEL H75, I18, I32, I38, J22, J31)

Abstract We study a model of the rise and fall of illiberal democracies. Voters value both liberty and economic security. In times of crisis, voters may prefer to elect an illiberal government that, by violating constitutional constraints, offers greater economic security but less liberty. However, violating these constraints allows the government to manipulate information, in turn reducing electoral accountability. We show how elements of liberal constitutions induce voters to elect illiberal governments that remain in power for inefficiently long—including forever. We derive insights into what makes constitutions stable against the rise of illiberal governments. We extend the model to allow for illiberal governments to overcome checks and balances and become autocracies. We show that stronger checks and balances are a double-edged sword: they slow down autocratization but may make it more likely. We discuss the empirical relevance of our theoretical framework and its connection to real world examples.

In the United States, elections are often administered by directly elected local officials who run as members of a political party. Do these officials use their office to give their party an edge in elections? Using a newly collected dataset of nearly 5,900 clerk elections and a close-election regression discontinuity design, we compare counties that narrowly elect a Democratic election administrator to those that narrowly elect a Republican. We find that Democrats and Republicans serving similar counties oversee similar election results, turnout, and policies. We also find that reelection is not the primary moderating force on clerks. Instead, clerks may be more likely to agree on election policies across parties than the general public and selecting different election policies may only modestly affect outcomes. While we cannot rule out small effects that nevertheless tip close elections, our results imply that clerks are not typically and noticeably advantaging their preferred party.

We evaluate the effect of rotating inspections carried out by China's central government in 2016 to 2017 in response to the country's air pollution crisis on the environmental performance of targeted cities and coal power plants. Using a staggered difference-in-differences (DID) design, we find that during one-month inspections concentrations of sulfur dioxide (SO₂) at coal power plants in targeted cities are on average lower by 25 to 52% compared to not-yet-inspected cities but revert by 54 to 62% on average once scrutiny ends. Following inspections, SO₂ pollution increases more quickly at state-owned plants accountable to the central government, compared to state-owned plants accountable to the local (city or below) government. Our results suggest that for most plants SO₂ concentration changes during inspections may have been due primarily to the operation of end-of-pipe SO₂ removal devices, while following inspections local state-owned plants may have reduced output.

We compare how in-kind food assistance and an electronic voucher-based program affect the delivery of aid in practice. The Government of Indonesia randomized across 105 districts the transition from in-kind rice to approximately equivalent electronic vouchers redeemable for rice and eggs at a network of private agents. Targeted households received 46 percent more assistance in voucher areas. For the bottom 15 percent of households at baseline, poverty fell 20 percent. Voucher recipients received higher-quality rice, and increased consumption of eggs. The results suggest moving from a manual in-kind to electronic voucher-based program reduced poverty through increased adherence to program design. (JEL H53, I18, I32, I38, O12)

Abstract Why do some states comply with international agreements while others flout them? In this article, I introduce a previously unconsidered explanation: bureaucratic structure. I develop a rational choice model examining the impact of bureaucratic structure on compliance, suggesting that the existence of several distinct bureaucracies can mute compliance with an international agreement by insulating some bureaucrats from pressure to comply. I examine this theory through newly coded data on a 2001 OECD agreement designed to decrease the percentage of aid that is “tied” to donor‐state products and services—a practice that is popular among special interests but which decreases foreign aid's effectiveness. I find that non–development‐oriented bureaucracies, such as departments of interior, labor, and energy, were significantly less likely to comply with the agreement than traditional development bureaucracies. This aggregates to the state level as well, where states with many aid agencies were less compliant than states with a streamlined bureaucracy.

Abstract Presidents select from a range of instruments when creating new policies through executive action. We study strategic substitution in this context and argue that presidents use less visible means of unilateral instruments when Congress is likely to scrutinize presidential action. Using data on unilateral orders issued between 1946 and 2020, we report two main findings. First, analyzing presidents’ choice of instruments, we show that presidents are more likely to substitute memoranda and other less visible instruments for executive orders and proclamations during periods of divided government. Second, after accounting for the substitution of executive orders with other instruments, we find that presidents issue greater numbers of directives during divided government than during unified government. These findings provide new evidence about the limitations of the separation of powers as a constraint on presidential unilateralism and highlight the importance of accounting for the variety of instruments through which presidents create unilateral policies.

This paper describes the results of a policy experiment conducted in coordination with the Nigerian government. In this experiment, some communities were randomly selected to receive a new doctor. These doctors were posted to the local public health center. Prior to their arrival, health care was provided by midlevel health-care providers (MLP). To separate the effect of (ostensibly higher) quality from that of quantity, another group of communities was provided with an additional midlevel provider. A third group of communities received no additional workers. No other inputs were provided. I find a measurable decrease in mortality in communities assigned a doctor but not in communities assigned an MLP, suggesting that quality in the health-care sector is a significant constraint. (JEL I11, I12, O15, O18)

Reformers are calling for greater oversight of police behavior, in part through enhanced use of civilian complaints. However, others counter that greater oversight could chill effective policing. We assess police officer response to administrative determinations of misconduct. Using Chicago data, we find strong evidence that a sustained allegation reduces that officer’s future misconduct. We find no evidence that this effect is driven by incapacitation, such as assignment to desk duty, or by officer disengagement. We conclude that our findings are most consistent with improved officer conduct, in part from oversight and officer concerns over promotion, salary, and desirable assignments. (JEL H76, J45, K42, M54)

This paper shows that partisan cable news broadcasts have a causal effect on the size and composition of budgets in US localities. Using exogenous channel positioning as an instrument for viewership, we show that exposure to the conservative Fox News channel reduces revenues and expenditures. Multiple mechanisms drive these results: Fox News improves election chances for local Republicans, alters politician campaign agendas, and shifts voter policy preferences on fiscal issues. Consistent with the priorities of small-government conservatism, we find evidence that private provision compensates for the reduced public services. The “Fox News effect” extends beyond vote shares to rightward policy shifts. (JEL D72, H71, H72, H75, I20, L82)

Many scholars consider the bargaining power between ruler and society to be one of the most important determinants of a country’s political regime and institutions. The relative bargaining power, in turn, is shaped by arms technology and societal modernization: arms tend to strengthen rulers, and modernization tends to strengthen society. We document that rulers outside of Western Europe were strengthened by advanced arms technology at a time when societies were weakly modernized and political demands limited. We dub this the “coercive imbalance” and argue that it has shaped the state-society bargain outside Western Europe since at least 1850. We show that the coercive imbalance arose because arms diffuse faster than civilian technology. We then use ordinary least squares, system GMM, and two-stage least squares to document that the adoption of advanced arms technology at an early stage of societal modernization is strongly associated with limited democracy, poor bureaucracy, and corruption.

This paper examines the tradeoffs of monitoring for wasteful public spending. By penalizing unnecessary spending, monitoring improves the quality of public expenditure and incentivizes firms to invest in compliance technology. I study a large Medicare program that monitored for unnecessary healthcare spending and consider its effect on government savings, provider behavior, and patient health. Every dollar Medicare spent on monitoring generated $24-29 in government savings. The majority of savings stem from the deterrence of future care, rather than reclaimed payments from prior care. I do not find evidence that the health of the marginal patient is harmed, indicating that monitoring primarily deters low-value care. Monitoring does increase provider administrative costs, but these costs are mostly incurred upfront and include investments in technology to assess the medical necessity of care.

Abstract Policy outcomes are determined not by the words in a statute but by the actions of private citizens. A policy's success or failure depends on how it shapes behavior and how that behavior shapes the future course of policy. To understand this process, we develop a model that combines the political and nonpolitical domains, focusing on competition policy and the regulation of markets. We show how the outcome of a policy change develops over time as firms respond in the market and interact with bureaucratic enforcement. We identify a critical threshold in market structure that determines whether a policy succeeds or fails, and discuss how the design of political institutions affects this level. The threshold represents a balancing of the path dependence of politics with the self‐correcting nature of markets. It establishes when political forces dominate those in markets and, thus, when a policy change has lasting effects on society.

Because the end of the Cold War failed to produce widespread democratic transitions, it is often viewed as having had only a superficial effect on Africa’s authoritarian regimes. We show this sentiment to be incorrect. Focusing on the elite coalitions undergirding autocracies, we argue that the end of the Cold War sparked profound changes in the constellation of alliances within regimes. It was an international event whose ripple effects altered the domestic political landscape and thereby enticed elite coalitions to transform and meet the new existential threat they faced. We demonstrate our argument using cabinets as a proxy for elite coalitions, showing that their composition drastically changed at the end of the Cold War. Africa’s authoritarian leaders dismissed many of the core members of their cabinets and increasingly appointed members of opposition parties to cabinet portfolios. Such changes, we argue, represent the dynamic responses that enabled autocracies to persist.

Why do some, but not all oil-rich states provide generous welfare to their populations? Building on a case study of Oman in the 1960s and 1970s, we argue that anti-systemic subversive threats motivate ruling elites in oil states to use welfare as a tool of mass co-optation. We use the generalized synthetic control method and difference-in-difference regressions for a global quantitative test of our argument, assessing the effect of different types of subversion on a range of long-term welfare outcomes in oil-rich and oil-poor states. We demonstrate that the positive effect of subversion appears limited to center-seeking subversive threats in oil-rich countries. The paper addresses a key puzzle in the literature on resource-rich states, which makes contradictory predictions about the impact of resource rents on welfare provision.

Abstract Does a school district that expands school choice provide better outcomes for students than a neighborhood-based assignment system? This article studies the Zones of Choice (ZOC) program, a school choice initiative of the Los Angeles Unified School District (LAUSD) that created small high school markets in some neighborhoods but left attendance zone boundaries in place throughout the rest of the district. We study market-level effects of choice on student achievement and college enrollment using a difference-in-differences design. Student outcomes in ZOC markets increased markedly, narrowing achievement and college enrollment gaps between ZOC neighborhoods and the rest of the district. The effects of ZOC are larger for schools exposed to more competition, supporting the notion that competition is a key channel. Demand estimates suggest families place substantial weight on schools’ academic quality, providing schools with competition-induced incentives to improve their effectiveness. The evidence demonstrates that public school choice programs have the potential to improve school quality and reduce neighborhood-based disparities in educational opportunity.

Abstract Could perceived relative economic standing affect citizens’ support for political leaders and institutions? We explore this question by examining Pakistan's national unconditional cash transfer program, the Benazir Income Support Program (BISP). Leveraging a regression discontinuity approach using BISP's administrative data and an original survey experiment, we find that perceptions of relative deprivation color citizen reactions to social protection. When citizens do not feel relatively deprived, receiving cash transfers has little sustained effect on individuals’ reported level of support for their political system and its leaders. However, when citizens feel relatively worse off, those receiving cash transfers become more politically satisfied while those denied transfers become more politically disgruntled. Moreover, the magnitude of the reduction in political support among non‐beneficiaries is larger than the magnitude of the increase in political support among beneficiaries. This has important implications for our understanding of the political ramifications of rising perceived inequality.

Are women disadvantaged whilst accessing justice? I chart, for the first time, the full trajectory of accessing justice in India using an original dataset of roughly half a million crime reports, subsequently merged with court files. I demonstrate that particular complaints can be hindered when passing through nodes of the criminal justice system, and illustrate a pattern of “multi-stage” discrimination. In particular, I show that women's complaints are more likely to be delayed and dismissed at the police station and courthouse compared to men. Suspects that female complainants accuse of crime are less likely to be convicted and more likely to be acquitted, an imbalance that persists even when accounting for cases of violence against women (VAW). The application of machine learning to complaints reveals—contrary to claims by policymakers and judges—that VAW, including the extortive crime of dowry, are not “petty quarrels,” but may involve starvation, poisoning, and marital rape. In an attempt to make a causal claim about the impact of complainant gender on verdicts, I utilize topical inverse regression matching, a method that leverages high-dimensional text data. I show that those who suffer from cumulative disadvantage in society may face challenges across sequential stages of seeking restitution or punitive justice through formal state institutions.

In this paper, we explain how presidents strategically invest in administrative capacity, noting that presidents have few incentives to invest effort in capacity building in most agencies. We test our account with two analyses. First, we examine the time it took for the Bush, Obama, Trump, and Biden Administrations to nominate individuals to appointed positions. We find that presidents prioritize appointments to policy over management positions and that nominations occur sooner in agencies that implement presidential priorities. Second, we examine the responses of federal executives to the 2020 Survey on the Future of Government Service to see whether perceptions of presidential investment in administrative capacity match our predictions. We find that federal executives perceive higher levels of investment when the agency is a priority of the president and when the agency shares the president’s policy views. We conclude with implications for our understanding of the modern presidency and government performance.

Skilled foreign-born workers are critical to firms. Yet political or cultural factors can lead governments to restrict skilled immigration. To what extent, and how, does lobbying help firms overcome immigration barriers? This study explores these questions by focusing on the case of US firms and an exogenous increase in H-1B high-skilled visa denial rates following the election of Trump in 2016. I construct an original firm-level data set that combines the universe of US temporary high-skilled visa petitions through 2017 with firms’ immigration lobbying reports and financial information. Leveraging the data and text analysis, I document key stylized facts about US immigration lobbying behavior: who, how, and what firms lobby. Using a difference-in-differences design, I find that firms’ bureaucratic lobbying under the Trump administration reduced denial rates on their visa petitions by at least 4.5 percentage points. These findings bridge existing research on immigration policy making and lobbying effectiveness.

Houston TX experienced a widely known failure of its police forensic laboratory. This gave rise to the Houston Forensic Science Center (HFSC) as a separate entity to provide forensic services to the City of Houston. HFSC is a very large forensic laboratory and has made significant progress at remediating the past failures and improving public trust in forensic testing. HFSC has a large and robust blind testing program, which has provided many insights into the challenges forensic laboratories face. HFSC’s journey from a notoriously failed lab to a model also gives perspective to the resource challenges faced by all labs in the country. Challenges for labs include the pervasive reality of poor-quality evidence. Also that forensic laboratories are necessarily part of a much wider system of interdependent functions in criminal justice making blind testing something in which all parts have a role. This interconnectedness also highlights the need for an array of oversight and regulatory frameworks to function properly. The major essential databases in forensics need to be a part of blind testing programs and work is needed to ensure that the results from these databases are indeed producing correct results and those results are being correctly used. Last, laboratory reports of “inconclusive” results are a significant challenge for laboratories and the system to better understand when these results are appropriate, necessary and most importantly correctly used by the rest of the system.

Using a rich dataset that merges student-level school records with birth records, and leveraging a student fixed effects design, we explore how a Florida private school choice program affected public school students’ outcomes as the program matured and scaled up. We observe growing benefits (higher standardized test scores and lower absenteeism and suspension rates) to students attending public schools with more preprogram private school options as the program matured. Effects are particularly pronounced for lower-income students, but results are positive for more affluent students as well. Local and district-wide private school competition are both independently related to student outcomes. (JEL H75, I21, I22, I28)

How do citizens hold local politicians accountable? I argue that citizens, especially through neighborhood associations, can use bloc voting as a bottom-up, grassroots strategy to pressure politicians for public services. Politicians monitor polling station voting, and communities switch allegiance if politicians do not deliver. I measure the perceived and actual relationships between community characteristics, bloc voting, and water access—an essential resource prone to political manipulation. I analyze an original household survey and conjoint experiment merged with electoral data in rural Brazil, and qualitative interviews illustrate theoretical mechanisms. Bloc voting is more likely in communities with high trust and participation, and bloc voting improves water access for association members. However, this strategy is only worthwhile for communities that can demonstrate their vote at their polling station. In contrast to top-down explanations of bloc voting, I highlight the interaction of collective action and electoral institutions for accountability and public service provision.

Do well-informed politicians make more effective spending decisions? In experiments with 70% of all elected politicians in Malawi ( $ N=460 $ ), we tested the effects of information on public spending. Specifically, we randomly provided information about school needs, foreign aid, and voting patterns prior to officials making real decisions about the allocation of spending. We show that these information interventions reduced inequalities in spending: treatment group politicians were more likely to spend in schools neglected by donors and in schools with greater need. Some information treatment effects were strongest in remote and less populated communities. These results suggest that information gaps partially explain inequalities in spending allocation and imply social welfare benefits from improving politicians’ access to information about community needs.

Public employment programs may affect poverty both directly through the income they provide and indirectly through general equilibrium effects. We estimate both effects, exploiting a reform that improved the implementation of India's National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGS) and whose rollout was randomized at a large (sub‐district) scale. The reform raised beneficiary households' earnings by 14%, and reduced poverty by 26%. Importantly, 86% of income gains came from non‐program earnings, driven by higher private‐sector (real) wages and employment. This pattern appears to reflect imperfectly competitive labor markets more than productivity gains: worker's reservation wages increased, land returns fell, and employment gains were higher in villages with more concentrated landholdings. Non‐agricultural enterprise counts and employment grew rapidly despite higher wages, consistent with a role for local demand in structural transformation. These results suggest that public employment programs can effectively reduce poverty in developing countries, and may also improve economic efficiency.

Early support for expert policy making through administrative agencies was rooted in concerns over political power. In a context of formal universal male suffrage, late nineteenth-century liberals (typically well-educated, urban professionals) opposed policies to regulate business out of fear of working-class radicalism. Yet by the 1910s, liberals supported economic regulation—through administrative agencies. We use a formal model to show how potential policy feedback effects made an antibusiness coalition between liberals and populists unachievable and how, by diminishing feedback effects, agencies facilitated a successful coalition to regulate business. Because administrative agencies guaranteed a central policy-making role for credentialed urban professionals, liberals could support farmers and industrial workers against big business while no longer fearing the rising power of their coalition partners. In this way, the strategic dilemma created by a changing distribution of power among social groups explains the development of broad political support for bureaucratic agencies.

In many countries, public sector employees are eligible to hold political offices during their employment as civil servants. This often triggers conflict-of-interest concerns that elected public employees might sway policies to their professional benefit. In this article, we build on representation scholarship in political science and public administration to assess such substantive effects of public employees’ political representation using detailed Norwegian administrative register and survey data (2003–19). Our main results indicate that public employees differ little from other members within their party in terms of ideology and policy preferences. They do, however, appear to move their party slightly toward the left of the political spectrum, consistent with preference spillover effects induced by heightened public sector representation. Finally, using an instrumental variable approach exploiting close elections, we find that political representation of public employees is associated with at best modest public spending, employment, and wage effects at the local level.

As one of the most powerful executive actions, rulemaking by U.S. federal agencies involves all three branches and governs many issue areas, but some rules are routine and others are highly consequential. We build a new rule universe composed of nearly forty-thousand considered rules listed in the Unified Agenda since Spring 1995 and employ an item response model with 15 raters to generate integrated estimates of rule significance for each of the rules. To showcase the usefulness of this new measure, we propose and test competing models on agency productivity, finding that the president and Congress influence rule promulgation in a nuanced way. The president is dominant when agencies consider moderately noteworthy rules, and Congress has more influence over the most significant regulations, suggesting that the branches’ influences vary with the consequential nature of the issues considered.

We exploit a natural experiment to study the causal link between dishonest behavior and public employment. When military conscription was mandatory in Argentina, eligibility was determined by both a lottery and a medical examination. To avoid conscription, individuals at risk of being drafted had strong incentives to cheat in their medical examination. These incentives varied with the lottery number. Exploiting this exogenous variation, we first present evidence of cheating in medical examinations. We then show that individuals with a higher probability of having cheated in health checks exhibit a higher propensity to occupy nonmeritocratic public sector jobs later in life. (JEL D91, J45, K42, O15)

Abstract I describe and analyze a model of strategic communication and deliberation in decentralized decision‐making settings. I show that, in a cheap‐talk environment, inclusion and exclusion of agents can affect the credibility of messaging between agents and, accordingly, the quality of policy decisions and overall social welfare. Somewhat surprisingly, the inclusion of agents can aid information aggregation and social welfare even when the added agents do not themselves communicate truthfully. Analogously, the results suggest an informational, social welfare–based rationale for excluding agents not only from observing policy‐relevant deliberation but also from observing the product of the communication precisely because the excluded agents possess decision‐making authority.

The literature on early modern state-building in Europe has focused on war as its main driver and therefore on states’ relationships with men. Feminist scholars have critiqued the Weberian conceptions this literature relies on as being gender biased. I suggest an alternative theoretical starting point for theories of early modern state-building: the political imperatives created by the demographic fluctuations of the Malthusian trap. Harnessing Foucault’s concept of biopower and its application to the construction of gender, I argue that population fluctuations incentivized demographic regulation, in particular of childbearing, in order to keep birth rates high and maternal and infant mortality low, implying that early modern European states were constituted through the construction and maintenance of gender regimes. I propose strategies for empirical investigation and argue that a more accurate account of early modern European state-building needs to incorporate demographic regulation and therefore requires gender to be at its center.

Despite strong theoretical foundations, randomized evaluations demonstrate that subnational performance assessments have a mixed record in improving governance. We suggest that a key factor influencing this disappointing result has been the omission of facilitation—working with bureaucrats on how to use subnational performance assessments (SPAs) effectively and encouraging collaboration across government agencies. The argument is tested on a nationally representative panel of townships in precoup Myanmar. Facilitation workshops were conducted in 20 randomly assigned townships, bringing together officials from multiple government agencies and introducing them to the results of the Myanmar Business Environment Index (MBEI), an SPA that scored a panel of 60 townships on 92 governance indicators. Results show that businesses in townships where officials attended facilitation workshops ranked their townships twice as high as the businesses in the control group. Variation in MBEI improvements was moderated by the degree of decentralization in bureaucratic agencies.

Leveraging the Tennessee STAR class size experiment, we show that Black students randomly assigned to at least one Black teacher in grades K–3 are 9 percentage points (13 percent) more likely to graduate from high school and 6 percentage points (19 percent) more likely to enroll in college compared to their Black schoolmates who are not. Black teachers have no significant long-run effects on White students. Postsecondary education results are driven by two-year colleges and concentrated among disadvantaged males. North Carolina administrative data yield similar findings, and analyses of mechanisms suggest role model effects may be one potential channel. (JEL H75, I21, I26, I28, J15)

Abstract Developing artificial intelligence (AI) technology requires data. In many domains, government data far exceed in magnitude and scope data collected by the private sector, and AI firms often gain access to such data when providing services to the state. We argue that such access can stimulate commercial AI innovation in part because data and trained algorithms are shareable across government and commercial uses. We gather comprehensive information on firms and public security procurement contracts in China’s facial recognition AI industry. We quantify the data accessible through contracts by measuring public security agencies’ capacity to collect surveillance video. Using a triple-differences strategy, we find that data-rich contracts, compared to data-scarce ones, lead recipient firms to develop significantly and substantially more commercial AI software. Our analysis suggests a contribution of government data to the rise of China’s facial recognition AI firms, and that states’ data collection and provision policies could shape AI innovation.

We study how political turnover in mayoral elections in Brazil affects public service provision by local governments. Exploiting a regression discontinuity design for close elections, we find that municipalities with a new party in office experience upheavals in the municipal bureaucracy: new personnel are appointed across multiple service sectors, and at both managerial and non-managerial levels. In education, the increase in the replacement rate of personnel in schools controlled by the municipal government is accompanied by test scores that are 0.05–0.08 standard deviations lower. In contrast, turnover of the mayor’s party does not impact local (non-municipal) schools. These findings suggest that political turnover can adversely affect the quality of public services when the bureaucracy is not shielded from the political process. (JEL D72, D73, H75, H76, J45, O17)

We posit that autocrats introduce local elections when their bureaucratic capacity is low. Local elections exploit citizens’ informational advantage in keeping local officials accountable, but they also weaken vertical control. As bureaucratic capacity increases, the autocrat limits the role of elected bodies to regain vertical control. We argue that these insights can explain the introduction of village elections in rural China and the subsequent erosion of village autonomy years later. We construct a novel dataset to document political reforms, policy outcomes, and de facto power for almost four decades. We find that the introduction of elections improves popular policies and weakens unpopular ones. Increases in regional government resources lead to loss of village autonomy, but less so in remote villages. These patterns are consistent with an organizational view of local elections within autocracies. (JEL D72, D73, D83, O17, O18, P25, P26)

This paper examines race and police use of force using data on 1.6 million 911 calls in two cities, neither of which allows for discretion in officer dispatch. Results indicate White officers increase force much more than minority officers when dispatched to more minority neighborhoods. Estimates indicate Black (Hispanic) civilians are 55 (75) percent more likely to experience any force, and five times as likely to experience a police shooting, compared to if White officers scaled up force similarly to minority officers. Additionally, 14 percent of White officers use excess force in Black neighborhoods relative to our statistical benchmark. (JEL H76, J15, K42, R23)

The Trump presidency generated concern about democratic backsliding and renewed interest in measuring the national democratic performance of the United States. However, the US has a decentralized form of federalism that administers democratic institutions at the state level. Using 51 indicators of electoral democracy from 2000 to 2018, I develop a measure of subnational democratic performance, the State Democracy Index. I then test theories of democratic expansion and backsliding based in party competition, polarization, demographic change, and the group interests of national party coalitions. Difference-in-differences results suggest a minimal role for all factors except Republican control of state government, which dramatically reduces states’ democratic performance during this period. This result calls into question theories focused on changes within states. The racial, geographic, and economic incentives of groups in national party coalitions may instead determine the health of democracy in the states.

This paper studies the impacts of managers in the administrative public sector using novel Italian administrative data containing an output‐based measure of productivity. Exploiting the rotation of managers across sites, I find that a one standard deviation increase in managerial talent raises office productivity by 10%. These gains are driven primarily by the exit of older workers who retire when more productive managers take over. I use these estimates to evaluate the optimal allocation of managers to offices. I find that assigning better managers to the largest and most productive offices would increase output by at least 6.9%.

This paper investigates the trade-offs between local elites and state agents as tax collectors in low-capacity states. We study a randomized policy experiment assigning neighborhoods of a large Congolese city to property tax collection by city chiefs or state agents. Chief collection raised tax compliance by 3.2 percentage points, increasing revenue by 44 percent. Chiefs collected more bribes but did not undermine tax morale or trust in government. Results from a hybrid treatment arm in which state agents consulted with chiefs before collection suggest that chief collectors achieved higher compliance by using local information to more efficiently target households with high payment propensities, rather than by being more effective at persuading households to pay conditional on having visited them. (JEL D73, D83, H24, H26, H71, O12, O17)

Concerned with poor service delivery, a large literature studies accountability of politicians to voters. This article instead considers accountability relationships within governments—the ability of politicians to implement policies by holding bureaucrats responsible for their actions. In collaboration with the Ugandan government, I conducted a field experiment across 260 local governments. The objective of the reform was to empower local politicians to exercise closer oversight over the bureaucracy through training and the dissemination of financial information. Lowered oversight costs increase politicians’ monitoring effort and the quality of services, but only in areas where the political leadership is not aligned with the dominant party. In areas under ruling-party control, politicians fear uncovering mismanagement of funds. In contrast to scholars arguing that insulating bureaucrats allows them to do their jobs more effectively, these findings imply that increased political oversight can improve government responsiveness in settings with a modicum of party competition.

Abstract We estimate the effect of losing Supplemental Security Income (SSI) benefits at age 18 on criminal justice and employment outcomes over the next two decades. To estimate this effect, we use a regression discontinuity design in the likelihood of being reviewed for SSI eligibility at age 18 created by the 1996 welfare reform law. We evaluate this natural experiment with Social Security Administration data linked to records from the Criminal Justice Administrative Records System. We find that SSI removal increases the number of criminal charges by a statistically significant 20% over the next two decades. The increase in charges is concentrated in offenses for which income generation is a primary motivation (60% increase), especially theft, burglary, fraud/forgery, and prostitution. The effect of SSI removal on criminal justice involvement persists more than two decades later, even as the effect of removal on contemporaneous SSI receipt diminishes. In response to SSI removal, youth are twice as likely to be charged with an illicit income-generating offense than they are to maintain steady employment at ${\$}$15,000/year in the labor market. As a result of these charges, the annual likelihood of incarceration increases by a statistically significant 60% in the two decades following SSI removal. The costs to taxpayers of enforcement and incarceration from SSI removal are so high that they nearly eliminate the savings to taxpayers from reduced SSI benefits.

Whether international crises end in conflict frequently depends on the information that leaders possess. To better explain how leaders acquire information, I develop and test an informational theory of bureaucracies during crises. Time-constrained leaders delegate information collection to advisers who lead bureaucracies. A division of labor between bureaucracies breeds comparative specialization among advisers. Some emphasize information on adversaries’ political attributes, which are harder to assess; others stress military attributes, which are easier to assess. Bureaucratic role thus affects the content and uncertainty that advisers provide. I use automated and qualitative coding to measure adviser input in 5,400 texts from US Cold War crises. As hypothesized, advisers’ positions affect the information and uncertainty they convey but not the policies they promote as canonical theories suggest. For individuals advising leaders during crises, what you know depends on where you sit. Consequently, the information leaders possess hinges on which bureaucracies have their attention.

Disadvantaged students perform differentially worse when randomly given a financially salient mathematics exam. For students with socioeconomic indicators below the national median, a 10 percentage point increase in the share of monetary themed questions depresses exam performance by 0.026 standard deviations, about 6 percent of their performance gap. Using question-level data, I confirm the role of financial salience by comparing performance on monetary and highly similar non-monetary questions. Leveraging the randomized ordering of questions, I identify an effect on subsequent questions, providing evidence that the attention capture effects of poverty affect policy relevant outcomes outside of experimental settings. (JEL G53, I21, I24, I32, J13, O15)

The solution to weak bureaucratic capacity in developing countries is often presumed to be more accountability. This paper shows how accountability initiatives, intended to reduce corruption, can actually hinder the development of capable government agencies by making it harder for directors to recruit experts and spend their budgets. It further highlights a common way public servants escape the accountability rules that limit their effectiveness: outsourcing bureaucracies to nonstate organizations. This practice of outsourcing bureaucracy to avoid accountability rules creates what I call “shadow” state capacity and, paradoxically, it may help explain “pockets of effectiveness” among government social programs in developing countries. Drawing on in-depth interviews and descriptive statistics, I show how outsourcing was a critical factor in producing two of Brazil’s most vaunted social sector programs. However, I also suggest that outsourcing bureaucracy may ultimately limit state capacity, even if it helps to build capable programs in the short run.

Abstract Access to information (ATI) policies are often praised for strengthening transparency, accountability, and trust in public institutions, yet evidence that they improve institutional performance is mixed. We argue that an important impediment to the effective operation of such policies is the failure of bureaucrats to comply with information requests that could expose poor performance. Analyzing a new data set on the performance of approximately 20,000 aid projects financed by 12 donor agencies in 183 countries, we find that enforcement matters: the adoption of ATI policies by agencies is associated with better project outcomes when these policies include independent appeals processes for denied information requests but with no improvement when they do not. We also recover evidence that project staff adjust their behavior in anticipation of ATI appeals, and that the performance dividends of appeals processes increase when bottom‐up collective action is easier and mechanisms of project oversight are weak.

Police, like other bureaucratic agencies, are responsible for collecting and disseminating policy-relevant data. Nonetheless, critical data, including killings by police, often go unreported. We argue that this is due in part to the limited oversight capacity of legislative bodies to whom police are accountable. Although many local assemblies lack the means for effective oversight, well-resourced state legislatures may induce transparency from state and substate agencies. This argument is evaluated in two studies of police transparency in the United States. First, we examine the compliance of 19,095 state, county, and municipal police agencies with official data requests over five decades, finding strong positive effects of state legislative capacity on transparency. Second, we examine the accuracy of transmitted data on killings by police, finding that lethality is systematically underreported in states with lower-capacity legislatures. Collectively, our study has implications for research on policing, legislatures, agency control, and analyses of government data.

Can democratic participation reduce inequalities in citizenship produced by policing? We argue that citizen participation in policing produces a paradox, which we call asymmetric citizenship. For some citizens, expanding participation in policing expands citizenship by enhancing state responsiveness to demands. Yet citizen participation in policing often produces demands to repress marginalized groups, thereby contracting their citizenship rights. We theorize that formal spaces for citizen participation in policing produce asymmetric citizenship through three mechanisms: (1) defining some groups as “virtuous citizens” and labeling marginalized groups as “security threats,” (2) gatekeeping to amplify the voice of “virtuous citizens” while silencing marginalized groups, and (3) articulating demands for police repression of marginalized groups to protect the rights of “virtuous citizens.” We illustrate the framework through a qualitative analysis of São Paulo’s Community Security Councils. Our analysis elucidates mechanisms through which democratic participation can reproduce, rather than ameliorate, inequality in policing.

Understanding sources of judicial bias is essential for establishing due process. To date, theories of judicial decision making are rooted in ranked societies with majority–minority group cleavages, leaving unanswered which groups are more prone to express bias and whether it is motivated by in-group favoritism or out-group hostility. We examine judicial bias in Kenya, a diverse society that features a more complex ethnic landscape. While research in comparative and African politics emphasizes instrumental motivations underpinning ethnic identity, we examine the psychological, implicit biases driving judicial outcomes. Using data from Kenyan criminal appeals and the conditional random assignment of judges to cases, we show that judges are 3 to 5 percentage points more likely to grant coethnic appeals than non-coethnic appeals. To understand mechanisms, we use word embeddings to analyze the sentiment of written judgments. Judges use more trust-related terms writing for coethnics, suggesting that in-group favoritism motivates coethnic bias in this context.

Abstract Cartels participating in procurement auctions frequently use bid rotation or prioritize incumbents to allocate contracts. However, establishing a link between observed allocation patterns and firm conduct has been difficult: there are cost-based competitive explanations for such patterns. We show that by focusing on auctions in which the winning and losing bids are very close, it is possible to distinguish allocation patterns reflecting cost differences across firms from patterns reflecting non-competitive environments. We apply our tests to two datasets: the sample of Ohio milk auctions studied in Porter and Zona (1999, “Ohio School Milk Markets: An Analysis of Bidding”, RAND Journal of Economics, 30, 263–288), and a sample of municipal procurement auctions from Japan.

Abstract What determines whether some asylum seekers are granted refugee status while others are rejected? I draw upon archival records from a representative sample of 4,141 asylum applications filed in France between 1976 and 2016 to provide new evidence on the determinants of asylum decisions. I find that applicants who are Christian (rather than Muslim) are more likely to be granted refugee status, controlling for all other individual characteristics available to the asylum officers making the decisions. However, linking archival records to detailed administrative data, I also show that bureaucrats at the French Asylum Office stop discriminating after about a year on the job. These findings have implications for strategies to curtail discrimination in courtrooms and administrations.

Abstract Economic theory predicts that outsourcing public services to private firms reduces costs, but the effect on quality is ambiguous. We explore quality differences between publicly and privately owned ambulances in Stockholm County, Sweden, a setting where patients are as good as randomly assigned to ambulances with different ownership status. We find that private ambulances reduce costs and perform better on contracted measures such as response time, but perform worse on noncontracted measures such as mortality. In fact, a patient has a 1.4% higher risk of death within three years if a private ambulance is dispatched (in aggregate, 420 more deaths each year). We also present evidence of the mechanism at work, suggesting that private firms cut costs at the expense of ambulance staff quality.

In environments of seemingly intractable conflict, how should we understand the role of state capacity building and security-sector reform in transitions to peace? Prevailing wisdom suggests that a strong state security apparatus mitigates cyclical violence and aids in transitions to predictable, rule-governed behavior. Yet growing attention to police brutality in institutionalized democracies calls this assumption into question. Drawing on a multiyear study of war making and state making in eastern DR Congo, this article interrogates logics of police capacity building, analyzing how and why reform efforts intended to bolster the state’s monopoly on violence frequently fail to curb the unrest they seek to disrupt. I argue that enhancing the coercive capacity of the police can entrench a wartime political order that makes peace more elusive; when police deploy the image of the state toward destabilizing ends they reinforce the institutions of everyday war, undermining the stability a monopoly on violence is intended to build.

Political borders profoundly influence outcomes central to international politics. Accordingly, a growing literature shows that historical boundaries affect important macro-outcomes such as patterns of interstate disputes and trade. To explain these findings, existing theories posit that borders have persistent effects on individual-level behavior, but the literature lacks empirical evidence of such effects. Combining spatial data on centuries of border changes in Europe with a wide range of contemporary survey evidence, we show that historical border changes have persistent effects on two of the most politically significant aspects of behavior: individuals’ political and social trust. We demonstrate that in areas where borders frequently changed, individuals are, on average, less trusting of others as well as their governments. We argue that this occurs because border changes disrupt historical state-building processes and limit the formation of interpersonal social networks, which leads to lower levels of trust.

The American criminal legal system is an important site of political socialization: scholars have shown that criminal legal contact reduces turnout and that criminalization pushes people away from public institutions more broadly. Despite this burgeoning literature, few analyses directly investigate the causal effect of lower-level police contact on voter turnout. To do so, we leverage individual-level administrative ticketing data from Hillsborough County, Florida. We show that traffic stops materially decrease participation for Black and non-Black residents alike, and we also find temporal variation in the effect for Black voters. Although stops reduce turnout more for Black voters in the short term, they are less demobilizing over a longer time horizon. Although even low-level contacts with the police can reduce political participation across the board, our results point to a unique process of political socialization vis-à-vis the carceral state for Black Americans.

Diversification of police forces is widely promoted as a reform for reducing racial disparities in police-civilian interactions and increasing police legitimacy. Despite these potential benefits, nearly every municipal police department in the United States remains predominately White and male. Here, we investigate whether the scale and persistence of minority underrepresentation in policing might partly be explained by a lack of support for diversification among voters and current police officers. Across two studies (<i>N</i> = 2, 661) sampling the US adult population and residents from a city with one of the least representative police forces in the country, individuals significantly overestimate officer diversity at both the local and national levels. We find that correcting these biased beliefs with accurate information reduces trust in police and increases support for hiring new officers from underrepresented groups. In the municipal sample, these corrections also cause an increase in residents' willingness to vote for reforms to diversify their majority White police department. Additional paired decision-making experiments (<i>N</i> = 1, 663) conducted on these residents and current police officers demonstrate that both prefer hiring new officers from currently underrepresented groups, independent of civil service exam performance and other hiring criteria. Overall, these results suggest that attitudes among voters and police officers are unlikely to pose a major barrier to diversity reforms.

This paper studies how political fragmentation affects government stability. Using a regression discontinuity design, we show that each additional party with representation in the local parliament increases the probability that the incumbent government is unseated by 5 percentage points. The entry of an additional party affects stability by reducing the probability of a single-party majority and increasing the instability of governments when such a majority is not available. We interpret our results in light of a bargaining model of coalition formation featuring government instability. (JEL C78, D72, H70)

Building on Max Weber’s observation that the state’s reliance on formal tools leads to governance for some and dehumanization for others, we investigate administrative standards as a social mechanism of stratification that sorts people into categories and allocates symbolic and financial resources. Specifically, we examine how at a time of increased family diversity, the state’s use of family standards at the end-of-life discounts certain people as kin. Based on ethnographic and documentary data about government’s implementation of family standards to identify next-of-kin and task them with the disposition of dead bodies, we find that the use of family standards leads to three outcomes: a formal fit between standard and family forms; a formal misfit between who is designated next-of-kin and who is willing to handle disposition, leading to bodies going unclaimed; and a formal refit, where people not officially designated as next-of-kin overcome formal barriers to disposition. Our analysis offers a conceptual framework to examine how administrative standards include and exclude people from social groups. These bureaucratic tools produce a standard-specific governable life for some, and a diverse range of oppositional effects varying from non-recognition to opportunism for the non-standardized.

Abstract Bureaucratic reputation is one of the most important concepts used to understand the behavior of administrative agencies and their interactions with multiple audiences. Despite a rich theoretical literature discussing reputation, we do not have a comparable measure across agencies, between countries, and over time. I present a new strategy to measure bureaucratic reputation from legislative speeches with word‐embedding techniques. I introduce an original dataset on the reputation of 465 bureaucratic bodies over a period of 40 years, and across two countries—the U.S. and the U.K. I perform several validation tests and present an application of this method to investigate whether partisanship and agency politicization matter for reputation. I find that agencies enjoy a better reputation among the members of the party in government, with partisan differences less pronounced for independent bodies. Finally, I discuss how this measurement strategy can contribute to classical and new questions about political–administrative interactions.

Why do we judge workplace contestation as right or wrong—and how does such moral judgment change? Classic theorizations of the “moral economy” assume an antinomy between moral life and markets to explain coercive protest. Recent research points instead to the interconnection of morality and economic exchange but fails to analyze contention as economic action. This article addresses this tension through a historical study of the moral valence of nurses’ strikes in California. In the 1940s, nurses associations framed strikes as immoral. By the 1970s, they articulated striking as a defense of nurses’ care against uncaring employers. This moral judgment was transformed through the reconciliation of insurgent demands and conservative moral constraints within organizations. Associations developed new bureaucratic structures and contentious practices that reconciled coercive power with the moral injunction to care. Economic sociologists should consider workplace contestation as an object of analysis and mechanism for explaining economic phenomena.

Government agencies may be an additional source of unequal representation beyond that stemming from the differential responsiveness of elected officials. We use plausibly exogenous focusing events, which raise public demands for government provision of local public goods, to examine evidence of inequality in agency decision-making. Using the empirical case of wildfire risk management in the western United States, we find that experiencing nearby wildfires raises the salience of wildfire risk and leads agencies to place a greater number of risk reduction projects nearby, even when wildfire risk has already been reduced. This effect predominates among high socioeconomic status communities, especially higher income, more educated, and whiter communities. Empirical evidence is consistent with a formal model in which public agencies perpetuate inequality due to differences in the costs of lobbying across demographically varying communities and differences across communities in the benefits to agencies of responding to their demands.

The rapid expansion of charter schools has fueled concerns about their impact on traditional public schools. I estimate the effect of charter openings on traditional public schools in Massachusetts and North Carolina by comparing schools near actual charter sites to those near proposed sites that were never occupied. I find charter openings reduced public school enrollment by around 5 percent and reduced White enrollment in North Carolina. I find no impact on student achievement, and my 95 percent confidence intervals rule out effects larger than ± 0.05 standard deviations. I find no effects on attendance or suspensions. (JEL H75, I21, I28, J15)

There is growing concern about the movement of individuals from private sectors to bureaucracies, yet it is unclear how bureaucratic revolving doors affect connected firms’ political participation. We argue that when connected individuals enter government, connected firms reduce their proactive forms of participation because their connected bureaucrats possess firm-specific technical and legal knowledge to help them achieve their policy objectives. We test our intuition by constructing a novel data set on career trajectories of bureaucrats in the Office of the US Trade Representative (USTR) and firms that are connected to USTR’s revolving-door bureaucrats. Empirical results show that firms with connections to USTR bureaucrats decrease their lobbying spending and participation on advisory committees under the USTR. The decrease in political participation is stronger when connected bureaucrats are more influential in policy production. Our findings suggest that decreases in interest groups’ political activities might not imply that their influence on policy making is diminished.

Previous research shows that how the state conducts itself influences citizen attitudes and behaviors through direct and proximal contact; we show the actions of state agents ripple out even further. Joining bureaucratic data on a publicly observable state behavior—racial disparities in investigatory traffic stops—with survey data, this article shows that residing in a place with extreme racial disparities in traffic stops is associated with depressed confidence in the police even in the absence of more direct forms of contact. This relationship does not extend to participatory behaviors, however, in which only personal stop history and proximal contact are predictors. Racially disparate policing practices, then, may undermine law enforcement legitimacy in a community as a whole, but mobilization to change policy appears limited to individuals who more directly experience the carceral state.

Sociological studies stress how state legibility serves as a form of control. Often overlooked is how states differ in their will to control and how this difference shapes legibility projects. To account for this variation, this article proposes a three-dimensional analytical framework to study legibility from a comparative perspective, illustrating it with an in-depth analysis of how Brazil and Mexico rendered poor families visible to implement conditional cash transfer programs. Drawing on content analysis of official documents, 100 in-depth interviews with political and bureaucratic elites, and 18 months of fieldwork, the article reveals the political and governance effects of distinct strategies of making poor families visible in the two countries. Specifically, it shows that the differences and consequences of legibility projects depended on the politics of legitimation of each conditional cash transfer program and had the unanticipated effect of making the state itself visible to broader publics and thus subject to intense scrutiny.

Abstract The organizational structure of the bureaucracy is a key determinant of policy outcomes. Bureaucratic agencies exhibit wide variation in their organizational capacity, which allows politicians to strategically shape policy implementation. This article examines what bureaucratic structure implies for the ability of voters to hold politicians electorally accountable. It explicitly models differences in organizational capacity across bureaucratic agencies and considers a problem where a politician must decide not only which policy to choose but which agency, or combination of agencies, will implement it. The choice of implementation feeds back into the choice of policy and this, in turn, affects how voters perceive the performance of the incumbent. This creates a chain of interdependence from agency structure to policy choice and political accountability. The formal model shows that the variation in organizational capacity serves the interests of voters by improving electoral control of politicians.

The Voting Rights Act of 1965 redefined race relations in the United States. Yet evidence on its effect on Black office holding remains scant. Using novel data on Black elected officials between 1962 and 1980, we assess the impact of the Voting Rights Act on the racial makeup of local governments in the Deep South. Exploiting predetermined differential exposure of Southern counties to the mandated federal intervention, we show that the latter fostered local Black office holding, particularly in the powerful county commissions, controlling local public finances. In the presence of election by district, covered counties experienced Black representation gains and faster capital spending growth.

Domestic courts sometimes prosecute foreign nationals for severe crimes—like crimes against humanity, genocide, torture, and war crimes—committed on foreign territory against foreign nationals. We argue that migrants can serve as agents of transnational justice. When migrants move across borders, as both economic migrants and refugees, they often pressure local governments to conduct criminal investigations and trials for crimes that occurred in their sending state. We also examine the effect of explanatory variables that have been identified by prior scholars, including the magnitude of atrocities in the sending state, the responsiveness of the receiving state to political pressure, and the various economic and political costs of prosecutions. We test our argument using the first multivariate statistical analysis of universal jurisdiction cases, focusing on multiple stages of prosecutions. We conclude that transnational justice is a justice remittance in which migrants provide accountability and remedies for crimes in their sending states.

Scholars have made important advances in explaining policy drift, uncovering the prevalence of drift in veto-riddled systems, the importance of bureaucratic discretion and statutory ambiguity in combatting drift, and its feedback effects. Despite research demonstrating the potential for judicial action to alleviate drift, we know little about the potential for the Supreme Court to facilitate policy drift. I argue that the Supreme Court may operate as a powerful agent of drift by stripping statutes of ambiguity, foreclosing policy innovation in institutions outside of Congress, and curtailing bureaucratic discretion and authority. To demonstrate these mechanisms, I show how in the case of federal labor law, the Court’s jurisprudence addressing the right to strike, federal preemption, and National Labor Relations Board authority played a central role in gradually undoing the efficacy of The National Labor Relations Act. This inquiry has important implications for understanding public policy, judicial power, the development of American labor law, and American democracy.

Among American states, differences in welfare programs and civil rights protections are growing. Conventional explanations point to conservative organizations that score flashy legislative victories. We draw on case studies of Medicaid and election administration in Rhode Island and Kansas to show that much policy divergence is due to a banal and ideologically symmetric process of partisan administration. Most federal policies rely on state governments for implementation. In the cases studied here, agency workers turned to interstate networks of experts, advocates, and nonprofit workers that provide competing models of policy implementation that mirror party priorities: backdoor expansion of social services and voter registration in Rhode Island and introduction of market principles into Medicaid and restrictive registration practices in Kansas. Partisan administration makes state implementation of federal policy a key field of political struggle, on which administrators working beyond public view advance partisan priorities that often cannot be realized by other means.

A prominent argument holds that the chief purpose of municipal civil service reform in the United States was to dislodge the overrepresentation of recent immigrants in city government. Using new data on all municipal employees from 1850 to 1940 and employing three research designs, we detect no evidence that the share of local government jobs held by foreign-born whites decreased following the introduction of reforms. Instead, we show that foreign-born whites—Irish immigrants in particular—experienced substantial gains in local government employment, concentrated in blue-collar occupations in small- and medium-sized municipalities. Our results call for a revisionist interpretation of Progressive Era reforms by questioning generalizations drawn from the experience of the largest cities in the United States. For most municipalities, instead, civil service reform in fact opened avenues to representation for members of foreign-born constituencies who had previously been locked out of government jobs.

During violent conflict, governments may acknowledge their use of illegitimate violence (e.g., noncombatant casualties) even though such violence can depress civilian support. Why would they do so? We model the strategic incentives affecting government disclosures of illegitimate violence in the face of potential NGO investigations, where disclosures, investigations, and support are endogenous. We highlight implications for the analysis of conflict data generated from government and NGO reports and for the emergence of government transparency. Underreporting bias in government disclosures positively correlates with underreporting bias in NGO reports. Furthermore, governments exhibit greater underreporting bias relative to NGOs when NGOs face higher investigative costs. We also illustrate why it is difficult to estimate negative effects of illegitimate violence on support using government data: with large true effects, governments have incentives to conceal such violence, leading to strategic attenuation bias. Finally, there is a U-shaped relationship between NGO investigative costs and government payoffs.

This paper studies an anticorruption policy—corporate debarment, or blacklisting—to understand how disclosing illicit corporate practices and the sanctions for these practices affect firm and worker outcomes. Exploiting a policy change in Brazil that imposed stricter penalties for corrupt firms, I find that debarment is associated with a sizable decline in employment and an increase in the probability of exiting the formal sector. I also document that workers’ annual earnings fall after debarment. The impacts are driven by lost revenues from government contracts. The results shed light on the costs to workers in weighing the consequences of corruption crackdown. (JEL D73, E26, H57, H83, J31, K42, O17)

Discriminatory treatment of minorities by public authorities remains a serious challenge and breaks with the central principles of impartiality. However, little research examines how discrimination can be reduced through political means. This article argues that discrimination occurs when the perceived marginal cost of serving a minority citizen exceeds the funding per user and/or when excess of demand forces the provider to prioritize which citizens to serve. This also suggests that increasing the funding per user and increasing supply to meet demand might reduce differential treatment. These predictions are tested in a high school enrollment system where the funding is linked to the number of students enrolled. Unique, fine-grained administrative data show that minority applicants are 9 percentage points less likely to be enrolled in their preferred high school. More importantly, an administrative reform shows how increasing the supply-side flexibility and pay per user cuts the difference in half.

Incarceration has become naturalized as a primary mode of punishment within the penal systems of modern states across the globe. This study examines how states develop the capacity to execute incarceration as a routine state function. I argue that rationalization and bureaucratization are key for transforming carceral enclosures into a naturalized feature of states’ routine exercise of coercion. I develop this argument through analysis of a dynamic case of carceral modernization in the Brazilian state of Espírito Santo (2003 to 2014). I analyze the significance of coordinated violence and performative strategies for rulers to extend administrative capacity to incarceration and transform confinement into a legitimate and legitimizing instrument of state power. Findings demonstrate how coercive practices and other modes of violence that state authorities come to narrate as illegitimate are not antithetical to modernization. Rather, they become constitutive of the very process of consolidating and legitimizing rational-legal modes of administration that routinely exercise violence while more effectively being misrecognized as such. By extending inquiry to how states develop the administrative capacity to exercise penal power, this analysis makes several contributions to the political sociology of punishment and theories of state-building.

Abstract Does flexible pay increase the gender wage gap? To answer this question, we analyze the wages of public school teachers in Wisconsin, where a 2011 reform allowed school districts to set teachers’ pay more flexibly and engage in individual negotiations. Using quasi-exogenous variation in the timing of the introduction of flexible pay, driven by the expiration of preexisting collective-bargaining agreements, we show that flexible pay lowered the salaries of women compared with men with the same credentials. This gap is larger for younger teachers and smaller for teachers working under a female principal or superintendent. Survey evidence suggests that the gap is partly driven by women engaging less frequently in negotiations over pay, especially when the counterpart is a man. The gap is unlikely to be driven by observable gender differences in job mobility or teacher ability, although the threat of moving and a high demand for male teachers could exacerbate it. Our results suggest that pay discretion and wage bargaining are important determinants of the gender wage gap and that institutions, such as unions, might help narrow this gap.

Can increasing control over earnings incentivize a woman to work, and thereby influence norms around gender roles? We randomly varied whether rural Indian women received bank accounts, training in account use, and direct deposit of public sector wages into their own (versus husbands') accounts. Relative to the accounts only group, women who also received direct deposit and training worked more in public and private sector jobs. The private sector result suggests gender norms initially constrained female employment. Three years later, direct deposit and training broadly liberalized women's own work-related norms, and shifted perceptions of community norms.

With inefficient bureaucratic institutions, the effects of laws are hard to assess and incompetent politicians may pass laws to build a reputation as skillful reformers. Since too many laws curtail bureaucratic efficiency, this mechanism can generate a steady state with Kafkaesque bureaucracy. Temporary surges in political instability heighten the incentives to overproduce laws and can shift the economy towards the Kafkaesque state. Consistent with the theory, after a surge in political instability in the early 1990s, Italy experienced a significant increase in the amount of poor-quality legislation and a decrease in bureaucratic efficiency. (JEL D72, D73)

Management matters for firms, but what practices are optimal in hierarchical government organizations? And can skilled managers identify them? A large-scale randomized trial conducted with the police of Rajasthan, India, tested four interventions recommended by senior police officers: limitations of transfers, rotation of duties and days off, increased community involvement, and on-duty training. Field experience motivated a fifth intervention: “decoy” visits by enumerators to register cases, incentivizing staff to improve service. Only training and decoy visits had robust impacts; others were poorly implemented and ineffective. Management reforms can improve policing, but even skilled leaders struggle to identify the optimal interventions. (JEL H76, J24, J45, K42, M53, O17)

Abstract Government procurement contracts rarely have many bids, often only one. Motivated by the institutional features of federal procurement, this article develops a principal-agent model where a buyer seeks sellers at a cost and negotiates contract terms with them. The model is identified and estimated with data on IT and telecommunications contracts. We find the benefits of drawing additional sellers are significantly reduced because the procurement agency can extract informational rents from sellers. Another factor explaining the small number of bids is that sellers are relatively homogeneous, conditional on observed project attributes. Administrative hurdles and corruption appear to play very limited roles.

This paper reports on a two-tiered experiment designed to separately identify the selection and effort margins of pay for performance (P4P). At the recruitment stage, teacher labor markets were randomly assigned to a “pay-for-percentile” or fixed-wage contract. Once recruits were placed, an unexpected, incentive-compatible, school-level re-randomization was performed so that some teachers who applied for a fixed-wage contract ended up being paid by P4P, and vice versa. By the second year of the study, the within-year effort effect of P4P was 0.16 standard deviations of pupil learning, with the total effect rising to 0.20 standard deviations after allowing for selection. (JEL C93, I21, J23, J33, J41, J45, O15)

Compensation of most US public school teachers is rigid and solely based on seniority. This paper studies the effects of a reform that gave school districts in Wisconsin full autonomy to redesign teacher pay schemes. Following the reform some districts switched to flexible compensation. Using the expiration of preexisting collective bargaining agreements as a source of exogenous variation in the timing of changes in pay, I show that the introduction of flexible pay raised salaries of high-quality teachers, increased teacher quality (due to the arrival of high-quality teachers from other districts and increased effort), and improved student achievement. (JEL J31, J45, J52, H75, I21)

US policy increasingly ties payments for providers to performance on quality measures, though little empirical evidence guides the design of such incentives. I deploy administrative data to study a large federal program that penalizes hospitals with high readmissions rates. Using policy-driven variation in the penalty incentive across hospitals for identification, I find that hospital responses to the penalty account for two-thirds of the observed decrease in readmissions over this period, as well as a decrease in heart attack mortality. Quality improvement accounts for about one-half of the decrease in readmissions; the remainder is explained by selective admission of returning patients. (JEL G22, H51, I11, I12, I13, I18)

Corrupt government hiring is common in developing countries. This paper uses original data to document the operation and consequences of corrupt hiring in a health bureaucracy. Hires pay bribes averaging 17 months of salary, but contrary to conventional wisdom, their observable quality is comparable to counterfactual merit-based hires. Exploiting variation across jobs, I show that the consequences of corrupt allocations depend on the correlation between wealth and quality among applicants: service delivery outcomes are good for jobs where this was positive and poor when negative. In this setting, the correlation was typically positive, leading to relatively good performance of hires. (JEL D73, I11, J16, J24, J45, M51, O17)

This article is a first attempt to systematically examine policy design and its influence on policy effectiveness in a comparative perspective. We begin by providing a novel concept and measure of policy design. Our Average Instrument Diversity (AID) index captures whether governments tend to reuse the same policy instruments and instrument combinations or produce policy solutions that are carefully tailored to the policy problem at hand. Second, we demonstrate that our AID index is a valid and reliable measure of policy design quality with a strong explanatory power for the outcome variables tested. Analyzing the composition of environmental policy portfolios in 21 OECD countries, we show that higher levels of AID are positively associated with a country’s policy effectiveness in environmental matters. Based on this finding, we analyze, in a third step, the factors that lead countries to adopt more or less diverse policy portfolios. We find that the policy design quality is significantly improved when policy makers are not bound by high institutional constraints and, more importantly, are backed by well-equipped bureaucracies.

Audits are a standard mechanism for reducing corruption in government investments. The quality of audits themselves, however, may be affected by relationships between auditor and target. We study whether provincial chief auditors in China show greater leniency in evaluating prefecture governments in their hometowns. In city-fixed-effect specifications—in which the role of shared background is identified from auditor turnover—we show that hometown auditors find 38 percent less in questionable monies. This hometown effect is similar throughout the auditor’s tenure and is diminished for audits ordered by the provincial Organization Department as a result of the departure of top city officials. We argue that our findings are most readily explained by leniency toward local officials rather than an endogenous response to concerns of better enforcement by hometown auditors. We complement these city-level findings with firm-level analyses of earnings manipulation by state-owned enterprises (SOE) via real activity manipulation (a standard measure from the accounting literature), which we show is higher under hometown auditors. (JEL D73, H54, H83, L32, M42, O18, P25)

Participants in means-tested programs must periodically document eligibility through a recertification process. If all cases that fail recertification are ineligible, the exact timing of this process should be irrelevant. We find that later recertification interview assignments for the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), which leave less time to reschedule missed interviews, decrease recertification success by 22 percent. The consequences of not recertifying due to later interviews are highly skewed: most cases quickly reenroll, while one-quarter remain off SNAP for over a year. The marginal disenrolled case is as needy as the average participant, suggesting inefficient screening from late interviews. (JEL H51, H75, I12, I18, I38)

Abstract A rich literature has noted political business cycles in democracies. We argue that in an autocracy with strong bureaucratic institutions, the pressure of evaluation and promotion has also generated political cycles of tax‐break policies. Furthermore, the timing and content of the evaluation have driven leaders to use tax breaks strategically to build economic performance, producing distributional consequences. Combining panel data of 1,510,153 firm‐year observations, city‐leader data from 1995 to 2007, and field interviews, we find that the tax‐break rates dropped for most firms during mayors’ turnover years. In the first year of office, that is, the “busy year,” mayors needed to prioritize large firms and especially large foreign firms. Small domestic private firms bore the cost of tenure cycles. In the last year of the mayors' tenure, that is, the “dust‐settled” year, there was little incentive to seek promotion, and even important firms could not gain the mayors' attention.

Improving “ last-mile” public service delivery is a recurring challenge in developing countries. Could the widespread adoption of mobile phones provide a scalable, cost-effective means for improvement? We use a large-scale experiment to evaluate the impact of phone-based monitoring on a program that transferred nearly a billion dollars to 5.7 million Indian farmers. In randomly selected jurisdictions, officials were informed that program implementation would be measured via calls with beneficiaries. This led to a 7.8 percent reduction in the number of farmers who did not receive their transfers. The program was highly cost-effective, costing 3.6 cents for each additional dollar delivered. (JEL O13, O33, Q12, Q18)

Abstract During traffic stops, police search black and Hispanic motorists more than twice as often as white motorists, yet those searches are no more likely to yield contraband. We ask whether equalizing search rates by motorist race would reduce contraband yield. We use unique administrative data from Texas to isolate variation in search behavior across and within highway patrol troopers and find that search rates are unrelated to the proportion of searches that yield contraband. We find that troopers can equalize search rates across racial groups, maintain the status quo search rate, and increase contraband yield. Troopers appear to be limited in their ability to discern between motorists who are more or less likely to carry contraband.

Abstract Increasing ideological polarization and dysfunction in Congress raise questions about whether and how Congress remains capable of constraining the activities of other actors in the separation of powers system. In this article, I argue Congress uses nonstatutory policymaking tools to overcome the burdens of legislative gridlock in an increasingly polarized time to constrain executive branch actors. I leverage a new data set of committee reports issued by the House and Senate appropriations committees from fiscal years 1923 through 2019 to empirically explore these dynamics and evaluate my argument. Traditionally, these reports are a primary vehicle through which Congress directs agency policymaking in the appropriations process. Committees increasingly turn to them when passing legislation is most difficult and interbranch agency problems are most pronounced. In this way, nonstatutory mechanisms may help maintain the balance of power across branches, even when Congress faces gridlock‐induced incapacity.

Abstract We link newly digitized personnel records of the U.S. government for 1907–1921 to census data to study the segregation of the civil service by race under President Woodrow Wilson. Using a difference-in-differences design around Wilson’s inauguration, we find that the introduction of employment segregation increased the black-white earnings gap by 3.4–6.9 percentage points. This increasing gap is driven by a reallocation of existing black civil servants to lower-paid positions, lowering their returns to education. Importantly, the negative effects extend beyond Wilson’s presidency. Using census data for 1900–1940, we show that segregation caused a relative decline in the home ownership rate of black civil servants. Moreover, by comparing children of black and white civil servants in adulthood, we provide suggestive evidence that descendants of black civil servants who were exposed to Wilson’s presidency exhibit lower levels of education, earnings, and social mobility. Our combined results thus document significant short- and long-run costs borne by minorities during a unique episode of state-sanctioned discrimination.

Awareness-raising messages feature prominently in most anticorruption strategies. Yet, there has been limited systematic research into their efficacy. There is growing concern that anticorruption awareness-raising efforts may be backfiring; instead of encouraging citizens to resist corruption, they may be nudging them to “go with the corrupt grain.” This study offers a first test of the effect of anticorruption messaging on ordinary people’s behavior. A household-level field experiment, conducted with a representative sample in Lagos, Nigeria, is used to test whether exposure to five different messages about (anti)corruption influence the outcome of a “bribery game.” We find that exposure to anticorruption messages largely fails to discourage the decision to bribe, and in some cases it makes individuals more willing to pay a bribe. Importantly, we also find that the effect of anticorruption messaging is conditioned by an individual’s preexisting perceptions regarding the prevalence of corruption.

Drawing on over 4,000,000 individual and 2,000 agency observations across five countries, this paper examines the relationship between features of an employee's work environment and intrinsic motivation in public agencies. It finds that practices which foster employees' sense of autonomy, competence, and relatedness are associated with substantially higher levels of intrinsic motivation across a broad range of settings. This is true both at the individual and agency level and when examining changes within agency over time. These patterns appear to be at least partially a result of differential selection in and out of the agency, with lower levels of supportive practices associated with greater desire to exit for employees with higher levels of intrinsic motivation. Nonfinancial elements of job design are strongly associated with intrinsic motivation, as are potentially more difficult to alter features of an agency, such as satisfaction with compensation and managerial quality. There is also suggestive evidence that the relationship between agency practices and employee intrinsic motivation is stronger when tasks are more difficult to monitor.

Does political corruption erode civic values and foster dishonest behavior? I test this hypothesis in the context of Mexico by combining data on local government corruption and cheating on school tests. I find that, following revelations of corruption by local officials, secondary students' cheating on cognitive tests increases significantly. The effect is large and robust and persists for over a year after malfeasance is revealed. These findings are validated by evidence from individual survey data, which documents that individuals interviewed right after corruption is revealed report being less honest, less trustworthy, and more prone to thinking that cheating is necessary to succeed, compared to similar individuals interviewed just beforehand. (JEL D72, H70, I21, K42, O17, Z13)

School policies that cause a large demand shift between public and private schooling may cause some private schools to enter or exit the market. We study how the policy effects differ under a fixed versus changing market structure in the context of a public school funding reform in New York City. We find evidence of a reduction in private schools in response to the reform. Using a model of demand for and supply of private schooling, we estimate that 20 percent of the reform’s effect on school enrollments came from increased private school exit and reduced private school entry. (JEL H75, I21, I22, I28)

We challenge the prevalent claim that courts can only influence policy by adjudicating disputes. Instead, we theorize the shadow effect of courts : policy makers preemptively altering policies in anticipation of possible judicial review. While American studies imply that preemptive reforms hinge on litigious interest groups pressuring policy makers who support judicial review, we advance a comparative theory that flips these presumptions. In less litigious and more hostile political contexts, policy makers may instead weaponize preemptive reforms to preclude bureaucratic conflicts from triggering judicial oversight and starve courts of the cases they need to build their authority. By allowing some preemptive judicial influence to resist direct judicial interference, recalcitrant policy makers demonstrate that shadow effects are not an unqualified good for courts. We illustrate our theory by tracing how a major welfare reform in Norway was triggered by a conflict within its Ministry of Labor and a government resistance campaign targeting a little-known international court.

Abstract Do politicians tend to adopt unpopular policies when the media and the public are distracted by other events? We examine this question by analyzing the timing of executive orders signed by U.S. presidents over the past four decades. We find robust evidence that executive orders are more likely to be signed on the eve of days when the news is dominated by other important stories that can crowd out coverage of executive orders. This relationship only holds in periods of divided government when unilateral presidential actions are more likely to be criticized by Congress. The effect is driven by executive orders that are more likely to make the news and to attract negative publicity, particularly those on topics on which president and Congress disagree. Finally, the timing of executive orders appears to be related to predictable news but not unpredictable ones, which suggests it results from a deliberate and forward‐looking PR strategy.

Parties rely on brokers to win elections in much of the developing world. How do parties use compensation to motivate these grassroots agents? Parties often decentralize broker payment decisions to local party elites. In addition to helping their party win elections, local elites seek personal career advancement. Because local elites typically rely on brokers’ support to advance, they have an incentive to use payments to strengthen their ties to brokers. Using a multiwave survey, we track the full range of payments to over 1,000 brokers from Ghana’s ruling party—the party most capable of distributing patronage benefits—across an electoral cycle. We show that the party operates a hybrid payment system missed by previous studies. The party rewards the brokers who deliver the most votes immediately after elections. But long after campaigns, when most payments are made, local party elites prioritize payments to brokers with upward connections to elites.

Previous studies have documented ethnic/racial bias in politicians’ constituency service, but less is known about the circumstances under which such ethnocentric responsiveness is curbed. We propose and test two hypotheses in this regard: the electoral incentives hypothesis , predicting that incentives for (re)election crowd out politicians’ potential biases, and the candidate selection hypothesis , stipulating that minority constituents can identify responsive legislators by using candidates’ partisan affiliation and stated policy preferences as heuristics. We test these hypotheses through a field experiment on the responsiveness of incumbent local politicians in Denmark ( N = 2,395), varying ethnicity, gender, and intention to vote for the candidate in the upcoming election, merged with data on their electoral performance and their stated policy preferences from a voting advice application. We observe marked ethnocentric responsiveness and find no indication that electoral incentives mitigate this behavior. However, minority voters can use parties’ and individual candidates’ stances on immigration to identify responsive politicians.

Scholars and policy makers frequently advocate recruiting “embedded” bureaucrats with strong ties to citizens in order to improve service delivery. Yet, officials who are too embedded in their communities are often blamed for corruption, favoritism, and ineffectiveness. We argue that this ambiguity stems from a mismatch between individual- and community-level effects of embeddedness. While personal ties increase engagement between directly connected citizens and bureaucrats, a community-level increase in bureaucrats’ personal ties alienates unconnected citizens and undermines claims of impartiality. We test this argument on public safety provision in the Philippines. We measure family networks in 286 villages, locate police officers within those networks, and analyze citizen survey responses. Citizens are more willing to trust and engage with officers to whom they are more closely related. However, in villages where officers are highly embedded, unconnected citizens evaluate their performance more poorly. Consequently, village-level officer embeddedness is associated with higher rates of feuds and disputes.

We estimate the degree to which individual police officers practice racial discrimination. Using a bunching estimation design and data from the Florida Highway Patrol, we show that minorities are less likely to receive a discount on their speeding tickets than White drivers. Disaggregating this difference to the individual police officer, we estimate that 42 percent of officers practice discrimination. We then apply our officer- level discrimination measures to various policy-relevant questions in the literature. In particular, reassigning officers across locations based on their lenience can effectively reduce the aggregate disparity in treatment (JEL H76, J15, K42)

Abstract Bureaucracies increasingly use quantitative measures to monitor personnel behavior. I develop a model of the incentives created by metrics management , a bureaucratic accountability technique, using policing as a case to show that monitoring can lead public‐interest motivated bureaucrats to focus on work not in the public interest. Second, I develop a new measure of data manipulation in crime statistics: although theory predicts the presence of manipulation, researchers observe only the altered data. I solve this using the fact that police departments can reclassify rapes (but not other violent crimes) as “unfounded,” concluding the reported crime did not occur. Finally, I test the effects of metrics management in policing using a novel data set. CompStat is associated with at least 3,500 additional minor arrests per city‐year, substantial data manipulation, and no decrease in serious crime. These results have implications for bureaucracies implementing metrics management, scholarship using administrative data, and legal implementation.

Abstract Collective action among public officials is necessary for the effective delivery of many social services, but relatively little is known about how it can be fostered through policy reforms. In this article, we compare cooperation among public officials within decentralized versus centrally‐administered municipalities in Honduras. Leveraging a quasi‐experiment in health sector reform, coupled with behavioral games and social network surveys, we find that decentralization is associated with greater cooperation. When they are able to communicate, health sector workers in decentralized municipalities contribute more to a public good than their centrally‐administered counterparts. This increase in cooperative behavior results in part from the decentralization reform engendering greater numbers of interactions and stronger ties across different levels of government. These findings indicate that institutional reforms like decentralization can favorably reconfigure patterns of social interactions across public organizations, which is an important component of administrative capacity in developing countries.

Abstract Economic growth requires confidence in the state's ability to enforce secure exchange. But when states selectively enforce rule of law, political considerations can moderate the trust that buyers have in sellers. I argue that political connections produce moral hazard in exchange because they introduce biases in expectations of judicial enforcement. Buyers avoid trade with politically connected sellers, and, in this context of unequal enforcement, formal contracts disproportionately protect politically connected buyers. To examine these features of connections and contracts, I created a sales business in Senegal and randomized whether employees signaled political connections and/or offered formal contracts during transactions. The results show that political connections decreased buyers' willingness to exchange. Formal contracts increased exchange, though primarily for connected buyers. These findings show that asymmetric political connections can impede daily trade and intensify economic inequalities in developing contexts, while simultaneously demonstrating the limits of state institutions for mitigating politically driven moral hazard.

Migrants are politically marginalized in cities of the developing world, participating in destination-area elections less than do local-born residents. We theorize three reasons for this shortfall: migrants’ socioeconomic links to origin regions, bureaucratic obstacles to enrollment that disproportionately burden newcomers, and ostracism by antimigrant politicians. We randomized a door-to-door drive to facilitate voter registration among internal migrants to two Indian cities. Ties to origin regions do not predict willingness to become registered locally. Meanwhile, assistance in navigating the electoral bureaucracy increased migrant registration rates by 24 percentage points and substantially boosted next-election turnout. An additional treatment arm informed politicians about the drive in a subset of localities; rather than ignoring new migrant voters, elites amplified campaign efforts in response. We conclude that onerous registration requirements impede the political incorporation, and thus the well-being, of migrant communities in fast-urbanizing settings. The findings also matter for assimilating naturalized yet politically excluded cross-border immigrants.

This paper develops a dynamic theory of the social and political foundations of governance quality. In the model, groups of citizens have different expected needs for a public service, and citizens choose whether to demand service when the need arises. Politicians representing these groups can determine policy benefits and delegate to bureaucrats the ability to invest in long-run service quality. The main feature of the theory is its foundation for citizen–government interactions, which draws from well-known queueing models of organizational service provision. The model provides a framework for characterizing the effectiveness and durability of government programs. A main implication is that politicized bureaucracies improve program survivability and increase the frequency of investment, while insulated bureaucracies increase the intensity of investment; overall service quality trades off between these two factors. Other results examine the implications of cross-group inequality, electoral conditions, and decentralization.

A counterpart of what is known as “European exceptionalism”—political stability and institutional arrangement that enabled modern economic growth and political development—is a “Chinese anomaly.” This anomaly takes the form of a sharp contrast with premodern Europe: Chinese imperial rulers stayed in power longer than their European counterparts, but this political stability was accompanied by a high level of institutional stasis. In this article, we argue that a well-known Chinese institution, the civil service examination (CSE) system, contributed to China’s imperial longevity. We use detailed historical data on individual CSE performance to demonstrate the longevity-contributory mechanisms of CSE—constraining access to power by aristocrats and other wealth holders. We argue that a key to unpacking the so-called Chinese anomaly is to understand the role of bureaucracy in political development in China and potentially in other regions.

Since the 1960s, “the stakeholder,” or affected party, has emerged as a novel democratic subject whose participation in varied institutional sites—from universities to government agencies, corporate boardrooms to international organizations—is seen as necessary for the management of complex problems. However, few specifically attend to the stakeholder as a distinct political subject and consider its implications for democratic practice. This paper presents a genealogy of the stakeholder, documenting its appearance in corporate managerialism and US public administration and showing how racial mobilization, rapid technological progress, and the political rationality of systems thinking provided the conditions of possibility for its emergence. Though orienting democracy around stakeholders permits opportunities for participation in political life, I argue that this subject is predicated on a circumscribed form of participatory politics that erodes habits of discovering a common good, erases distinctions between individuals and corporate bodies, and amplifies the problem of expertise.

Government outsourcing of services to private sector entities is increasingly common. The conventional wisdom ties governments’ outsourcing decisions to either an ideological preference for market-based solutions or fiscal pressures. However, these conjectures have not been systematically subjected to empirical scrutiny. I develop an aggregate annual measure of US state-level outsourcing decisions—macro outsourcing—and explore whether the evidence supports these pathways. I also point to an underappreciated political pathway by which potential losers—bureaucrats organized into public sector unions—affect the decision to outsource. The results offer little support for the received wisdom and instead demonstrate that states with strong unions are less likely to rely on private actors. I bolster this finding with preliminary analyses showing that states with laws that sap union power exhibit higher levels of outsourcing. Overall, these results show that outsourcing is a decidedly political phenomenon, albeit via an unexpected route.

Abstract A key feature of parliamentary democracy is government accountability vis‐à‐vis the legislature, but the important question of who speaks for the government—cabinet ministers or unelected bureaucrats, and the institutional underpinnings of this behavior—receives scant attention in the existing literature. We investigate this question using the case of Japan, and data on more than four million committee speeches spanning distinct electoral and legislative institutional environments. We document how a party‐strengthening electoral system reform in 1994 facilitated a dramatic shift in the nature of government accountability to parliamentary committees: speeches by ministers increased, speeches by bureaucrats decreased, and discursive accountability between ministers and opposition legislators increased. Subsequent legislative reforms expanding junior ministerial roles and placing explicit limits on bureaucratic participation further reinforced the effects. These findings shed new light on the institutional foundations of responsible party government in general as well as its progressive development in Japan.

Research on the welfare state has devoted considerable attention to social policy expansion. However, little is known about why governments expand social policies serving groups with limited power on issues with low visibility. I call these “benevolent policies.” This class of social policies improves population well-being but produces minimal political gains for the governments enacting them. Why do governments expand benevolent policies if political incentives for reform are weak? I investigate this question by focusing on government responses to malnutrition. Drawing on nine months of fieldwork, including 71 interviews, I argue that the origins of policy expansion can be found in the government bureaucracy. Bureaucrats with technical expertise—technocrats—can play a defining role, deploying international pressure to court executive support and orchestrate policy change. Their actions help explain the Indonesian government’s unexpected expansion of nutrition policies, which serve low-income women and children and address micronutrient malnutrition.

A central issue in democratic theory concerns whether and how politicians can maximize their policy returns from bureaucratic delegation. In this article, we propose that politicians assure favorable delegation outcomes in part by strategically matching responsive personnel and prioritized resources across policy issues and over time. We substantiate our analysis with four decades’ worth of data from the Swedish executive bureaucracy, taking particular advantage of the fact that the cabinet ministers generally appoint their agency heads on tenure-protected fixed terms. Using a within-agency research design, we show that the governing parties award more funds to agencies appointed by their ideological allies than to agencies appointed by their ideological opponents. Our findings underscore that political decisions about bureaucratic appointments and appropriations are both part of the same general delegation process but also highlight how political competition can undermine democratic control of bureaucratic policy making.

Many countries shift substantial public resources across jurisdictions to mitigate spatial economic disparities. We use a general equilibrium model with multiple asymmetric regions, labor mobility, and costly trade to carve out the aggregate implications of fiscal transfers. Calibrating the model for Germany, we find that transfers indeed deliver smaller disparities across regions. This comes at the cost of lower national output, however, because economic activity is diverted away from core cities and toward remote areas with low productivity. But despite this loss in output per capita by about 2 percent in our baseline specification, welfare still increases by 0.07 percent because the transfer scheme countervails overcongestion in large cities. If the optimal transfer regime was implemented, welfare would increase by 0.06 percent. (JEL H77, J61, R12, R13, R23)

During the Great Recession, national public school per-pupil spending fell by roughly 7 percent and persisted beyond the recovery. The impact of such large and sustained education funding cuts is not well understood. To examine this, first, we document that the recessionary drop in spending coincided with the end of decades-long national growth in both test scores and college-going. Next, we show that this stalled educational progress was particularly pronounced in states that experienced larger recessionary budget cuts for plausibly exogenous reasons. To isolate budget cuts that were unrelated to (i) other ill-effects of the recession or (ii) endogenous state policies, we use states’ historical reliance on state-appropriated funds (which are more sensitive to the business cycle) to fund public schools interacted with the timing of the recession as instruments for reductions in school spending. Cohorts exposed to these spending cuts had lower test scores and lower college-going rates. The spending cuts led to larger test score gaps by income and race. (JEL E32, H52, H75, I21, I28, J15)

This paper builds a new microdatabase that covers 100 countries at all income levels and long-run time series in the United States (1870–2010) and Mexico ( 1960–2010) to document how the modern tax system arises over development. I establish a new set of stylized facts, which show that the income tax exemption threshold decreases in the income distribution as a country develops, tracking growth in the employee share of employment that occurs gradually further down the income distribution. Additional evidence supports the interpretation that the rise in third-party covered income through increases in employee share drives expansions of the income tax base over development. (JEL D31, H23, H24, H71, J22, J23, N40)

Money and Regulation For-profit corporations bolster their influence over government rulemaking by funding nonprofit entities that then submit ostensibly independent comments to agencies that reinforce the corporate position. Bertrand et al. analyzed public comments submitted to U.S. agencies on proposed regulations, and link to data on hard-to-trace corporate donations through charitable foundations to nonprofits. Donations increased the likelihood that a nonprofit would submit comments and increased the similarity between the nonprofit's comments and the firm's own comments. This donation-driven co-commenting increased the alignment between the firm's comments and the agency's ultimate discussion of the finalized rule. Q. J. Econ. 10.1093/qje/qjab023 (2021).

Abstract We design a field experiment to study how the allocation of authority between frontline procurement officers and their monitors affects performance both directly and through the response to incentives. In collaboration with the government of Punjab, Pakistan, we shift authority from monitors to procurement officers and introduce financial incentives in a sample of 600 procurement officers in 26 districts. We find that autonomy alone reduces prices by 9% without reducing quality and that the effect is stronger when the monitor tends to delay approvals for purchases until the end of the fiscal year. In contrast, the effect of performance pay is muted, except when agents face a monitor who does not delay approvals. Time use data reveal agents’ responses vary along the same margin: autonomy increases the time devoted to procurement, and this leads to lower prices only when monitors cause delays. By contrast, incentives work when monitors do not cause delays. The results illustrate that organizational design and anti-corruption policies must balance agency issues at different levels of the hierarchy.

Abstract This article estimates the effect of environmental regulation on firm productivity using a spatial regression discontinuity design implicit in China's water quality monitoring system. Because water quality readings are important for political evaluations and the monitoring stations only capture emissions from their upstream regions, local government officials are incentivized to enforce tighter environmental standards on firms immediately upstream of a monitoring station, rather than those immediately downstream. Exploiting this discontinuity in regulation stringency with novel firm-level geocoded emission and production data sets, we find that immediate upstream polluters face a more than 24% reduction in total factor productivity (TFP), and a more than 57% reduction in chemical oxygen demand emissions, as compared with their immediate downstream counterparts. We find that the discontinuity in TFP does not exist in nonpolluting industries, only emerged after the government explicitly linked political promotion to water quality readings, and was predominantly driven by prefectural cities with career-driven leaders. Linking the TFP estimate with the emission estimate, a back-of-the-envelope calculation indicates that China's water regulation efforts between 2000 and 2007 were associated with an economic cost of more than 800 billion Chinese yuan.

Researchers often lack the necessary data to credibly estimate racial discrimination in policing. In particular, police administrative records lack information on civilians police observe but do not investigate. In this article, we show that if police racially discriminate when choosing whom to investigate, analyses using administrative records to estimate racial discrimination in police behavior are statistically biased, and many quantities of interest are unidentified—even among investigated individuals—absent strong and untestable assumptions. Using principal stratification in a causal mediation framework, we derive the exact form of the statistical bias that results from traditional estimation. We develop a bias-correction procedure and nonparametric sharp bounds for race effects, replicate published findings, and show the traditional estimator can severely underestimate levels of racially biased policing or mask discrimination entirely. We conclude by outlining a general and feasible design for future studies that is robust to this inferential snare.

In all modern bureaucracies, politicians retain some discretion in public employment decisions, which may lead to frictions in the selection process if political connections substitute for individual competence. Relying on detailed matched employer-employee data on the universe of public employees in Brazil over 1997–2014, and on a regression discontinuity design in close electoral races, we establish three main findings. First, political connections are a key and quantitatively large determinant of employment in public organizations, for both bureaucrats and frontline providers. Second, patronage is an important mechanism behind this result. Third, political considerations lead to the selection of less competent individuals. (JEL D72, D73, J45, O17)

Publicizing firms’ socially undesirable actions may enhance firms’ incentives to avoid such actions. In 2009, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) began issuing press releases about facilities that violated safety and health regulations. Using quasi-random variation arising from a cutoff rule OSHA followed, I find that publicizing a facility’s violations led other facilities to substantially improve their compliance and experience fewer occupational injuries. OSHA would need to conduct 210 additional inspections to achieve the same improvement in compliance as achieved with a single press release. Evidence suggests that employers improve compliance to avoid costly responses from workers. (JEL J28, J81, K32, L51, M54)

School choice may lead to improvements in school productivity if parents’ choices reward effective schools and punish ineffective ones. This mechanism requires parents to choose schools based on causal effectiveness rather than peer characteristics. We study relationships among parent preferences, peer quality, and causal effects on outcomes for applicants to New York City’s centralized high school assignment mechanism. We use applicants’ rank-ordered choice lists to measure preferences and to construct selection-corrected estimates of treatment effects on test scores, high school graduation, college attendance, and college quality. Parents prefer schools that enroll high-achieving peers, and these schools generate larger improvements in short- and long-run student outcomes. Preferences are unrelated to school effectiveness and academic match quality after controlling for peer quality. (JEL D12, H75, I21, I26, I28)

We study how sharing a hometown or college connection with an incumbent member of China’s Politburo affects a candidate’s likelihood of selection as a new member. In specifications that include fixed effects to absorb quality differences across cities and colleges, we find that hometown and college connections are each associated with 5–9 percentage point reductions in selection probability. This “connections penalty” is equally strong for retiring Politburo members, arguing against quota-based explanations, and it is much stronger for junior Politburo members, consistent with a role for intra-factional competition. Our findings differ from earlier work because of our emphasis on within-group variation, and our focus on shared hometown and college, rather than shared workplace, connections. (JEL D72, O17, P26, Z13)

Abstract How do policies in international organizations reflect the preferences of powerful institutional stakeholders? Using an underutilized data set on the conditions associated with World Bank loans, we find that borrower countries that vote with the United States at the United Nations are required to enact fewer domestic policy reforms, and on fewer and softer issue areas. Though U.S. preferences permeate World Bank decision making, we do not find evidence that borrower countries trade favors in exchange for active U.S. intervention on their behalf. Instead, we propose that U.S. influence operates indirectly when World Bank staff—consciously or unconsciously—design programs that are compatible with U.S. preferences. Our study provides novel evidence of World Bank conditionality and shows that politicized policies can result even from autonomous bureaucracies.

This paper explores the role of civic culture in expanding fiscal capacity by developing a model based on reciprocal obligations: citizens pay their taxes and the state provides public goods. Civic culture evolves over time according to the relative payoff of civic‐minded and materialist citizens. A strong civic culture manifests itself as high tax revenues sustained by high levels of voluntary tax compliance and provision of public goods. This captures the idea of government as a reciprocal social contract between the state and its citizens. The paper highlights the role of political institutions and common interests in the emergence of civic culture.

Abstract This article provides evidence from a fragile state that citizens demand more of a voice in the government when it tries to tax them. I examine a field experiment randomizing property tax collection across 356 neighborhoods of a large Congolese city. The tax campaign was the first time most citizens had been registered by the state or asked to pay formal taxes. It raised property tax compliance from 0.1% in control to 11.6% in treatment. It also increased political participation by about 5 percentage points (31%): citizens in taxed neighborhoods were more likely to attend town hall meetings hosted by the government or submit evaluations of its performance. To participate in these ways, the average citizen incurred costs equal to their daily household income, and treated citizens spent 43% more than control. Treated citizens also positively updated about the provincial government, perceiving more revenue, less leakage, and a greater responsibility to provide public goods. The results suggest that broadening the tax base has a “participation dividend,” a key idea in historical accounts of the emergence of inclusive governance in early modern Europe and a common justification for donor support of tax programs in weak states.

Abstract We evaluate a randomized outreach study in which the IRS sent informational letters to 3.9 million households that paid a tax penalty for lacking health insurance coverage under the Affordable Care Act. Drawing on administrative data, we study the effect of this intervention on taxpayers’ subsequent health insurance enrollment and mortality. We find the intervention led to increased coverage during the subsequent two years and reduced mortality among middle-aged adults over the same time period. The results provide experimental evidence that health insurance coverage can reduce mortality in the United States.

One important motivation for creating cap-and-trade programs for carbon emissions is the expectation that they will stimulate much-needed low-carbon innovation. I construct a new panel of British firms to investigate this hypothesis, finding that the European carbon market has encouraged greater low-carbon patenting and R&amp;D spending among regulated firms without necessarily driving short-term reductions in carbon intensity of output. This stands in contrast to past cap-and-trade programs, which have primarily spurred adoption of existing pollution control technologies, with little effect on innovation. I discuss how to reconcile these contrasting findings and implications for the future of carbon markets. (JEL D22, O32, O34, Q52, Q54, Q58)

Can e-governance reforms improve government policy? By making information available on a real-time basis, information technologies may reduce the theft of public funds. We analyze a large field experiment and the nationwide scale-up of a reform to India’s workfare program. Advance payments were replaced by “ just-in-time” payments, triggered by e-invoicing, making it easier to detect misreporting. Leakages went down: program expenditures dropped by 24 percent, while employment slightly increased; there were fewer fake households in the official database; and program officials’ personal wealth fell by 10 percent. However, payment delays increased. The nationwide scale-up resulted in a persistent 19 percent reduction in program expenditure. (JEL C93, D72, I38, O15, O17)

Abstract In theory, granting politicians tools to oversee bureaucrats can reduce administrative malfeasance. In contrast, I argue that the political control of bureaucrats can increase corruption when politicians need money to fund election campaigns and face limited institutional constraints. In such contexts, politicians can leverage their discretionary powers to incentivize bureaucrats to extract rents from the state on politicians' behalf. Using data from an original survey of bureaucrats (N = 864) across 80 randomly sampled local governments in Ghana, I show that bureaucrats are more likely to facilitate politicians' corrupt behavior when politicians are perceived to be empowered with higher levels of discretionary control. Using qualitative data and a list experiment to demonstrate the mechanism, I show that politicians enact corruption by threatening to transfer noncompliant officers. My findings provide new evidence on the sources of public administrative deficiencies in developing countries and qualify the presumption that greater political oversight improves governance.

Under what conditions does state expansion into limited statehood areas improve perceptions of state authority? Although previous work emphasizes identity or institutional sources of state legitimacy, I argue that relationships between state agents and citizens drive positive attitude formation, because these relationships provide information and facilitate social bonds. Moreover, when state agents and citizens share demographic characteristics, perceptional effects may improve. Finally, citizens finding procedural interactions between state agents and citizens unfair may adopt negative views about the state. I test these three propositions by randomizing household visits by male or female police officers in rural Liberia. These visits facilitated relationship building, leading to improved perceptions of police; shared demographic characteristics between police and citizens did not strengthen this effect. Perceptions of unfairness in the randomization led to negative opinions about police. The results imply that relationship building between state agents and citizens is an important part of state building.

Government programs often fail on the ground because of poor implementation by local bureaucrats. Prominent explanations for poor implementation emphasize bureaucratic rent-seeking and capture. This article documents a different pathology that we term bureaucratic overload : local bureaucrats are often heavily under-resourced relative to their responsibilities. We advance a two-step theory explaining why bureaucratic overload is detrimental to implementation as well as why politicians under-invest in local bureaucracy, emphasizing a lack of electoral incentives. Drawing on a nationwide survey of local rural development officials across India, including time-usage diaries that measure their daily behavior, we provide quantitative evidence that (i) officials with fewer resources are worse at implementing rural development programs, plausibly because they are unable to allocate enough time to managerial tasks and (ii) fewer resources are provided in administrative units where political responsibility for implementation is less clear. The findings shed light on the political economy and bureaucratic behavior underpinning weak local state capacity.

Using data from Pakistan, we show that existing methods produce unbiased and reliable estimates of teacher value added (TVA) despite significant differences in context. Although effective teachers increase learning substantially, observed teacher characteristics account for less than 5 percent of the variation in TVA. The first two years of tenure and content knowledge correlate with TVA in our sample. Wages for public sector teachers do not correlate with TVA, although they do in the private sector. Finally, teachers newly entering on temporary contracts with 35 percent lower wages have similar distributions of TVA to the permanent teaching workforce. (JEL I21, J31, J41, J45, O15)

In 2008, the IRS initiated efforts to curb the use of offshore accounts to evade taxes. This paper uses administrative microdata to examine the impact of enforcement efforts on taxpayers’ reporting of offshore accounts and income. We find that enforcement caused approximately 50,000 individuals to disclose offshore accounts with a combined value of about $100 billion. Most disclosures happened outside offshore voluntary disclosure programs by individuals who never admitted prior noncompliance. Disclosed accounts were concentrated in countries often characterized as tax havens. Enforcement-driven disclosures increased annual reported capital income by $2–$4 billion, corresponding to $0.6–$1.2 billion in additional tax revenue. (JEL H24, H26, K34)

Abstract Administrators can use their discretion to discriminate in the provision of public services via two mechanisms. They make decisions to allocate public services, allowing them to discriminate via allocative exclusion. They can also discriminate by targeting administrative burdens toward outgroups to make bureaucratic processes more onerous. While prior audit studies only examine the use of administrative burdens, we offer evidence of both mechanisms. We sent a request to all Danish primary schools (N = 1,698) from an ingroup (a typical Danish name) and outgroup (a Muslim name) father asking if it was possible to move his child to the school. While both groups received similar response rates, we find large differences in discrimination via allocative exclusion: Danes received a clear acceptance 25% of the time, compared to 15% for Muslims. Muslims also faced greater administrative burdens in the form of additional questions.

Abstract Scholars have often dismissed the effect of war on state formation in regions like Latin America, where mobilization for war is deemed insufficiently intense and international conflict fails to out‐select weaker states. Against this conventional wisdom, I contend that wars can affect state‐building trajectories in a postwar period through the different state institutions that result from victory and defeat. After reconsidering the role of war outcomes in classical bellicist theory I use difference‐in‐differences analysis to identify the effect of losing vis‐à‐vis winning a war on levels of state capacity in a panel of Latin America (1865–1913). I then illustrate my causal mechanisms in case studies of the Paraguayan War (1864–1870) and the War of the Pacific (1879–1883) and apply the synthetic control method to these cases. Although out‐selection of losers obscures the effect of war outcomes in European history, Latin America illuminates their long‐term consequences.

Can gender-based “enclaves” facilitate women’s access to justice? I examine all-female police stations in India and test whether group-specific institutions assist victims of gender-based violence and female officers in law enforcement. I create an original dataset based on Indian police reports and leverage the manner in which all-women police stations were opened in Haryana state to estimate their causal effect. The creation of enclaves in law enforcement does not increase registered crime. In fact, the intervention lowers the caseload at standard stations by justifying the deflection of gendered crimes, reduces responsibilities for policewomen, and increases travel cost for victims seeking redress. The institutions formalize the “counseling” of victims by encouraging reconciliation with abusers at the expense of arrest of suspects, and survey evidence suggests that all-women stations might not be associated with positive perceptions of policewomen. Broadly, I argue that representation as separation may have unintended consequences.

Conventional political economy models predict taxation will increase after franchise expansion to low-income voters. Yet, contrary to expectations, in ranked societies—where social status is a cleavage—elites can instead build cross-class coalitions to undertake a strategy of bureaucratic weakening to limit future redistributive taxation. We study a case where status hierarchies were particularly extreme: the post-Civil War American South. During Reconstruction, under federal oversight, per capita taxation was higher in counties where slavery had been more extensive before the war, as predicted by standard theoretical models. After Reconstruction ended, however, taxes fell and bureaucratic capacity was weaker where slavery had been widespread. Moreover, higher intrawhite economic inequality was associated with lower taxes and weaker capacity after Reconstruction in formerly high-slavery counties. These findings on the interaction between intrawhite economic inequality and pre-War slavery suggest that elites built cross-class coalitions against taxation where whites sought to protect their racial status.

Natural resources can have a negative impact on the economy through corruption and civil conflict. This paper tests whether information can counteract this political resource curse. We implement a large-scale field experiment following the dissemination of information about a substantial natural gas discovery in Mozambique. We measure outcomes related to the behavior of citizens and local leaders through georeferenced conflict data, behavioral activities, lab-in-the-field experiments, and surveys. We find that information targeting citizens and their involvement in public deliberations increases local mobilization and decreases violence. By contrast, when information reaches only local leaders, it increases elite capture and rent-seeking. (JEL C73, D72, D74, O13, O17, Q33, Q34)

In 2016, the Liberian government delegated management of 93 randomly selected public schools to private providers. Providers received US$50 per pupil, on top of US$50 per pupil annual expenditure in control schools. After one academic year, students in outsourced schools scored 0.18 σ higher in English and mathematics. We do not find heterogeneity in learning gains or enrollment by student characteristics, but there is significant heterogeneity across providers. While outsourcing appears to be a cost-effective way to use new resources to improve test scores, some providers engaged in unforeseen and potentially harmful behavior, complicating any assessment of welfare gains. (JEL H41, I21, I28, O15)

Expectations of transfers by central governments incentivize overborrowing by local governments. In this paper, we ask if fiscal rules can reduce overborrowing if central governments cannot commit to enforce penalties when rules are violated. We study a model in which the central government’s type is unknown and show that fiscal rules increase overborrowing if the central government’s reputation is low. In contrast, fiscal rules are effective in lowering debt if the central government’s reputation is high. Even when the central government’s reputation is low, binding fiscal rules will arise in the equilibrium of a signaling game. (JEL E62, H62, H63, H77, H81)

Candidates often tout their private sector experience when running for public office. But do businessperson politicians actually govern differently? This paper argues that given their preferences and managerial expertise, businesspeople in office adopt policies favorable to the business community and improve government efficiency. To test these claims, I collect data on over 33,000 Russian mayors and legislators and investigate policy outcomes using detailed municipal budgets and over a million procurement contracts. Using a regression discontinuity design, I find that businessperson politicians increase expenditures on roads and transport, while leaving health and education spending untouched. Prioritizing economic over social infrastructure brings immediate benefits to firms, while holding back long-term accumulation of human capital. Businesspeople also do not reduce budget deficits, but rather adopt less competitive methods for selecting contractors, particularly in corruption-ripe construction. In all, businessperson politicians do more to make government run for business, rather than like a business.

We investigate the use of high-powered incentives for the Colombian military and show that this practice produced perverse side effects. Innocent civilians were killed and misrepresented as guerillas (a phenomenon known in Colombia as “false positives”). There were significantly more false positives during the period of high-powered incentives in municipalities with weaker judicial institutions and where a higher share of brigades were commanded by colonels, who have stronger career concerns than generals. In municipalities with a higher share of colonels, the high-powered incentives period also coincided with a worsening of local judicial institutions and no discernible improvement in overall security. (JEL D72, D74, D82, K41, K42, O17)

Abstract An increasing number of police departments use information technology (IT) to optimize patrolling strategies, yet little is known about its effectiveness in preventing crime. Based on quasi-random access to “predictive policing,” this study shows that IT improves police productivity as measured by crime clearance rates. Thanks to detailed information on individual incidents and offender-level identifiers it also shows that criminals strategies are predictable. Moreover, the introduction of predictive policing coincides with a large negative trend-discontinuity in crime rates. The benefit–cost ratio of this IT innovation appears to be large.

We use a policy experiment in Indonesia to show how local political boundaries affect ethnic tension. Redrawing district borders along group lines reduces conflict. However, the gains in stability are undone or even reversed when new boundaries increase ethnic polarization. Greater polarization leads to more violence around majoritarian elections but has little effect around lower-stakes, proportional representation elections. These results point to distinct incentives for violence in winner-take-all settings with contestable public resources. Overall, our findings illustrate the promise and pitfalls of redrawing borders in diverse countries where it is infeasible for each group to have its own administrative unit. (JEL D72, D74, J15, O15, O17, O18)

The idea that rulers must seek consent before making policy is key to democracy. We suggest that this practice evolved independently in a large fraction of human societies where executives ruled jointly with councils. We argue that council governance was more likely to emerge when information asymmetries made it harder for rulers to extract revenue, and we illustrate this with a theoretical model. Giving the population a role in governance became one means of overcoming the information problem. We test this hypothesis by examining the correlation between localized variation in agricultural suitability and the presence of council governance in the Standard Cross Cultural Sample. As a further step, we suggest that executives facing substantial information asymmetries could also have an alternative route for resource extraction—develop a bureaucracy to measure variation in productivity. Further empirical results suggest that rule by bureaucracy could substitute for shared rule with a council.

Abstract Skepticism about the quality of health systems and their consequent underuse are thought to contribute to high rates of mortality in the developing world. The perceived quality of health services may be especially critical during epidemics, when people choose whether to cooperate with response efforts and frontline health workers. Can improving the perceived quality of health care promote community health and ultimately help to contain epidemics? We leverage a field experiment in Sierra Leone to answer this question in the context of the 2014 West African Ebola crisis. Two years before the outbreak, we randomly assigned two interventions to government-run health clinics—one focused on community monitoring, and the other conferred nonfinancial awards to clinic staff. Prior to the Ebola crisis, both interventions increased clinic utilization and patient satisfaction. Community monitoring additionally improved child health, leading to 38% fewer deaths of children under age five. Later, during the crisis, the interventions also increased reporting of Ebola cases by 62%, and community monitoring significantly reduced Ebola-related deaths. Evidence on mechanisms suggests that both interventions improved the perceived quality of health care, encouraging patients to report Ebola symptoms and receive medical care. Improvements in health outcomes under community monitoring suggest that these changes partly reflect a rise in the underlying quality of administered care. Overall, our results indicate that promoting accountability not only has the power to improve health systems during normal times, but can also make them more resilient to emergent crises.

Misuse of prescription opioids is a leading cause of premature death in the United States. We use state government administrative data and machine learning methods to examine whether the risk of future opioid dependence, abuse, or poisoning can be predicted in advance of an initial opioid prescription. Our models accurately predict these outcomes and identify particular prior nonopioid prescriptions, medical history, incarceration, and demographics as strong predictors. Using our estimates, we simulate a hypothetical policy which restricts new opioid prescriptions to only those with low predicted risk. The policy's potential benefits likely outweigh costs across demographic subgroups, even for lenient definitions of "high risk." Our findings suggest new avenues for prevention using state administrative data, which could aid providers in making better, data-informed decisions when weighing the medical benefits of opioid therapy against the risks.

We embed a field experiment in a nationwide recruitment drive for a new health care position in Zambia to test whether career benefits attract talent at the expense of prosocial motivation. In line with common wisdom, offering career opportunities attracts less prosocial applicants. However, the trade-off exists only at low levels of talent; the marginal applicants in treatment are more talented and equally prosocial. These are hired, and perform better at every step of the causal chain: they provide more inputs, increase facility utilization, and improve health outcomes including a 25 percent decrease in child malnutrition.

Why do local governments sometimes hire lobbyists to represent them in other levels of government? I argue that such mobilization efforts depend in part on the policy congruence between localities and their elected delegates in the legislature. I provide evidence consistent with this theory by examining how municipal governments in the United States respond to partisan and ideological mismatches with their state legislators—a common representational challenge. Using almost a decade of original panel data on municipal lobbying in all 50 states, I employ difference-in-differences and a regression discontinuity design to demonstrate that cities are significantly more likely to hire lobbyists when their districts elect non-co-partisan state representatives. The results are broadly consistent with a model of intergovernmental mobilization in which local officials purchase advocacy to compensate for the preference gaps that sometimes emerge in multilevel government.

Scholars have long acknowledged that legislators strategically employ procedure to advance policy preferences. But evidence for this view is confined to the lawmaking process, omitting an essential function of elected representatives: oversight of executive policy making. We argue that ex post procedural oversight is also driven by policy disagreement. We demonstrate this by analyzing congressional participation in US Environmental Protection Agency rulemaking from 2007 to 2017. Using the content of public comments and commenters’ political contributions, our study is the first to locate the spatial position of rulemaking proposals. We find that the more ideologically distant the agency proposal, the more likely a request for documents, additional hearings, or more time for public participation. Moreover, these requests are likely to parallel substantive criticisms and be concentrated among members with experienced staff. These findings imply that—beyond setting the baseline rules of bureaucratic policy making—well-resourced elected officials leverage procedure during policy implementation.

Why do governments centralize control over regions? We present a theory of the transition from indirect to direct rule, focusing on the strategic interaction between a ruler and local potentates who provide civil order in exchange for a share of tax revenue. When the threat of rebellion from below falls and elites become less crucial intermediaries, the ruler is able to centralize power, replacing local potentates with direct agents of the state and investing in a fiscal bureaucracy for future state development. We assess the theory using subnational data from sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Mexico around the time of a dramatic demographic collapse, which undermined the threat of domestic conflict. Using a difference-in-differences approach and an instrumental variables empirical strategy based on the climate shocks associated with a virulent series of epidemics, we show that state centralization occurred faster in areas experiencing a more dramatic decline in population.

Does political affirmative action undermine or promote development? We present the first systematic analysis of Scheduled Areas in India, home to 100 million citizens, where local political office is reserved for the historically disadvantaged Scheduled Tribes. A newly constructed dataset of 217,000 villages allows us to probe conflicting hypotheses on the implementation of the world’s largest workfare program, the National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme. We find that reservations deliver no worse overall outcomes, that there are large gains for targeted minorities, and that these gains come at the cost of the relatively privileged, not other minorities. We also find improvements in other pro-poor programs, including a rural roads program and general public goods. Reservations more closely align benefits to each group’s population share, allaying concerns of overcompensation for inequalities. Contrary to the expectations of skeptics, results indicate that affirmative action can redistribute both political and economic power without hindering overall development.

Abstract The U.S. federal government spends huge sums buying goods and services from outside of the public sector. Given the sums involved, strategic government purchasing can have electoral consequences. In this article, we suggest that more politicized agencies show favoritism to businesses in key electoral constituencies and to firms connected to political parties. We evaluate these claims using new data on U.S. government contracts from 2003 to 2015. We find that executive departments, particularly more politicized department‐wide offices, are the most likely to have contracts characterized by noncompetitive procedures and outcomes, indicating favoritism. Politically responsive agencies—but only those—give out more noncompetitive contracts in battleground states. We also observe greater turnover in firms receiving government contracts after a party change in the White House, but only in the more politicized agencies. We conclude that agency designs that limit appointee representation in procurement decisions reduce political favoritism.

When citizens ask questions, how does their government answer? Requests for government information confront officials with incentives both for and against disclosure. We argue that officials seek to manage political risks in ways that favor requests from government-aligned regions. We study responsiveness in the context of Mexico’s access-to-information law, using publicly available data from several hundred thousand information requests filed with Mexican federal government agencies between 2003 and 2015. Our empirical strategy makes comparisons only among requests sent to similar agencies on similar topics at similar times, while accounting for the complexity, sophistication, and sensitivity of individual requests. We find that requests filed from locales with higher governing-party vote shares receive more favorable responses, across multiple indicators of the nature and timing of responses. Further, we find bias only for requests on publicly relevant topics, providing evidence in favor of a mechanism of mitigating political risks over one of rewarding supporters with greater access to benefits.

Despite growing interest in state race-making, we know little about how race-making plays out in the everyday practice of policy governance. To address this gap, I examine the implementation of the Indian Child Welfare Act (1978), which sought to end generations of state policies that denied tribal sovereignty and forcibly removed Native children from their tribes. ICWA’s protections extend to children based on tribal citizenship, not racial status. Marshalling 40 years of archival data from the government agencies charged with ICWA enforcement, I analyze how ICWA implementers determine a child’s Indian status. I find that authorities routinely eschew the requirement to treat Indian as a citizenship category, re-defining it as a race. Yet whether and how state actors racialize Indianness varies by the institutional contexts in which they work. Comparing state child welfare agencies, state courts, and federal courts, I identify three institutional characteristics that organize race-making practices: evidentiary standards, record-keeping requirements, and incentive structures. These characteristics influence whether state decision-makers operationalize “Indian” as a racial category and the cognitive and ideological processes that undergird their classifications. I also demonstrate that changes in these institutional characteristics yield concomitant shifts in whether and how state agents engage in racialization.

Abstract Civil service organizations in the developing world often lack women and minorities in leadership positions. This has important consequences for the quality of public goods provision and the perceived trustworthiness of bureaucrats. We explore the effect of democratization on the discrimination of women and minorities in the civil service. We argue democratization leads to increased discrimination due to the politicization of identity cleavages. We test our argument using administrative data from Indonesia that cover the career histories of more than four million active civil servants. We exploit the exogenous timing of Indonesia's democratization and the staggered introduction of local direct elections for identification purposes. We find strong evidence that democratization worsened the career prospects of female and some religious minority bureaucrats. Penalties are higher for employees of departments led by conservative Muslim parties, in districts with larger Muslim party vote shares or larger Muslim populations, and in the religiously conservative province of Aceh.

Abstract This article introduces a new explanation for why citizens may fail to vote based on government performance. We argue that when politicians have limited capacity to control bureaucrats, citizens will not know whether government performance is a good signal of the incumbent's quality. We develop a selection model of elections in which policy is jointly determined by a politician and a bureaucrat. When politicians have incomplete power over policy, elections perform worse at separating good and bad types of incumbents. We test the theory's predictions using survey experiments conducted with nearly 9,000 citizens and local officials in Uganda. We find that citizens and officials allocate more responsibility to politicians when they are perceived as having more power relative to bureaucrats. The allocation of responsibility has electoral consequences: When respondents believe that bureaucrats are responsible for performance, they are less likely to expect that government performance will affect incumbent vote share.

I evaluate long-run academic impacts of specialized programming for high-achieving students by analyzing Advanced Work Class (AWC), an accelerated curriculum delivered in dedicated classrooms for fourth through sixth graders in Boston Public Schools. Fuzzy regression discontinuity estimates show that AWC has positive yet imprecise impacts on test scores and improves longer-term outcomes, increasing high school graduation and college enrollment. These gains are driven by black and Latino students. An analysis of mechanisms highlights the importance of staying “on track” throughout high school, with little evidence that AWC gains result from peer effects. (JEL H75, I21, I28, J15)

Abstract Liberal and republican political theorists have not paid much attention to a theory of public administration or policy implementation. To the extent that they have, they have tended to endorse an ideal‐typical Weberian model of bureaucracy and impersonal ethics of rules to limit street‐level discretion. This article argues that the Weberian bureaucratic ethics is inconsistent with core liberal and republican values and, in fact, dominating at the street level. In order for laws and policies to be implemented in a manner consistent with liberal and republican principles, an alternative public ethics is proposed—a public ethics of care. Building on earlier research, this article argues that a public ethics of care represents an important supplement to liberal and republican ideals, as well as a better alternative to Weberian bureaucratic ethics, for implementing laws and policies at the street level in limited and responsive, nondominating ways.

This paper documents how regulatory uncertainty may undermine public service when different levels of government share a mandate on public service provision. I examine the Brazilian water and sanitation sector, which presents a natural experiment of shared provision between state and municipal companies. Using a difference-in-differences framework, I study a legal reform that clarified the relationship between municipal and state providers and eliminated any takeover threat by state companies. I find that after the reform, municipal companies almost doubled their total system investment, leading to significant increases in system access and decreases in child mortality. (JEL H77, L95, O13, O18, Q53)

Abstract Existing explanations of human rights abuses emphasize a strategic logic of repression. Yet certain classes of abuses may arise absent the intent to repress because of the misaligned bureaucratic incentives of state agents. To separate accounts of strategic repression from bureaucratic incentives, we study the responses of state agents working within the Haitian criminal justice system to a randomized, free legal assistance intervention for detainees held in illegal pretrial detention. Legal assistance addresses moral hazard problems of the bureaucrats responsible for processing cases. We demonstrate that legal assistance accelerates case advancement and liberation, in line with the view that large‐scale human rights abuses in the justice system can result from poor governance and not repressive intent.

Existing studies show that party alignment between national and subnational politicians has a positive impact on government spending. However, public programs often need the approval or input from career bureaucrats. Since party politics do not directly affect these agents’ incentives, it is unclear whether party alignment will affect their performance and the programs they supervise. To examine this question, I rely on a uniquely large and granular data set of projects implemented under the Member of Parliament Local Area Development Scheme in India. The evidence shows that party alignment leads to lower project approval time and a higher utilization of program resources without compromising the overall quality of projects. Career concerns emerge, over political selection, as an important mechanism explaining bureaucratic behavior. The overall findings suggest that bureaucrats’ incentives combined with the structure of promotions in the civil service are important factors explaining the impact of party alignment on the distribution of resources.

Abstract Through a field experiment and audit study, we test how the electoral calendar affects the use of local economic development policies. We explore how electoral timing along with local political institutions and party composition affect local governments’ offers of investment incentives to outside firms. We legally incorporated a consultancy and, on behalf of a real investor in manufacturing, approached roughly 3,000 U.S. municipalities with inquiries. The main experimental results show no greater tendency to offer incentives for investment anticipated prior to than after elections—a null result that is estimated with high precision. Limiting the sample to municipalities that specialize in manufacturing, the relevant subgroup, suggests that election timing matters in this most likely set of locales. Some observational findings include additional evidence on how direct elections of executives and partisanship correlate with incentive offers.

The United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Science Advisory Board (SAB) provides expert advice to inform agency decision-making. Recent regulations have decreased the representation of academic scientists on the EPA SAB and increased the representation of industry scientists. In an experiment, we asked how the US public views the goals and legitimacy of the board as a function of its composition. Respondents perceived SABs with a majority of industry scientists to be more likely to promote business interests than SABs with a majority of academic scientists. Liberals were less likely than conservatives to perceive industry-majority SABs as promoting human health and the environment, and making unbiased and evidence-based decisions. Our findings underscore the potential for politicization of scientific advice to the government.

We examine a new dataset of public procurement laws, practice, and outcomes in 187 countries. We measure regulation as restrictions on the discretion of the procuring entities. We find that laws and practice are highly correlated with each other across countries, and better practice is correlated with better outcomes, but laws themselves are not correlated with outcomes. A closer look shows that stricter laws correlate with improved outcomes, but only in countries with low public sector capacity. We present a model of procurement in which both regulatory rules and public sector capacity determine procurement outcomes. In the model, regulation is effective in countries with low public sector capacity, but not in countries with high capacity because it inhibits the socially optimal exercise of discretion to exclude low quality bidders. (JEL D73, H11, H57, K12, K42, O17)

Abstract How does mobile broadband internet affect approval of government? Using Gallup World Poll surveys of 840,537 individuals from 2,232 subnational regions in 116 countries from 2008 to 2017 and the global expansion of 3G mobile networks, we show that on average, an increase in mobile broadband internet access reduces government approval. This effect is present only when the internet is not censored, and it is stronger when the traditional media are censored. 3G helps expose actual corruption in government: revelations of the Panama Papers and other corruption incidents translate into higher perceptions of corruption in regions covered by 3G networks. Voter disillusionment had electoral implications. In Europe, 3G expansion led to lower vote shares for incumbent parties and higher vote shares for the antiestablishment populist opposition. Vote shares for nonpopulist opposition parties were unaffected by 3G expansion.

Organizational theory scholars typically see organizations as race-neutral bureaucratic structures, while race and ethnicity scholars have largely neglected the role of organizations in the social construction of race. The theory developed in this article bridges these subfields, arguing that organizations are racial structures—cognitive schemas connecting organizational rules to social and material resources. I begin with the proposition that race is constitutive of organizational foundations, hierarchies, and processes. Next, I develop four tenets: (1) racialized organizations enhance or diminish the agency of racial groups; (2) racialized organizations legitimate the unequal distribution of resources; (3) Whiteness is a credential; and (4) the decoupling of formal rules from organizational practice is often racialized. I argue that racialization theory must account for how both state policy and individual attitudes are filtered through—and changed by—organizations. Seeing race as constitutive of organizations helps us better understand the formation and everyday functioning of organizations. Incorporating organizations into a structural theory of racial inequality can help us better understand stability, change, and the institutionalization of racial inequality. I conclude with an overview of internal and external sources of organizational change and a discussion of how the theory of racialized organizations may set the agenda for future research.

We study the effect of application costs on the targeting of disability programs. We identify these effects using the closings of Social Security Administration field offices, which provide assistance with filing disability applications. Closings lead to a persistent 16 percent decline in the number of disability recipients in surrounding areas, with the largest effects for applicants with moderately severe conditions and low education levels. Disability applications fall by only 10 percent, implying that the closings reduce targeting efficiency based on current eligibility standards. Increased congestion at neighboring offices appears more important as a channel than higher travel or information costs. (JEL H55, I13, I18, J14)

Abstract We develop a framework for welfare analysis of interventions designed to increase take-up of social safety net programs in the presence of potential behavioral biases. We calibrate the key parameters using a randomized field experiment in which 30,000 elderly individuals not enrolled in—but likely eligible for—the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) are either provided with information that they are likely eligible, provided with this information and offered assistance in applying, or are in a “status quo” control group. Only 6% of the control group enrolls in SNAP over the next nine months, compared to 11% of the Information Only group and 18% of the Information Plus Assistance group. The individuals who apply or enroll in response to either intervention have higher net income and are less sick than the average enrollee in the control group. We present evidence consistent with the existence of optimization frictions that are greater for needier individuals, which suggests that the poor targeting properties of the interventions reduce their welfare benefits.

Over the past 30 years, cities across the United States have adopted quality-of-life ordinances aimed at policing social marginality. Scholars have documented zero-tolerance policing and emerging tactics of therapeutic policing in these efforts, but little attention has been paid to 911 calls and forms of third-party policing in governing public space and the poor. Drawing on an analysis of 3.9 million 911 and 311 call records and participant observation alongside police officers, social workers, and homeless men and women residing on the streets of San Francisco, this article elaborates a model of “complaint-oriented policing” to explain additional causes and consequences of policing visible poverty. Situating the police within a broader bureaucratic field of poverty governance, I demonstrate how policing aimed at the poor can be initiated by callers, organizations, and government agencies, and how police officers manage these complaints in collaboration and conflict with health, welfare, and sanitation agencies. Expanding the conception of the criminalization of poverty, which is often centered on incarceration or arrest, the study reveals previously unforeseen consequences of move-along orders, citations, and threats that dispossess the poor of property, create barriers to services and jobs, and increase vulnerability to violence and crime.

States, rebels, and mafias all provide governance beyond their core membership; increasingly, so do prison gangs. US gangs leverage control over prison life to govern street-level drug markets. Brazil’s Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC) gang goes further, orchestrating paralyzing attacks on urban targets, while imposing a social order throughout slums that sharply reduces homicides. We analyze hundreds of seized PCC documents detailing its drug business and internal disciplinary system. Descriptively, we find vast, consignment-based trafficking operations whose profits fund collective benefits for members’ families; elaborate bureaucratic procedures and recordkeeping; and overwhelmingly nonviolent punishments for debt-nonpayment and misconduct. These features, we argue, reflect a deliberate strategy of creating rational-bureaucratic legitimacy in criminal governance. The PCC’s collectivist norms, fair procedures, and meticulous “criminal criminal records” facilitate community stigmatization of infractors, giving mild sanctions punitive heft and inducing widespread voluntary compliance without excessive coercion. This has aided the PCC’s rapid expansion across Brazil.

Abstract We present results from a large-scale randomized experiment across 350 schools in Tanzania that studied the impact of providing schools with (i) unconditional grants, (ii) teacher incentives based on student performance, and (iii) both of the above. After two years, we find (i) no impact on student test scores from providing school grants, (ii) some evidence of positive effects from teacher incentives, and (iii) significant positive effects from providing both programs. Most important, we find strong evidence of complementarities between the programs, with the effect of joint provision being significantly greater than the sum of the individual effects. Our results suggest that combining spending on school inputs (the default policy) with improved teacher incentives could substantially increase the cost-effectiveness of public spending on education.

We use a population resettlement program in Indonesia to identify long-run effects of intergroup contact on national integration. In the 1980s, the government relocated two million ethnically diverse migrants into hundreds of new communities. We find greater integration in fractionalized communities with many small groups, as measured by national language use at home, intermarriage, and children’s name choices. However, in polarized communities with a few large groups, ethnic attachment increases and integration declines. Residential segregation dampens these effects. Social capital, public goods, and ethnic conflict follow similar patterns. Overall, our findings highlight the importance of localized contact in shaping identity. (JEL D63, J12, J15, J18, O15, R23, Z13)

We compare the adult outcomes of cohorts who were differentially exposed to policy-induced changes in Head Start and K–12 spending, depending on place and year of birth. IV and sibling-difference estimates indicate that, for poor children, these policies both increased educational attainment and earnings, and reduced poverty and incarceration. The benefits of Head Start were larger when followed by access to better-funded schools, and increases in K–12 spending were more efficacious when preceded by Head Start exposure. The findings suggest dynamic complementarities, implying that early educational investments that are sustained may break the cycle of poverty. (JEL H52, H75, I21, I26, I28, I32, I38)

Abstract Central governments face compliance problems when they rely on local governments to implement policy. In authoritarian political systems, these challenges are pronounced because local governments do not face citizens at the polls. In a national‐scale, randomized field experiment in China, we test whether a public, non‐governmental rating of municipal governments' compliance with central mandates to disclose information about the management of pollution increased compliance. We find significant and positive treatment effects on compliance after only one year that persist with reinforcement into a second post‐treatment year. The public rating appears to decrease the costs of monitoring compliance for the central government without increasing public and media attention to pollution, highlighting when this mode of governance is likely to emerge. These results reveal important roles that nonstate actors can play in enhancing the accountability of local governments in authoritarian political systems.

Bureaucracies often post staff to better or worse locations, ostensibly to provide incentives. Yet we know little about whether this works, with heterogeneity in preferences over postings impacting effectiveness. We propose a performance-ranked serial dictatorship mechanism, whereby bureaucrats sequentially choose desired locations in order of performance. We evaluate this using a two-year field experiment with 525 property tax inspectors in Pakistan. The mechanism increases annual tax revenue growth by 30–41 percent. Inspectors whom our model predicts face high equilibrium incentives under the scheme indeed increase performance more. Our results highlight the potential of periodic merit-based postings in enhancing bureaucratic performance. (JEL C93, D73, H71, H83, J45, M54, O17)

The administrative ability of the state to deliver effective policy is essential for economic development. While sociologists have long devoted attention to domestic forces underpinning state capacity, the authors focus on world system pressures from Western-dominated international organizations. Scrutinizing policy reforms mandated by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the authors argue that “structural conditions” exert deleterious effects on bureaucratic quality by increasing the risk of bureaucrats falling prey to special interests and narrowing potential policy instruments available to them. The authors test these arguments using a new data set on IMF conditionality from 1985 to 2014. Their analysis shows that structural conditions—especially conditions on privatization, price deregulation, and public sector employment—reduce bureaucratic quality. Using instrumentation techniques, the authors also discount the possibility that the relationship is driven by the IMF imposing structural conditions precisely in countries with low bureaucratic quality. A careful reconsideration of IMF policy reforms is therefore required to avoid undermining local institutions.

We study the role of self-selection into public service in sustaining honesty in the public sector. Focusing on the world’s least corrupt country, Denmark, we use a survey experiment to document strong self-selection of more honest individuals into public service. This result differs sharply from existing findings from more corrupt settings. Differences in pro-social versus pecuniary motivation appear central to the observed selection pattern. Dishonest individuals are more pecuniarily motivated and self-select out of public service into higher-paying private sector jobs. Accordingly, we find that increasing public sector wages would attract more dishonest candidates to public service in Denmark. (JEL D73, H83, J31, J45)

Bureaucracies are configured differently to private sector and political organizations. Across a wide range of civil services entry is competitive, promotion is constrained by seniority, jobs are for life and retirement occurs at a fixed age. This implies that older entering officers, who are less likely to attain the glittering prize of reaching the top of the bureaucracy before they retire, may be less motivated to exert effort. Using a nationwide stakeholder survey and rich administrative data on elite civil servants in India we provide evidence that: (i) officers who cannot reach the senior-most positions before they retire are perceived to be less effective and are more likely to be suspended and (ii) this effect is weakened by a reform that extends the retirement age. Together these results suggest that the career incentive of reaching the top of a public organization is a powerful determinant of bureaucrat performance.

Despite massive investments in teacher professional development (PD) programs in developing countries, there is little evidence on their effectiveness. We present results of a large-scale, randomized evaluation of a national PD program in China in which teachers were randomized to receive PD; PD plus follow-up; PD plus evaluation of the command of PD content; or no PD. Precise estimates indicate PD and associated interventions failed to improve teacher and student outcomes after one year. A detailed analysis of the causal chain shows teachers find PD content to be overly theoretical, and PD delivery too rote and passive, to be useful. (JEL I21, I28, J24, J45, O15, P36)

What happens when local governments hire lobbyists? Although intergovernmental lobbying is common in the United States and other federal systems, we know little about its consequences. Using newly compiled data on state-level lobbying across the country, I establish a positive correlation between city lobbying and state funding. I then introduce over a decade of panel data on municipal lobbying in California to estimate the returns to lobbying for cities with a difference-in-differences design. I show that lobbying increases state transfers to cities by around 8%. But the benefits of intergovernmental lobbying are not equally distributed. I find that cities with higher levels of own-source revenue per capita net more state money when they hire lobbyists, despite enjoying a local revenue advantage. These results offer some of the first empirical evidence that city officials can influence state spending by lobbying—but this behavior may also perpetuate local economic inequality.

Abstract Autocrats depend on a capable secret police. Anecdotal evidence, however, often characterizes agents as surprisingly mediocre in skill and intellect. To explain this puzzle, this article focuses on the career incentives underachieving individuals face in the regular security apparatus. Low‐performing officials in hierarchical organizations have little chance of being promoted or filling lucrative positions. To salvage their careers, these officials are willing to undertake burdensome secret police work. Using data on all 4,287 officers who served in autocratic Argentina (1975–83), we study biographic differences between secret police agents and the entire recruitment pool. We find that low‐achieving officers were stuck within the regime hierarchy, threatened with discharge, and thus more likely to join the secret police for future benefits. The study demonstrates how state bureaucracies breed mundane career concerns that produce willing enforcers and cement violent regimes. This has implications for the understanding of autocratic consolidation and democratic breakdown.

Donald Trump has articulated foreign policy ideas at variance with the prior status quo of liberal internationalism. Trump’s status as an ideological outsider poses an interesting question: Can an executive institutionalize unorthodox foreign policy ideas in the face of bureaucracies dedicated to an alternative set of norms? This article argues that the Trump administration has failed to create new institutions or reorganize existing foreign policy bureaucracies to better serve its policy aims. Trump’s brand of populism succeeds more in the weakening of bureaucracies embodying liberal internationalism than in the creation of populist alternatives. While the institutional foundations for populism are likely to remain weak in the future, this administration’s erosion of existing institutions will make any post-Trump restoration of liberal internationalism a difficult enterprise. This suggests that the literature on bureaucratic control cannot treat all ideas equally. Some ideas are likelier to thrive in a de-institutionalized environment than others.

This work puts the current president’s efforts to deconstruct the administrative state (i.e., the agencies, people, and processes of the executive establishment) into context. Analogous to their neglect of the nation’s physical infrastructure, I explain why Congress and the president rarely have incentives to tend to the care and feeding of the departments and agencies of government, particularly the parts that provide few direct benefits to key electoral interests. I describe the health of the administrative state before Trump’s presidency to illustrate the cumulative effect of these incentives. I then turn to reviewing the Trump administration’s actions to deconstruct the administrative state. I illustrate how the president’s approach is consistent with the actions of previous presidents and how he departs, notably positioning himself as president but not chief executive. I conclude with implications for the quality of governance in the United States and some modest proposals for reform.

Federal civil servants need policy expertise to formulate and implement public policy. Presidents and congresses do not confer such expertise when they delegate responsibility for policy making. Existing research suggests that elected officials’ efforts to gain control of federal agencies can reduce agency expertise by inducing civil servants to exit the agency and reducing incentives for civil servants to exert effort, including acquiring policy expertise. I use data from an original survey of federal executives to examine whether politicization reduces agency expertise. I find that civil servants whose policy preferences diverge from those of political appointees are more likely to perceive that their agency is politicized and that civil servants who perceive their agency is politicized are more likely to exit the agency and less likely to engage in behaviors that build policy expertise. In total, these findings provide systematic, microlevel evidence demonstrating how politicization can reduce agency policy expertise.

Abstract Although many countries recruit bureaucrats using affirmative action, the effect of affirmative action recruits on bureaucratic performance has rarely been examined. Some worry that affirmative action worsens bureaucratic performance by diminishing the quality of recruits, whereas others posit that it improves performance by making recruits more representative of and responsive to the population. We test for these possibilities using unusually detailed data on the recruitment, background, and careers of India's elite bureaucracy. We examine the effect of affirmative action hires on district‐level implementation of MGNREGA, the world's largest anti‐poverty program. The data suggest that disadvantaged group members recruited via affirmative action perform no worse than others.

This paper proposes a novel theoretical framework to study the features of mass purges in authoritarian regimes. We contend that mass purges are an instrument of top-down accountability meant to motivate and screen a multitude of agents (e.g., single-party members, state bureaucrats). We show that the set of purged agents is well delineated in mild purges, whereas no performance indicator is a guarantee of safety in violent purges. The proportion of purged agents is non-monotonic in the intensity of violence. For the autocrat, increasing the intensity of violence always raises performance, but it improves the selection of subordinates only if violence is low to begin with. Hence, even absent de jure checks, the autocrat is de facto constrained by her subordinates’ strategic behavior. We use historical (including the Soviet purges and the Cultural Revolution) and recent (the Erdogan purge) events to illustrate our key theoretical findings.

The delivery of basic health products and services remains abysmal in many parts of the world where child mortality is high. This paper shows the results from a large-scale randomized evaluation of a novel approach to health care delivery. In randomly selected villages, a sales agent was locally recruited and incentivized to conduct home visits, educate households on essential health behaviors, provide medical advice and referrals, and sell preventive and curative health products. Results after 3 years show substantial health impact: under 5-years child mortality was reduced by 27 percent at an estimated average cost of $68 per life-year saved. (JEL I12, I18, J13, O15, O18)

We study the impact of regulating product entry and quality information requirements on an oligopoly equilibrium and consumer welfare. Product testing can reduce consumer uncertainty, but also increase entry costs and delay entry. Using variation between EU and US medical device regulations, we document patterns consistent with valuable learning from more stringent US requirements. To derive welfare implications, we pair the data with a model of supply, demand, and testing regulation. US policy is indistinguishable from the policy that maximizes total surplus in our estimated model, while the European Union could benefit from more testing. “Post-market surveillance” could further increase surplus. (JEL D43, I18, L13, L51, L64, O31, O38)

Police use of force bears on central matters of political science, including equality of citizen treatment by government. In light of recent high-profile officer-involved shootings (OIS) that resulted in civilian deaths, we assess whether, conditional on a shooting, a civilian’s race predicts fatality during police-civilian interactions. We combine Los Angeles data on OIS with a novel research design to estimate the causal effects of fatal shootings on citizen-initiated contact with government. Specifically, we examine whether fatal OIS affect citizen contact with the municipal government via use of the emergency 911 and nonemergency 311 call systems in Los Angeles. We find no average effect of OIS on patterns of 911 and 311 call behavior across a wide range of empirical specifications. Our results suggest, contrary to existing evidence, that OIS, in and of themselves, do not substantively change civic behavior, at least not citizen-initiated contact with local government.

Government responsiveness is often viewed as a result of political pressure from the public, but why do politicians facing similar pressure sometimes differ in their responsiveness? This article considers the configurations of elite networks as a key mediating factor. We argue that access to external support networks helps improve politicians’ responsiveness to ordinary citizens by reducing their dependence on vested interests, and we test this claim using China’s land market reform as a case. Leveraging novel city-level measures of mass grievances and political networks, we demonstrate that the intensity of land-related grievances is on average positively associated with reform occurrence, but this association is only salient among a subset of city leaders who enjoy informal connections to the higher-level authority. We also show that connected leaders tend to implement policies less congruent with local bureaucratic and business interests. These findings underscore the importance of intra-elite dynamics in shaping mass-elite interactions.

An analysis of adjudicated divorce decisions in two Chinese provinces reveals the extent to which and the reasons why Chinese courts subvert the global legal norms they symbolically embrace. In China, uncontested no-fault divorces are readily attainable outside the court system. Courts, by contrast, granted divorces in fewer than half of the cases they adjudicated. Despite an abundance of formal legal mechanisms designed to provide relief to victims of marital abuse, a plaintiff’s claim of domestic violence did not increase the probability a court granted a divorce request. Chinese courts’ highly institutionalized practice of denying first-attempt divorce petitions and granting divorces on subsequent litigation attempts disproportionately impacts women and has spawned a sizable population of female marital-violence refugees. These findings carry substantive and theoretical implications concerning the limits and possibilities of the local penetration of global legal norms.

This article uses reputation theory to address a century-old puzzle: what guides the choice of coordination efforts in large politico-administrative systems? Max Weber, founder of the modern study of bureaucracy, famously considered a hierarchy superior to other organizational models. However, modern governments are not organized as one big hierarchy but as a set of parallel hierarchies, typically 15–20 ministries. This raises a coordination challenge, which in practice has proven surprisingly difficult to meet. Based on reputation theory, we argue that concerns of audience management are likely to be an important factor when deciding on the level of coordination. We investigate this argument in the European Union’s central executive institution, the EU Commission. Based on more than 7,000 cases from the EU Commission’s internal digital coordination system we analyze the impact of audience sensitivity and audience involvement on coordination efforts. Our findings suggest that audience concerns are important drivers of agencies’ interdepartmental coordination.

The Dodd-Frank Act shifted regulatory jurisdiction over “ midsize” investment advisers from the SEC to state-securities regulators. Client complaints against midsize advisers increased relative to those continuing under SEC oversight by 30 to 40 percent of the unconditional probability. Complaints increasingly cited fiduciary violations and rose more where state regulators had fewer resources. Advisers responding more to weaker oversight had past complaints, were located farther from regulators, faced less competition, had more conflicts of interest, and served primarily less-sophisticated clients. Our results inform optimal regulatory design in markets with informational asymmetries and search frictions. (JEL G24, G28, K22, L51, L84)

We assess the importance of price regulation and price discrimination to low-income students’ access to opportunities in public higher education. In 2003, Texas shifted tuition-setting authority away from the state legislature to public universities themselves. In response, most institutions raised sticker prices and many began charging more for high-earning majors, such as business and engineering. We find that poor students actually shifted toward higher earning programs following deregulation, relative to non-poor students. Deregulation facilitated more price discrimination through increased grant aid and enabled supply-side enhancements, which may have partially shielded poor students from higher sticker prices. (JEL D63, H75, I22, I23, I24, I28, I32)

Abstract The ability of presidents to unilaterally shape administrative policymaking challenges a foundation of congressional power: Rarely can Congress statutorily veto administrative actions over presidential opposition. Consequently, Congress has turned to other means of influence, including the appropriations and oversight processes, although questions remain about the degree to which they have been effective. To investigate, I study a spatial model of administrative policymaking that assumes Congress can execute a legislative veto, as well as a baseline model in which congressional influence requires a coalition with the president. I compare the two models and develop empirical tests that exploit instances when their implications differ. Applying the tests to data on federal regulatory policymaking shows consistent evidence that Congress exerts veto power over administrative activity, even over those actions endorsed by the president. I conclude by discussing some broader implications, including the extent to which existing studies understate the constraints on presidential power.

Delegation of powers represents a grant of authority by politicians to one or more agents whose powers are determined by the conditions in enabling statutes. Extant empirical studies of this problem have relied on labor-intensive content analysis that ultimately restricts our knowledge of how delegation has responded to politics and institutional change in recent years. We present a machine learning approach to the empirical estimation of authority and constraint in European Union (EU) legislation, and demonstrate its ability to accurately generate the same discretionary measures used in an original study directly using all EU directives and regulations enacted between 1958–2017. We assess validity by training our classifier on a random sample of only 10% of hand-coded provisions and replicating an important substantive finding. While our principal interest lies in delegation, our method is extensible to any context in which human coding has been profitably produced.

The retrenchment of court-ordered school desegregation has been more variable and incomplete than often acknowledged, challenging common accounts that blame changes in federal policy and legal precedent. This study supplements these accounts by examining local factors that influenced whether and when desegregation orders were dismissed between 1970 and 2013. After accounting for federal policy changes and districts’ variable success in desegregating schools, several ostensibly race-neutral organizational, financial, and political incentives appear to influence the survival of desegregation orders. Racial competition dynamics related to local racial composition also seem to play a role, as desegregation orders have been most vulnerable when and where black population shares surpass a tipping point of about 40%.

How do proto-state organizations achieve an initial accumulation of power, such that they are in a position to grow (or shrink) as an organization, maintain their prestige (or lose it), and be viewed, by elite and populace, as something real and consequential that can be argued about, supported, or attacked? This article argues that state-formation has a performative dimension, in which the publicity of acts of violence, coercion, and negotiation made by agents of the proto-state, and the variable interpretation of these acts, are paramount to the state’s success (or failure) and developing character. In the model developed here, agents of a would-be state act in response to emergencies, and when public interpretations of those actions assign their character and effectiveness to “the state,” the state is performed into being. In particular, public performance solves, in part, agency problems obtaining between state rulers and their staff and elite allies. The formation of the federal government in the early American republic (1783 to 1801), whose success is insufficiently accounted for by extant theory, provides an opportunity to develop a model of the performative dimension of state-formation.

Incidents of police violence can undermine trust in legal authorities. Whether such incidents have this effect will depend on how citizens evaluate victims, the police, and public officials. Citizens’ evaluations may be shaped by information about (1) a pattern of police violence and (2) government responses. We study citizens’ reactions to police violence by randomly assigning these two types of information in the context of the Stephon Clark shooting in Sacramento. We find that information influences levels of blame for and trust in the police, but the effects depend on citizens’ race and whether they live in the community where the violence occurred. In contrast, information does not alter citizens’ perceptions of local police officer organizations and, in turn, their willingness to follow police endorsements in elections. These results suggest a catch-22 whereby police violence can diminish the standing of police personnel, but favorable local opinion preserves their political influence.

Communities provide a crucial experiential context for native-immigrant interactions, yet we know little about the impact of local government performance on shaping public responses to immigrants. Building on arguments considering efficient governments as critical factors in facilitating immigrant integration and mitigating denizens' political deprivation, we argue that efficient local governments also play a significant role in reducing anti-immigrant behavior. Using cost efficiency modeling to generate a measure of local government efficiency (LGE), we show high LGE is associated with fewer incidents of anti-immigrant violence in Germany during its unprecedented refugee intake in 2015. Testing the broader implications of our theory, we employ longitudinal data on LGE of Dutch municipalities merged with police records of criminal offenses against immigrants (2012–15). Results from two-way fixed effects models show a systematic, negative link between efficiency and violence. Our results suggest that improving local governance can have salutary benefits on intergroup relations.

Abstract In setting prices for physician services, Medicare solicits input from a committee that evaluates proposals from industry. The committee itself comprises members from industry; we investigate whether this arrangement leads to regulatory capture with prices biased toward industry interests. We find that increasing a measure of affiliation between the committee and proposers by one standard deviation increases prices by 10%. We then evaluate whether employing a biased committee as an intermediary may nonetheless be desirable, if greater affiliation allows the committee to extract information needed for regulation. We find industry proposers more affiliated with the committee produce less hard evidence in their proposals. However, on soft information, we find evidence of a trade-off: private insurers set prices that more closely track Medicare prices generated under higher affiliation.

A health insurer's Medical Loss Ratio (MLR) is the share of premiums spent on medical claims, or the inverse markup over average claims cost. The Affordable Care Act introduced minimum MLR provisions for all health insurance sold in fully insured commercial markets, thereby capping insurer profit margins, but not levels. While intended to reduce premiums, we show this rule creates incentives to increase costs. Using variation created by the rule's introduction as a natural experiment, we find medical claims rose nearly one-for-one with distance below the regulatory threshold: 7 percent in the individual market and 2 percent in the group market. Premiums were unaffected. (JEL G22, H51, I13, I18)

The case of restaurant hygiene grading occupies a central role in information disclosure scholarship. Comparing Los Angeles, which enacted grading in 1998, with California from 1995–1999, Jin and Leslie (2003) found that grading reduced foodborne illness hospitalizations by 20 percent. Expanding hospitalization data and collecting new data on mandatorily reported illnesses, we show that this finding does not hold up under improvements to the original data and methodology. The largest salmonella outbreak in state history hit Southern California before Los Angeles implemented grading. Placebo tests detect the same treatment effects for Southern California counties, none of which changed restaurant grading. (JEL D83, H75, I12, I18, L83, L88)

We study how a regulator can best target inspections. Our case study is a US Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) program that randomly allocated some inspections. On average, each inspection led to 2.4 (9 percent) fewer serious injuries over the next five years. We use new machine learning methods to estimate the effects of alternative targeting rules. OSHA could have averted twice as many injuries by targeting the highest expected averted injuries and nearly as many by targeting the highest expected level of injuries. Either approach would have generated nearly $1 billion in social value over the decade we examine.

Agencies use notice-and-comment rulemaking to issue countless regulations with substantial economic stakes. The empirical literature on rulemaking has produced a complex set of descriptive findings yet has struggled with informal concerns about selection bias. This article characterizes notice and comment as a persuasion game played between regulators and outside interests. Analysis of this stakeholder-balancing model yields three key theoretical payoffs: an informational rationale for regulators to write rules with higher private and social costs, an explanation for strategic positioning by regulators even without oversight, and clarification that adverse priors are a more powerful mobilizing force than adverse policies. The model’s two-sided selection dynamics reveal that well-established empirical regularities are inconsistent with extreme public-interest zealotry and strong capture but fit a range of intermediate outcomes. To obtain deeper insights about bias in rulemaking, the model suggests focusing on the cost of rule revision, rule movement following abstention, and variation in stakeholder preferences.

Activist nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) increasingly oppose firms’ practices. We suggest this might be related to the vulnerability of public regulation to corporate influence. We examine a potentially harmful industrial project subject to regulatory approval. Under industry influence, the regulator may approve the project even though it is harmful. However, an NGO may oppose it. We characterize the circumstances under which NGO opposition occurs and under which it is socially beneficial. Our theory explains the role that NGOs have assumed in the last decades, and has implications for the social legitimacy of activism and the appropriate degree of transparency of industrial activities. (JEL D21, D74, D82, L31, L51)

Discretion is fundamental to understanding interbranch interactions in the US separation-of-powers system. Yet, measuring discretion is challenging. The few existing measures have difficulty capturing both delegation and constraint in a consistent way over time. In this article, we propose a novel measure of executive discretion based on legislative appropriations to all agencies, weighted by spending limitations imposed by Congress in appropriations committee reports. We provide evidence for the validity of the measure, including a test of the ally principle to establish construct validity. Finally, we demonstrate the wider utility of the measure by employing it to evaluate hypotheses about how political control over the bureaucracy influences congressional policy making in the context of discretion. We show that agency design and presidential control are important factors in congressional decisions. Overall, we present a versatile measure of discretion that researchers can use to explore a variety of questions in American politics.

In developing countries, NGOs and governments often rely on local groups for the delivery of financial and public services. This paper studies how the design of rules used for group leader selection affects leader identity and shapes service delivery. To do so, we randomly assign newly formed savings and loan groups to select their leaders using either a public discussion procedure or a private vote procedure. Leaders selected with a private vote are found to be less positively selected on socioeconomic characteristics. This results in groups that are more inclusive toward poor members, without being less economically efficient. (JEL D72, O16, O17, O22, Z13)

We combine a randomized experiment with administrative data to study the effects of mandatory job search periods in the Dutch welfare system. Job search periods postpone the first welfare benefits payment and encourage applicants to start searching for jobs actively. Job search periods substantially reduce benefits take up. The decline in benefits receipt is permanent, but fully compensated by increased earnings because of higher reemployment rates. We do not find detectable effects on health and crime outcomes, nor do we observe income declines for more vulnerable applicants. Our results suggest that job search periods are an effective instrument for targeting benefits to welfare applicants. (JEL C93, I38, J31, J64)

Abstract Marriage rights were extended to same‐sex couples in the United States in 2015. However, anecdotes of bureaucratic noncompliance (in the form of bias or denial of license issuance) raise the possibility that de jure marriage equality has not led to equality in practice. We investigate this by conducting a nationwide audit experiment of local‐level marriage license–granting officials in the United States. These officials vary in the constituencies they serve, as well as how they are selected, allowing us to evaluate long‐standing hypotheses about bureaucratic responsiveness. Overall, we find no evidence of systematic discrimination against same‐sex couples—regardless of responsiveness measure, institutions, ideology, or prior state legal history. We find, however, that among same‐sex couples, officials tended to be more responsive to lesbian couples. In contrast to evidence in other areas of service provision, such as policing and federal assistance programs, we find bureaucrats tasked with provision of marriage services show little evidence of discrimination.

Abstract Can access to a few hundred dollars of liquidity affect the career choice of a recent college graduate? In a three-year field experiment with Teach For America (TFA), a prestigious teacher placement program, we randomly increase the financial packages offered to nearly 7,300 potential teachers who requested support for the transition into teaching. The first two years of the experiment reveal that although most applicants do not respond to a marginal $600 of grants or loans, those in the worst financial position respond by joining TFA at higher rates. We continue the experiment into the third year and self-replicate our results. For the highest-need applicants, an extra $600 in loans, $600 in grants, and $1,200 in grants increase the likelihood of joining TFA by 12.2, 11.4, and 17.1 percentage points (or 20.0%, 18.7%, and 28.1%), respectively. Additional grant and loan dollars are equally effective, suggesting a liquidity mechanism. A follow-up survey bolsters the liquidity story and also shows that those drawn into teaching would have otherwise worked in private-sector firms.

Abstract Authority over related policy issues is often dispersed among multiple government agencies. In this article, I study when Congress should delegate to multiple agencies, and how shared regulatory space complicates agency decision making. To do so, I develop a formal model of decentralized policymaking with two agencies that incorporates information acquisition and information sharing, delineating situations where legislators should and should not prefer multiple agencies. Greater divergence between the agencies' ideal points distorts information sharing and policy choices, but it may increase the amount of information acquisition. Congress achieves better policy outcomes by delegating authority to both agencies if the agencies have strong policy disagreements. If the agencies have similar policy preferences, however, then Congress may want to consolidate authority within one agency because this approach mitigates free‐riding and takes advantage of returns to scale.

Where it concerns traditional political knowledge, on average, men have outscored women. Research indicates that part of the knowledge gap originates before adulthood, and convincing work indicates it is likely the result of unequal returns to education. Yet, no research that we know has examined the role of educators. Given research about representative bureaucracy and how a gender match between student and teacher improves girls’ performance in fields that they may otherwise perceive as dominated by men, we examine the theory’s application to political knowledge. Using administrative data from five cohorts of public school students in North Carolina, we test the hypothesis that female students will do better on a state exam in civics and economics when their teacher is a woman. Results of our analyses support the hypothesis by revealing a small but significant narrowing of the gap in test scores when students have a female teacher.

Governments of all stripes have attempted to transgress ordinary legal limits and infringe upon rights and liberties under the cover of emergency powers. Are repressive policies adopted under emergency law less likely to comply with extant legal limits, as compared to repressive policies adopted under normal law? What are the mechanisms by which the potential abuse of emergency powers can be constrained? To answer these questions, we develop a game-theoretic model that builds upon the fact that political rulers rely on security agents to execute their repressive policies. We show that rulers always prefer to make policy under emergency law while security agents actually prefer the legal regime that incentivizes rulers to choose a policy more likely to comply with ordinary legal limits. Consequently, there is a potential endogenous constraint on the abuse of emergency powers given that rulers must rely on security agents to implement their repressive decisions.

Since at least T. H. Marshall, scholars have recognized military service as a form of sacrifice that warrants compensation from the state. War-widow pensions, expansion of the franchise, and subsidized higher education are all examples of rights and benefits "bestowed" in return for wartime mobilization. Similarly, in the United States, governments have hired veterans preferentially for civilian public jobs as recompense for active military service. Although oft overlooked, those policies seem influential: the percentage of job holders identifying as veterans in the civilian US executive branch exceeds the proportion in the wider population by several multiples. This century-old pattern suggests another way that wartime mobilization has influenced the state. Yet, efforts to understand it have struggled to rule out the possibility that those who serve in the armed forces are predisposed to work for the state in both military and civilian capacities. Here, we rule out this possibility by examining whether birthdates randomly called for induction in the Vietnam-Era Selective Service Lotteries (VSSL) appear disproportionately in the population of nonsensitive personnel records of the civilian US executive branch. We find that birthdates called for induction appear with unusually high frequency among employees who were draft eligible and at risk for induction but not among other employees. This finding suggests a treatment effect from military service, thus dovetailing with the hypothesis that wartime mobilization has substantially and continually influenced who works in the contemporary administrative state.

Governments around the world have privatized public services in the name of efficiency and citizen empowerment, but some argue that privatization could also affect citizen participation in democratic governance. We explore this possibility by estimating the impact of charter schools (which are publicly funded but privately operated) on school district elections. The analysis indicates that the enrollment of district students in charter schools reduced the number of votes cast in district school board contests and, correspondingly, reduced turnout in the odd-year elections in which those contests are held. This impact is concentrated in districts that serve low-achieving, impoverished, and minority students, leading to a modest decline in the share of voters in those districts who are black and who have children. There is little evidence that charter school expansion affected the outcomes of school board elections or turnout in other elections.

Using data on over a million land transactions during 2004-2016 where local governments are the sole seller, we find that firms linked to members of China's supreme political elites-the Politburo-obtained a price discount ranging from 55.4% to 59.9% compared with those without the same connections. These firms also purchased slightly more land. In return, the provincial party secretaries who provided the discount to these "princeling" firms are 23.4% more likely to be promoted to positions of national leadership. To curb corruption, President Xi Jinping stepped up investigations and strengthened personnel control at the province level. Using a spatially matched sample (e.g., within a 500-meter radius), we find a reduction in corruption of between 42.6% and 31.5% in the provinces either targeted by the central inspection teams or whose party secretary was replaced by one appointed by Xi. Accordingly, this crackdown on corruption has also significantly reduced the promotional prospects of those local officials who rely on supplying a discount to get ahead.

We study the impact of post-1990 school finance reforms, during the so-called “adequacy” era, on absolute and relative spending and achievement in low-income school districts. Using an event study research design that exploits the apparent randomness of reform timing, we show that reforms lead to sharp, immediate, and sustained increases in spending in low-income school districts. Using representative samples from the National Assessment of Educational Progress, we find that reforms cause increases in the achievement of students in these districts, phasing in gradually over the years following the reform. The implied effect of school resources on educational achievement is large. (JEL H75, I21, I22, I24, I28)

Abstract Patron–client networks are widely found in governments of transitional societies and are often seen as an impediment to effective governance. This article advances an alternative view that emphasizes their enabling effects. I argue that patron–client relations can be used to improve government performance by resolving principal–agent problems within political hierarchies. I substantiate this claim by examining how patronage networks shape economic performance of local governments in China. Using an original city–level panel data set between 2000 and 2011, and a new method that identifies patronage ties based on past promotions, I show that city leaders with informal ties to the incumbent provincial leaders deliver significantly faster economic growth than those without. I conduct additional analyses to rule out several important alternative explanations and provide evidence on the incentive‐enhancing mechanism. These findings highlight the importance of informal institutions for bureaucratic management and authoritarian governance.

This study examines how the historical state conditions long‐run development, using Vietnam as a laboratory. Northern Vietnam (Dai Viet) was ruled by a strong, centralized state in which the village was the fundamental administrative unit. Southern Vietnam was a peripheral tributary of the Khmer (Cambodian) Empire, which followed a patron‐client model with more informal, personalized power relations and no village intermediation. Using a regression discontinuity design, the study shows that areas exposed to Dai Viet administrative institutions for a longer period prior to French colonization have experienced better economic outcomes over the past 150 years. Rich historical data document that in Dai Viet villages, citizens have been better able to organize for public goods and redistribution through civil society and local government. We argue that institutionalized village governance crowded in local cooperation and that these norms persisted long after the original institutions disappeared.

I combine newly digitized personnel and public finance data from the British colonial administration for the period 1854–1966 to study how patronage affects the promotion and incentives of governors. Governors are more likely to be promoted to higher salaried colonies when connected to their superior during the period of patronage. Once allocated, they provide more tax exemptions, raise less revenue, and invest less. The promotion and performance gaps disappear after the abolition of patronage appointments. Patronage therefore distorts the allocation of public sector positions and reduces the incentives of favored bureaucrats to perform. (JEL D73, F54, H83, J45, M51, N43, N44)

The increasingly visible presence of heavily armed police units in American communities has stoked widespread concern over the militarization of local law enforcement. Advocates claim militarized policing protects officers and deters violent crime, while critics allege these tactics are targeted at racial minorities and erode trust in law enforcement. Using a rare geocoded census of SWAT team deployments from Maryland, I show that militarized police units are more often deployed in communities with large shares of African American residents, even after controlling for local crime rates. Further, using nationwide panel data on local police militarization, I demonstrate that militarized policing fails to enhance officer safety or reduce local crime. Finally, using survey experiments-one of which includes a large oversample of African American respondents-I show that seeing militarized police in news reports may diminish police reputation in the mass public. In the case of militarized policing, the results suggest that the often-cited trade-off between public safety and civil liberties is a false choice.

Employing the universe of juvenile court decisions in a US state between 1996 and 2012, we analyze the effects of emotional shocks associated with unexpected outcomes of football games played by a prominent college team in the state. We find that unexpected losses increase sentence lengths assigned by judges during the week following the game. Unexpected wins, or losses that were expected to be close contests ex ante have no impact. The effects of these emotional shocks are asymmetrically borne by black defendants. The impact of upset losses on sentence lengths is larger for defendants if their cases are handled by judges who received their bachelor's degrees from the university with which the football team is affiliated. Different falsification tests and a number of auxiliary analyses demonstrate the robustness of the findings. These results provide evidence for the impact of emotions in one domain on decisions in a completely unrelated domain among a uniformly highly educated group of individuals (judges) who make decisions after deliberation that involve high stakes (sentence lengths). They also point to the existence of a subtle and previously unnoticed capricious application of sentencing. (JEL D83, I23, J13, J15, K42, L83, Z21)

We show that in the presence of admissions reserves, the effect of the precedence order (i.e., the order in which different types of seats are filled) is comparable to the effect of adjusting reserve sizes. Either lowering the precedence of reserve seats at a school or increasing the school’s reserve size weakly increases reserve-group assignment at that school. Using data from Boston Public Schools, we show that reserve and precedence adjustments have similar quantitative effects. Transparency about these issues—in particular, how precedence unintentionally undermined intended policy—led to the elimination of walk zone reserves in Boston’s public school match.

Recent empirical evidence suggests an ambiguous relationship between internal conflicts, state capacity, and tax performance. In theory, internal conflict should create strong incentives for governments to develop the fiscal capacity necessary to defeat rivals. We argue that one reason that this does not occur is because internal conflict enables groups with de facto power to capture local fiscal and property rights institutions. We test this mechanism in Colombia using data on tax performance and property rights institutions at the municipal level. Municipalities affected by internal conflict have tax institutions consistent with the preferences of the parties dominating local violence. Those suffering more right-wing violence feature more land formalization and higher property tax revenues. Municipalities with substantial left-wing guerrilla violence collect less tax revenue and witness less land formalization. Our findings provide systematic evidence that internal armed conflict helps interest groups capture municipal institutions for their own private benefit, impeding state-building.

Scholarship on bureaucratic responsiveness to Congress typically focuses on delegation and formal oversight hearings. Overlooked are daily requests to executive agencies made by legislators that propose policies, communicate concerns, and request information or services. Analyzing over 24,000 of these requests made to 13 executive agencies between 2007 and 2014, I find agencies systematically prioritize the policy-related requests of majority party legislators—but that this effect can be counteracted when presidents politicize agencies through appointments. An increase in politicization produces a favorable agency bias toward presidential copartisans. This same politicization, however, has a net negative impact on agency responsiveness—agencies are less responsive to members of Congress, but even less responsive to legislators who are not presidential copartisans. Critically, this negative impact extends beyond policy-related requests to cases of constituency service. The results suggest that presidential appointees play an important, daily mediating role between Congress and the bureaucracy.

Scholarship on oversight of the bureaucracy typically conceives of legislatures as unitary actors. But most oversight is conducted by individual legislators who contact agencies directly. I acquire the correspondence logs of 16 bureaucratic agencies and re-evaluate the conventional proposition that ideological disagreement drives oversight. I identify the effect of this disagreement by exploiting the transition from George Bush to Barack Obama, which shifted the ideological orientation of agencies through turnover in agency personnel. Contrary to existing research, I find ideological conflict has a negligible effect on oversight, whereas committee roles and narrow district interests are primary drivers. The findings may indicate that absent incentives induced by public auditing, legislator behavior is driven by policy valence concerns rather than ideology. The results further suggest collective action in Congress may pose greater obstacles to bureaucratic oversight than previously thought.

Abstract Public‐sector unions are generally thought to increase the size of government through collective bargaining. This article challenges this idea for the case of teacher unions in the United States and argues that while collective bargaining institutions sometimes lead to increased education spending, this is not the norm. Using a new longitudinal data set spanning all states before and after they granted collective bargaining rights to teachers, the article shows that although states that mandate districts to bargain with teachers have higher education expenditures than states that do not, the differences precede collective bargaining. Difference‐in‐differences analyses find no evidence that introducing collective bargaining rights led to average increases in the level of resources devoted to education. Although existing theories cannot explain these null findings, the article shows one reason behind them is that most laws granting collective bargaining rights to teachers were not unambiguously prolabor, but included both pro‐ and anti‐union provisions.

We model criminal investigation as a principal-agent-monitor problem in which the agent can bribe the monitor to destroy evidence. Building on insights from Laffont and Martimort’s 1997 paper, we study whether the principal can profitably introduce asymmetric information between agent and monitor by randomizing the monitor’s incentives. We show that it can be the case, but the optimality of random incentives depends on unobserved preexisting patterns of private information. We provide a data-driven framework for policy evaluation requiring only unverified reports. A potential local policy change is an improvement if, everything else equal, it is associated with greater reports of crime.

This paper investigates the effects of polling station administrator diversity on elections in India, using a natural experiment: the random assignment of government officials to teams managing stations on election day, together with surveys conducted with voters and election officers. I demonstrate that changes in the religious and caste composition of officer teams impact voting at the polling station level, causing shifts in coalition vote shares large enough to influence election outcomes. Effects are strongest when officers have greater discretion over the voting process. I also provide evidence suggesting own-group favoritism by election personnel as one relevant mechanism. (JEL C93, D72, D73, J15, O17, Z12)

Human workers ensure the functioning of governments around the world. The efficacy of human workers, in turn, is linked to the climatic conditions they face. Here we show that the same weather that amplifies human health hazards also reduces street-level government workers' oversight of these hazards. To do so, we employ US data from over 70 million regulatory police stops between 2000 and 2017, from over 500,000 fatal vehicular crashes between 2001 and 2015, and from nearly 13 million food safety violations across over 4 million inspections between 2012 and 2016. We find that cold and hot temperatures increase fatal crash risk and incidence of food safety violations while also decreasing police stops and food safety inspections. Added precipitation increases fatal crash risk while also decreasing police stops. We examine downscaled general circulation model output to highlight the possible day-to-day governance impacts of climate change by 2050 and 2099. Future warming may augment regulatory oversight during cooler seasons. During hotter seasons, however, warming may diminish regulatory oversight while simultaneously amplifying the hazards government workers are tasked with overseeing.

Lack of trust in state institutions, often due to poor service provision, is a pervasive problem in many developing countries. If this increases reliance on non-state actors for crucial services, the resulting self-reinforcing cycle can further weaken the state. This paper examines whether such a cycle can be disrupted. We focus on dispute resolution in rural Punjab, Pakistan. We find that providing information about reduced delays in state courts leads to citizens reporting higher willingness to use state courts and to greater fund allocations to the state in two lab-in-the-field games designed to measure trust in state and non-state actors in a high-stakes setting. More interestingly, we find indirect effects on non-state actors. After receiving state positive information, respondents report lower likelihood of using non-state institutions and reduce funds allocated to them in field games. Furthermore, we find similar direct and indirect effects on a battery of questions concerning people's beliefs about these actors, including a decreased allegiance to the non-state actor. We rationalize these results with a model of motivated reasoning whereby reduced usage of non-state institutions makes people less likely to hold positive views about them. These results indicate that, despite substantial distrust of the state in Pakistan, credible new information can change beliefs and behavior. The feedback loop between state ineffectiveness and the legitimacy of non-state actors may be reversible.

I conducted a randomized field experiment in traditional public elementary schools in Houston, Texas designed to test the potential productivity benefits of teacher specialization. The average impact of encouraging schools to specialize their teachers on student achievement is −0.11 standard deviations per year on a combined index of math and reading test scores. I argue that the results are consistent with a model in which the benefits of specialization driven by sorting teachers into a subset of subjects based on comparative advantage is outweighed by inefficient pedagogy due to having fewer interactions with each student, though other mechanisms are possible. (JEL D31, E32, J22, J24, J31)

Abstract In recent years, scholars have expended considerable efforts to understand the executive appointment process and the forces influencing the choices made by the president and the Senate. However, some factors integral to theoretical models have not been well integrated empirically, and other relevant factors have not been incorporated much at all. Here, we focus on one determinant corresponding to the former critique—nominee ideology—and another corresponding to the latter—the independence of decision makers in the targeted agencies. We examine a series of theoretically driven hypotheses regarding the effects of both ideology and independence on who gets nominated and if and when nominees are eventually confirmed. Results show nominee ideology and decision maker independence matter a great deal and factor into presidential strategic choices and senatorial responses in ways according to expectations. Our findings have important ramifications for understanding appointments empirically and for future theoretical development.

Canonical political budget cycle theories predict an increase in visible government expenditures in election years due to signaling by incumbents. We identify the presence of an alternative election-related distortion of government budgets—a drop in capital expenditures—that applies in low capacity and weak governance settings. In election years, the increase in scrutiny and distraction of politicians and bureaucrats decreases the ability of governments to facilitate complicated capital investments. We test this argument by exploiting the exogenous phasing in and timing of local direct elections in Indonesian districts and detailed data on local budget compositions to document the existence of meaningful reductions in capital expenditures in election years. This effect is mediated by the status of incumbents. While safe incumbents who are running for reelection can avoid this particular type of distortion, elections with embattled incumbents or without incumbents running for reelection exhibit much stronger effects.

Many politicians manipulate information to prevent voters from holding them accountable; however, mobile text messages may make it easier for nongovernmental organizations to credibly share information on official corruption that is difficult for politicians to counter directly. We test the potential for texts on budget management to improve democratic accountability by conducting a large (<i>n</i> = 16,083) randomized controlled trial during the 2016 Ugandan district elections. In cooperation with a local partner, we compiled, simplified, and text-messaged official information on irregularities in local government budgets. Verified recipients of messages that described more irregularities than expected reported voting for incumbent councillors 6% less often; verified recipients of messages conveying fewer irregularities than expected reported voting for incumbent councillors 5% more often. The messages had no observable effect on votes for incumbent council chairs, potentially due to voters' greater reliance on other sources of information for higher profile elections. These mixed results suggest that text messages on budget corruption help voters hold some politicians accountable in settings where elections are not free and fair.

Classic theory is ambiguous regarding what is most meaningful for workers and workplaces. Are bureaucratic rules most consequential by providing predictability, as suggested by Weber, or problematic, owing to assaults on autonomy? And what of proximate social relations, seen as fundamental in ethnographic, resistance, and justice accounts? This article’s analyses, which draw on a unique sample of approximately 2,500 German workers across heterogeneous contexts, reveal pronounced effects of horizontal and vertical social relations on worker (i.e., satisfaction and fairness) and workplace (i.e., commitment and effort) outcomes. These effects, which hold for high- and low-status workers, exist beyond independent, mediating, or conditional associations with rules and have differing implications for women versus men. The authors discuss the importance of their findings for work, organizational, and inequality literatures and call for greater attention to relational dimensions of work-life, their frequent disconnect from bureaucratic structures, and the consequences for organizations and the individuals within.

We analyze a model of policy making in which only one actor (e.g., a bureaucratic agency or a well-funded interest group) has the capacity to develop high-quality policy proposals. By virtue of her skills, this actor has an effective monopoly on policy development and thus can craft proposals that are good for herself but provide few benefits to decision makers who enact policies. We then examine institutional responses that decision makers can use to induce a policy-development monopolist to craft more appealing proposals: (i) establishing in-house policy development capacity, (ii) delegating authority to an agent who counterbalances the monopolist’s preferences, and (iii) fostering competition by policy developers with different preferences. We apply our model to a diverse set of contexts, including lobbying in term-limited state legislatures, regulation of banking and financial services, and administrative procedures for rule making in US federal bureaucracies.

Politicians react to administrative policy making by developing systems of oversight. Existing studies largely emphasize the advantages of reactive oversight, where politicians wait for interest groups to pull a “fire alarm” on noncompliant activity. Less attention has been paid to proactive oversight, where politicians police administrators directly. To evaluate the effectiveness of “police patrol” oversight, I look to the White House, which has been policing regulatory proposals since the Nixon administration. I show how policing, or regulatory review, has made agencies more responsive to the president, both by singling out noncompliant proposals and, critically, by shaping agency behavior in anticipation of review. My findings suggest that police patrol oversight is more efficient than previously acknowledged, notably because the associated deterrence effects yield low-cost compliance. I conclude with a discussion of why Congress, despite having similar incentives to control administrators, has not adopted a parallel system of policing.

Scholarly attention on executive policy making has largely focused on presidents and the federal bureaucracy. Yet, state policy making is just as important given its immediate influence on our daily lives. This article provides a guide to studying this area for interested scholars. First, I make the case for why state executive policy making is important and its advantages over the federal level. Second, I outline four approaches to researching this area: (1) asking state-specific questions, (2) using the states to strictly test federal-level theories, (3) leveraging state-level data to test underlying mechanisms of theories developed for the federal level, and (4) examining intergovernmental interactions. I conclude by highlighting the available resources for such research, while calling attention to areas needing improvement.

Do people hold politicians accountable for the performance of government? I test this question using individual-level experiences with the performance of one major public service: transportation. I compile records of transit performance, tracked via individuals’ fare transactions and train delays, and link these data to opinion surveys. I show that people perceive different levels of performance but fail to connect performance with judgments of government. I build on this by testing the importance of responsibility attribution on people’s ability to hold government accountable. I find that when people are experimentally provided with information on government responsibilities, they are able to connect their experiences of performance with their opinions of government. These results demonstrate that confusion about government responsibilities can frustrate accountability.

How does ethnic politics affect the state’s ability to provide policing services? Using a panel of administrative personnel data on the full careers of 6,784 police officers, we show how the rise of ethnic politics around Kenya’s independence influenced policemen’s behavior. We find a significant deterioration in discipline after Kenya’s first multiparty election for those police officers of ethnic groups associated with the ruling party. These effects are driven by a behavioral change among these policemen. We find no evidence of favoritism within the police. Instead, our results are consistent with co-ethnic officers experiencing an emboldenment effect. Our findings highlight that the state’s security apparatus, at its most granular level, is not insulated from ethnic politics. (JEL D72, J15, K42, O15, O17)

Abstract Not all citizens’ voices are heard with equal strength in the political chorus. Based on studies of policy feedback, we suggest that engaging underrepresented citizens in the production of public services (i.e., making them “coproducers”) increases their political voice. We use a field experiment to test the effect of involving ethnic minorities in the education of their children on their propensity to directly voice their preferences with the education policy through government citizen surveys and their tendency to vote in elections. Among these normally underrepresented citizens, coproduction increased their propensity to voice their preferences to politicians through citizen surveys but not their tendency to vote. The effect on voicing in government citizen surveys tends to be larger among nonvoters. The results indicate how policies involving underrepresented citizens can raise the voices of people who would not otherwise be heard.

The Great Depression produced a profound and lasting influence on the structure of US government. This paper studies theoretically and empirically the increased centralization of revenues and expenditures by the states relative to local governments during this period. A model of property and sales taxation and tax delinquency is introduced. In the model, the income decline of the Depression causes a rise in property tax delinquency and leads to a shift toward sales taxation and fiscal centralization by the states. Empirical evidence based on cross-state variation in the severity of the Depression is consistent with the model's key predictions. (JEL E32, H25, H71, H72, H77, N12, N42)

When making appointments to bureaucratic positions, presidents often have to balance various appointee traits, including loyalty, competence, connections, campaign experience, and potential electoral benefit. Previous research has suggested that patronage appointees—often characterized as those individuals appointed because of campaign experience, electoral benefit, or other nonpolicy political benefits—tend to be placed in low-priority agencies whose missions are ideological matches to the president and in positions where they will have minimal effects on agency outcomes. However, this research has overlooked the role of agency structure and the ease with which appointees can be placed into—or removed from—office. This article focuses on agency decision-maker independence, or the extent to which agency structure limits the appointment/removal of key agency decision makers. Using data on individuals appointed in the first six months of the Obama administration, I find that presidents put fewer patronage appointees into agencies whose structural features promote agency decision-maker independence.

Political corruption is considered a major impediment to economic development, and yet it remains pervasive throughout the world. This paper examines the extent to which government audits of public resources can reduce corruption by enhancing political and judiciary accountability. We do so in the context of Brazil’s anti-corruption program, which randomly audits municipalities for their use of federal funds. We find that being audited in the past reduces future corruption by 8 percent, while also increasing the likelihood of experiencing a subsequent legal action by 20 percent. We interpret these reduced-form findings through a political agency model, which we structurally estimate. Based on our estimated model, the reduction in corruption comes mostly from the audits increasing the perceived threat of the non-electoral costs of engaging in corruption.

This paper explores racial differences in police use of force. On non-lethal uses of force, blacks and Hispanics are more than fifty percent more likely to experience some form of force in interactions with police. Adding controls that account for important context and civilian behavior reduces, but cannot fully explain, these disparities. On the most extreme use of force – officer-involved shootings – we find no racial differences in either the raw data or when contextual factors are taken into account. We argue that the patterns in the data are consistent with a model in which police officers are utility maximizers, a fraction of which have a preference for discrimination, who incur relatively high expected costs of officer-involved shootings.

Hayek (1945) argues that local information is key to understanding the efficiency of alternative economic systems and whether production should be centralized or decentralized. The Chinese experience of decentralizing SOEs confirms this insight: when the distance to the government is farther, the SOE is more likely to be decentralized, and this distance-decentralization link is more pronounced with higher communication costs and greater firm-performance heterogeneity. However, when the Chinese central government oversees SOEs in strategic industries, the distance-decentralization link is muted. We also consider alternative agency-cost-based explanations, and do not find much support. (JEL D22, D83, L25, L32, L33, O14, P31)

We use variation in historical state centralization to examine the long-term impact of institutions on cultural norms. The Kuba Kingdom, established in Central Africa in the early 17th century by King Shyaam, had more developed state institutions than the other independent villages and chieftaincies in the region. It had an unwritten constitution, separation of political powers, a judicial system with courts and juries, a police force, a military, taxation, and significant public goods provision. Comparing individuals from the Kuba Kingdom to those from just outside the Kingdom, we find that centralized formal institutions are associated with weaker norms of rule following and a greater propensity to cheat for material gain. This finding is consistent with recent models where endogenous investments to inculcate values in children decline when there is an increase in the effectiveness of formal institutions that enforce socially desirable behavior. Consistent with such a mechanism, we find that Kuba parents believe it is less important to teach children values related to rule-following behaviors.

Students in India who cheat on a simple laboratory task are more likely to prefer public sector jobs. This paper shows that cheating on this task predicts corrupt behavior by civil servants, implying that it is a meaningful predictor of future corruption. Students who demonstrate pro-social preferences are less likely to prefer government jobs, while outcomes on an explicit game and attitudinal measures to measure corruption do not systematically predict job preferences. A screening process that chooses high-ability applicants would not alter the average propensity for corruption. The findings imply that differential selection into government may contribute, in part, to corruption. (JEL C91, D12, D73, H83, K42, O12, O17)

This paper measures the effect of increased primary school spending on students' college enrollment and completion. Using student-level panel administrative data, I exploit variation in the school funding formula imposed by Michigan's 1994 school finance reform, Proposal A. Students exposed to $1,000 (10 percent) more spending were 3 percentage points (7 percent) more likely to enroll in college and 2.3 percentage points (11 percent) more likely to earn a postsecondary degree. The effects were concentrated among districts that were urban and suburban, lower poverty, and higher achieving at baseline. Districts targeted the marginal dollar toward schools serving less-poor populations within the district. (JEL H75, I21, I22, I28)

How does a large unconditional increase in salary affect the performance of incumbent employees in the public sector? We present experimental evidence on this question in the context of a policy change in Indonesia that led to a permanent doubling of teacher base salaries. Using a large-scale randomized experiment across a representative sample of Indonesian schools that accelerated this pay increase for teachers in treated schools, we find that the large pay increase significantly improved teachers' satisfaction with their income, reduced the incidence of teachers holding outside jobs, and reduced self-reported financial stress. Nevertheless, after two and three years, the increase in pay led to no improvement in student learning outcomes. The effects are precisely estimated, and we can rule out even modest positive impacts on test scores. Our results suggest that unconditional pay increases are unlikely to be an effective policy option for improving the effort and productivity of incumbent employees in public-sector settings.

Partisanship is a primary predictor of attitudes toward public policy. However, we do not yet know whether party similarly plays a role in shaping public policy behavior, such as whether to apply for government benefits or take advantage of public services. While existing research has identified numerous factors that increase policy uptake, the role of politics has been almost entirely overlooked. In this paper, we examine the case of the Affordable Care Act to assess whether policy uptake is not only about information and incentives; but also about politics. Using longitudinal data, we find that Republicans have been less likely than Democrats to enroll in an insurance plan through state or federal exchanges, all else equal. Employing a large-scale field experiment, we then show that de-emphasizing the role of government (and highlighting the market's role) can close this partisan gap.

We study patronage politics in authoritarian Vietnam, using an exhaustive panel of ranking officials from 2000 to 2010 to estimate their promotions' impact on infrastructure in their hometowns of patrilineal ancestry. Native officials' promotions lead to a broad range of hometown infrastructure improvement. Hometown favoritism is pervasive across all ranks, even among officials without budget authority, except among elected legislators. Favors are narrowly targeted toward small communes that have no political power, and are strengthened with bad local governance and strong local family values. The evidence suggests a likely motive of social preferences for hometown. (JEL D72, H76, O15, O17, O18, P25, Z13)

Within seemingly weak states, exceptionally effective subunits lie hidden. These high-performing niches exhibit organizational characteristics distinct from poor-performing peer organizations, but also distinct from high-functioning organizations in Western countries. This article develops the concept of interstitial bureaucracy to explain how and why unusually high-performing state organizations in developing countries invert canonical features of Weberian bureaucracy. Interstices are distinct-yet-embedded subsystems characterized by practices inconsistent with those of the dominant institution. This interstitial position poses particular challenges and requires unique solutions. Interstices cluster together scarce proto-bureaucratic resources to cultivate durable distinction from the status quo, while managing disruptions arising from interdependencies with the wider neopatrimonial field. I propose a framework for how bureaucratic interstices respond to those challenges, generalizing from organizational comparisons within the Ghanaian state and abbreviated historical comparison cases from the nineteenth-century United States, early-twentieth-century China, mid-twentieth-century Kenya, and early-twenty-first-century Nigeria.

This paper asks whether pay disclosure in the public sector changes wage setting at the top of the distribution. I examine a 2010 California mandate that required municipal salaries to be posted online. Among top managers, disclosure led to approximately 7 percent average compensation declines, and a 75 percent increase in their quit rate, relative to managers in cities that had already disclosed salaries. The wage cuts were largely nominal. Wage cuts were larger in cities with higher initial compensation, but not in cities where compensation was initially out of line with (measured) fundamentals. The response is more consistent with public aversion to high compensation than the effects of increased accountability.

Many organizations have budgets that expire at the end of the fiscal year and may face incentives to rush to spend resources on low-quality projects at year's end. We test these predictions using data on procurement spending by the US federal government. Spending in the last week of the year is 4.9 times higher than the rest-of-the-year weekly average, and year-end information technology projects have substantially lower quality ratings. We also analyze the gains from allowing agencies to roll over unused funds into the next fiscal year. (JEL H57, H61)

We examine US city governments’ use of fines and court fees for local revenue, a policy that disproportionately affects black voters, and the connections between this policy and black representation. Using data on over 9,000 cities, we show that the use of fines as revenue is common and that it is robustly related to the share of city residents who are black. We also find that black representation on city councils diminishes the connection between black population and fines revenue. Our findings speak to the potential of descriptive representation to alleviate biases in city policy.

Redistribution programs in developing countries often “leak” because local officials do not implement programs as the central government intends. We study one approach to reducing leakage. In an experiment in over 550 villages, we test whether mailing cards with program information to targeted beneficiaries increases the subsidy they receive from a subsidized rice program. On net, beneficiaries received 26 percent more subsidy in card villages. Ineligible households received no less, so this represents substantially lower leakage.

Coordinated single-offer school assignment systems are a popular education reform. We show that uncoordinated offers in NYC's school assignment mechanism generated mismatches. One-third of applicants were unassigned after the main round and later administratively placed at less desirable schools. We evaluate the effects of the new coordinated mechanism based on deferred acceptance using estimated student preferences. The new mechanism achieves 80 percent of the possible gains from a no-choice neighborhood extreme to a utilitarian benchmark. Coordinating offers dominates the effects of further algorithm modifications. Students most likely to be previously administratively assigned experienced the largest gains in welfare and subsequent achievement. (JEL C78, D82, I21, I28)

Development projects like schools and latrines are popular with politicians and voters alike, yet many developing countries are littered with half-finished projects that were abandoned mid-construction. Using an original database of over 14,000 small development projects in Ghana, I estimate that one-third of projects that start are never completed, consuming nearly one-fifth of all local government investment. I develop a theory of project noncompletion as the outcome of a dynamically inconsistent collective choice process among political actors facing commitment problems in contexts of limited resources. I find evidence consistent with key predictions of this theory, but inconsistent with alternative explanations based on corruption or clientelism. I show that fiscal institutions can increase completion rates by mitigating the operational consequences of these collective choice failures. These findings have theoretical and methodological implications for distributive politics, the design of intergovernmental transfers and aid, and the development of state capacity.

Do businesspeople who win elected office use their positions to help their firms? Business leaders become politicians around the world, yet we know little about whether their commitment to public service trumps their own private interests. Using an original dataset of 2,703 firms in Russia, I employ a regression discontinuity design to identify the causal effect of firm directors winning seats in subnational legislatures from 2004 to 2013. First, having a connection to a winning politician increases a firm’s revenue by 60% and profitability by 15% over a term in office. I then test between different mechanisms, finding that connected firms improve their performance by gaining access to bureaucrats and not by signaling legitimacy to financiers. The value of winning a seat increases in more politically competitive regions but falls markedly when more businesspeople win office in a convocation. Politically connected firms extract fewer benefits when faced with greater competition from other rent-seekers.

We analyze the impact of trade-induced income shocks on the size of local government and the provision of public services. Areas in the United States with declining labor demand and incomes due to increasing import competition from China experience relative declines in housing prices and business activity. Since local governments are disproportionately funded through property and sales taxation, declining property values and a decrease in economic activity translate into less revenue, which constrains the ability of local governments to provide public services. State and federal governments have limited ability to smooth local shocks, and the impact on the provision of public services is compounded when local income shocks are highly correlated with shocks in the rest of the state. The outcome is a relative decline not only in incomes but also in the quality of public services and amenities in trade exposed localities. (JEL F14, F16, H41, H71, R12, R31, R51)

While locally embedded bureaucrats may be more willing and able to enhance public goods provisioning in the places that they serve, they may also be more likely to be captured by elite interests. We reconcile these two viewpoints by arguing that locally embedded bureaucrats enhance public goods provisioning when they can be held accountable by the public. We test this theory using data from India, examining how changes in public goods provision within districts are related to the embeddedness of the senior bureaucrats who served in them, using the plausibly random initial assignment of bureaucrats to account for the endogeneity of officer assignment. We find that officers from the state they serve increase public goods provision. Consistent with our theory, this effect is only present in districts with conditions that favor accountability. Our findings further the literatures on embeddedness, bureaucracy, leadership, and development.

We investigate the effects of territorial government fragmentation on the quality of public services. We argue that an increase in the number of regional governments has two effects: (1) it redistributes fiscal and administrative resources to underserved regions and (2) encourages yardstick competition. Extreme government fragmentation, however, limits efficiency gains by reducing administrative capacity, economies of scale, and enabling capture. We test this argument using original data on the number of regional governments in sub-Saharan Africa (1960–2012). Consistent with our theoretical expectations, we find robust evidence for an initial increase in the quality of services provision following regional government splits, which levels off at high levels of regional fragmentation. Three distinct difference-in-difference analyses of microlevel, georeferenced data on health outcomes in Malawi, Nigeria, and Uganda further support our theoretical argument.

We present evidence of how policies that create opportunities to avoid open competition in procurement lead to the manipulation of procurement values. We exploit a policy reform in which public bodies were given the autonomy to preselect potential contractors below newly defined discretionary thresholds. Manipulation is revealed through bunching of procurements just below the thresholds in construction works and services, and to a lesser degree, in goods. Among manipulated contracts, we document a threefold increase in the probability that procurements are allocated to anonymous firms, which can hide their owners. This sorting violates assumptions behind regression-discontinuity designs. (JEL D73, D86, H57, K23, L74)

Abstract A growing experimental literature uses response rates to fictional requests to measure discrimination against ethnic minorities. This article argues that restricting attention to response rates can lead to faulty inferences about substantive discrimination depending on how response dummies are correlated with other response characteristics. We illustrate the relevance of this problem by means of a conjoint experiment among all German welfare offices, in which we randomly varied five traits and designed requests to allow for a substantive coding of response quality. We find that response rates are statistically indistinguishable across treatment conditions. However, putative non‐Germans receive responses of significantly lower quality, potentially deterring them from applying for benefits. We also find observational evidence suggesting that discrimination is more pronounced in welfare offices run by local governments than in those embedded in the national bureaucracy. We discuss implications for the study of equality in the public sphere.

This study estimates the effect of improved bureaucrat quality on poverty alleviation by exploring a unique human capital reallocation policy in China—the College Graduate Village Officials (CGVOs) program. We find that introducing CGVOs into the village governance system improves the targeting and implementation of the central government's social assistance programs. CGVOs help eligible poor households understand and apply for relevant subsidies, thus increasing the number of pro-poor program beneficiaries. Further analysis suggests that CGVOs change bureaucrat quality, rather than quantity, of village governance, and their presence reduces elite capture of pro-poor programs. (JEL D73, H83, J24, O17, O18, P25, P26)

Police agencies devote vast resources to minimising the time that it takes them to attend the scene of a crime. Despite this, the long-standing consensus is that police response time has no meaningful effect on the likelihood of catching offenders. We revisit this question using a uniquely rich dataset from the Greater Manchester Police. To identify causal effects, we use a novel strategy that exploits discontinuities in distance to the response station across locations next to each other, but on different sides of division boundaries. Contrary to previous evidence, we find large and strongly significant effects: in our preferred estimate, a 10% increase in response time leads to a 4.7 percentage points decrease in the likelihood of clearing the crime. We find stronger effects for thefts than for violent offenses, although the effects are large for every type of crime. We find suggestive evidence in support of two mechanisms: the likelihood of an immediate arrest and the likelihood that a suspect will be named by a victim or witness both increase as response time becomes faster. We argue that, under conservative assumptions, hiring an additional response officer would generate a benefit, in terms of future crime prevented, equivalent to 170% of her payroll cost.

An underappreciated way members of Congress represent interests is by pursuing policy goals through their communication with the bureaucracy. I argue that the bureaucracy provides an alternative, covert way for cross-pressured legislators, who face diverging pressures from party leaders, interest groups, and subconstituencies, to satisfy conflicting interests. Using original data of senators’ communication with the US Department of Labor from 2005 to 2012 (109th through 112th Congresses), I show that, when faced with cross-pressures from party and constituency, senators strategically choose less visible, back-channel means for pursuing policy goals. These findings provide a new perspective on representation by demonstrating that legislators pursue policy goals outside of the legislative process in an effort to evade accountability.

This article reimagines poverty governance as a labor process. Extending theories of bureaucratic fields and street-level bureaucracies, the proposed model suggests that the state manages the poor through fragmented activities embedded in horizontal and vertical relations of production. I use an ethnography of 911 ambulance operations in a single California county to advance this perspective. From plugging gunshot wounds to moving sidewalk slumberers, ambulance crews interact with a mostly impoverished clientele base by transforming spaces in bodies and bodies in spaces. This two-sided governance puts the ambulance in recurrent contact with the hospital emergency department and the police squad car. Across these institutions, ambulance crews struggle with their nurse and police counterparts over the horizontal shuffling of burdensome work, shaping the life chances of their subjects in the process. At the same time, bureaucratic and capitalistic forces from above activate a lean ambulance fleet that is minimally wasteful and highly flexible. This verticality structures clientele processing through the ambulance and fuels tensions across the frontlines of governance. In an effort to advance theory and fill an empirical gap, this article proposes a new model for understanding the management of marginality and highlights an overlooked case of poverty regulation.

A by-product of the extension of mass education is the increase in the level of education of those eligible for political offices. This can have a profound impact on the effectiveness of local governments. In this paper, I examine the effects of a large school construction program in Indonesia on local governance and public good provision. The results show that the program led to important increases in the provision of public goods. Furthermore, I provide evidence consistent with the hypothesis that the increase in the education of the village heads was one of the main mechanisms behind these results. (JEL D72, H41, H75, I21, O15, O17)

Sparked by high-profile confrontations between police and citizens in Ferguson, Missouri, and elsewhere, many commentators have criticized the excessive militarization of law enforcement. We investigate whether surplus military-grade equipment acquired by local police departments from the Pentagon has an effect on crime rates. We use temporal variations in US military expenditure and between-counties variation in the odds of receiving a positive amount of military aid to identify the causal effect of militarized policing on crime. We find that (i) military aid reduces street-level crime; (ii) the program is cost-effective; and (iii) there is evidence in favor of a deterrence mechanism. (JEL H56, H76, K42)

The slow pace of administrative action is arguably a defining characteristic of modern bureaucracy. The reasons proffered for delay are numerous, often centering on procedural hurdles or bureaucrats’ ineptitude. I offer a different perspective on delay in one important bureaucratic venue: the federal rulemaking process. I argue that agencies can speed up (fast-track) or slow down (slow-roll) the rulemaking process in order to undermine political oversight by Congress, the president, and the courts. That is, when the political climate is favorable, agencies rush to lock in a rule, but when it is less favorable, they wait on the chance that it will improve. I find empirical support for this proposition using an event history analysis of more than 11,000 agency rules from 150 bureaus. The results support the interpretation that agencies strategically delay, and that delay is not simply evidence of increased bureaucratic effort.

We study a 2004 program designed to motivate Chinese bureaucrats to reduce accidental deaths. Each province received a set of “death ceilings” that, if exceeded, would impede government officials' promotions. For each category of accidental deaths, we observe a sharp discontinuity in reported deaths at the ceiling, suggestive of manipulation. Provinces with safety incentives for municipal officials experienced larger declines in accidental deaths, suggesting complementarities between incentives at different levels of government. While realized accidental deaths predict the following year's ceiling, we observe no evidence that provinces manipulate deaths upward to avoid ratchet effects in the setting of death ceilings. (JEL D73, J28, J45, J81, O15, P26, P36)

Perceptions of the policy leanings of government agencies are an important component of an agency’s political environment, and an agency’s political environment can greatly influence how agencies formulate and implement public policy. We use a recent survey of federal executives to measure the perceptions of the ideological leanings of twice as many agencies as previously possible. Our estimates compare reassuringly to extant measures based on both expert evaluations and aggregations of the opinions of those working within agencies. We also develop a novel measure of perceptions of workforce skill. Given the prominence of the concepts of agency ideology and skill in theories of executive branch politics, the estimates we generate provide important opportunities for understanding agencies’ political environments and their implications for policy making. The generation of these measures also illustrates an approach to measuring hard-to-observe characteristics that could usefully be adopted in other contexts.

Studies of property rights overwhelmingly focus on whether states expropriate or protect property, overlooking the crucial issue of whether private sector actors will use state institutions. By contrast, I argue that the “supply” of formal legal institutions often fails to ensure firms will rely on the state for property rights protection. Instead, firms frequently avoid formal legal institutions and turn to illegal strategies based on violence or corruption. Whether firms adopt legal strategies depends on: (1) firm-level practices and beliefs that impede the use of law, (2) the effectiveness of illegal strategies, and (3) coordination problems resulting from firms’ expectations about each other’s strategies. Drawing on interviews with firms, lawyers, and private security agencies, as well as an original survey of Russian enterprises, I illustrate how “demand-side” factors led to a surprising increase in Russian firms’ reliance on formal legal institutions over the past two decades. The findings suggest that comprehensive understanding of property rights and the rule of law requires not only attention to state institutions’ effectiveness, but also to private actors’ strategies.

The molecularization of race thesis suggests geneticists are gaining greater authority to define human populations and differences, and they are doing so by increasingly defining them in terms of U.S. racial categories. Using a mixed methodology of a content analysis of articles published in Nature Genetics (in 1993, 2001, and 2009) and interviews, we explore geneticists’ population labeling practices. Geneticists use eight classification systems that follow racial, geographic, and ethnic logics of definition. We find limited support for racialization of classification. Use of quasi-racial “continental” terms has grown over time, but more surprising is the persistent and indiscriminate blending of classification schemes at the field level, the article level, and within-population labels. This blending has led the practical definition of “population” to become more ambiguous rather than standardized over time. Classificatory ambiguity serves several functions: it helps geneticists negotiate collaborations among researchers with competing demands, resist bureaucratic oversight, and build accountability with study populations. Far from being dysfunctional, we show the ambiguity of population definition is linked to geneticists’ efforts to build scientific authority. Our findings revise the long-standing theoretical link between scientific authority and standardization and social order. We find that scientific ambiguity can function to produce scientific authority.

Governments may extract rent from private citizens by inflating taxes and spending on projects benefiting special interests. Using a spatial equilibrium model, I show that less elastic housing supplies increase governments’ abilities to extract rents. Inelastic housing supply, driven by exogenous variation in local topography, raises local governments’ tax revenues and causes citizens to combat rent seeking by enacting laws limiting the power of elected officials. I find that public sector workers, one of the largest government special interests, capture a share of these rents through increased compensation when collective bargaining is legal or through corruption when collective bargaining is outlawed. (JEL H71, H72, J45, J52, R31, R51)

We analyze the effect of municipal employees’ political representation in municipal councils on local public spending. We use within-party, as-good-as-random variation in close elections in the Finnish open-list proportional election system to quantify the effect. One more councilor employed by the public sector increases spending by about 1%. The effect comes largely through the largest party and is specific to the employment sector of the municipal employee. The results are consistent with public employees having an information advantage over other politicians, and thus, being able to influence policy.

We develop a model of crime in which the number of police, the crime rate, the arrest rate, the employment rate, and the wage rate are joint outcomes of a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. The local government chooses the size of its police force and citizens choose among work, home, and crime alternatives. We estimate the model using metropolitan statistical area (MSA)-level data. We use the estimated model to examine the effects on crime of targeted federal transfers to local governments to increase police. We find that knowledge about unobserved MSA-specific attributes is critical for the optimal allocation of police across MSA’s.

The concept of “embedded autonomy” speaks to the importance of coordination and bidirectional information exchange between Weberian bureaucrats and their private sector interlocutors. It has proven influential in the sociology of development, where it originated, and in the broader discipline. But the prospects for bidirectional information exchange depend upon the structure and nature of the private sector, which has been all but overlooked by the literature on embedded autonomy. This article therefore encourages scholars to take private sector structure seriously by bringing existing network analytic methods to bear on the embedded autonomy debate. Specifically, I identify a tension between the requisites of information gathering, which is facilitated by nonredundant ties among actors, and information diffusion, which requires redundant ties; demonstrate how one Mexican agency has resolved this tension in assisting the upgrading of the artisanal ceramics sector; and conclude that the strategic filling of social network holes lies at the heart of effective bureacrats’ efforts to promote development.

This article examines the effects of natural resource extraction on authoritarian governments’ provision of public services, using subnational data from China. Facing no electoral constraint that would reflect the policy preferences of citizens, Chinese local leaders instead allocate public funds differentially based on their need for quality labor in local economic development, a critical criterion for their political success. When the local economy benefits from natural resources, the need for skilled local labor dissipates, and leaders invest less in social services that enhance labor productivity. Using panel data across all prefecture-level cities (1992–2010), I find evidence that mineral resource abundance leads local governments to provide fewer public services for education and health care. Meanwhile, services unrelated to labor quality remain unaffected. The results are robust to the inclusion of key confounding factors such as FDI inflows and state-owned enterprises’ output contributions. Additional analyses reject alternative mechanisms including political turnover.

In 1964–68, the U.S. Congress enacted comprehensive legislation prohibiting discrimination in employment (1964 Civil Rights Act), voting (1965 Voting Rights Act), and housing (1968 Fair Housing Act). A half-century later, most scholars concur that voting rights was by far the most successful, fair housing was a general failure, and Title VII fell somewhere in between. Explanations of civil rights effectiveness in political sociology that emphasize state-internal resources and capacities, policy entrepreneurship, and/or the degree of white resentment cannot explain this specific outcome hierarchy. Pertinent to President Trump’s policies, the authors propose an alternative hypothesis grounded in the sociology of law: the comparative effectiveness of civil rights policies is best explained by the extent to which each policy incorporated a “group-centered effects” (GCE) statutory and enforcement framework. Focusing on systemic group disadvantage rather than individual harm, discriminatory consequences rather than discriminatory intent, and substantive group results over individual justice, GCE offers an alternative theoretical framework for analyzing comparative civil rights outcomes.

Many institutions—including American federal bureaucracies and legislatures world-wide—are characterized by one set of actors who possess the right to determine which policies will be enacted and an opposing set of actors who possess the right to delay the enactment of those policies. However, this interaction is not well understood. We provide a model that shows that a modest procedural right to delay but not veto the enactment of policies affords considerable influence over the policy agenda, so long as policymaking is time-consuming and time is scarce. In an application to the US Senate, our model exhibits properties that are consistent with common empirical claims about partisanship, polarization, and gridlock. It also justifies the considerable variation in the amount of delay imposed on the passage of various bills and the historic reluctance of the Senate to adopt reforms that would expedite the tedious cloture process.

I develop a model of policy making in complex domains where bureaucrats find it very difficult to establish autonomous sources of expertise, so regulators are highly dependent on the regulated industry and its willingness to engage in self-regulation. In the model, a legislative principal decides whether to delegate the power to an agency to regulate the activities of a firm or industry. The policy domain is complex in that knowledge of the implications of different policy choices is concentrated in the firm. The agency can learn about the policy environment only through monitoring the firm’s efforts at self-regulation. The main result is that, as policy becomes more complex, regulatory outcomes are increasingly biased toward those preferred by the firm. Moreover, when the agency has preferences that diverge from the firm’s, the firm invests less in its own self-regulatory efforts for fear that its policy investments will be expropriated.

Theories of rebellion and revolution neglect short-run processes within state structures that can undermine their internal cohesion. These processes are evident in the rapid unraveling of the Chinese state early in the Cultural Revolution. Portrayed in past accounts as a culmination of student and worker insurgencies, an early 1967 wave of power seizures was in fact accelerated by an internal rebellion of bureaucrats against their own superiors. These led to the widespread collapse of local governments, diverting the course of the Cultural Revolution and forcing intervention by the armed forces. An event-history analysis of the diffusion of power seizures across a hierarchy of 2,215 government jurisdictions portrays a top-down cascade that spread deeply into rural regions with few students and workers and little popular protest. The internal rebellions were generated endogenously by events during the course of these upheavals, as individual officials reacted to shifting circumstances that threatened their positions.

In advanced democracies, most government spending is allocated according to criteria approved by a legislature but implemented by the bureaucracy. I ask whether this fact imposes a binding constraint on the ability of legislators to engage in targeted redistribution, by constructing a model in which legislators are constrained to allocate spending by a formula of limited dimension—in contrast to benchmark models where proposers have the flexibility to manipulate the payoffs of individual members directly. The model predicts oversized winning coalitions, positive distributions outside of the winning coalition, and the emergence of persistent voting blocs. I then apply the model to a sample of 31 US federal spending bills, using new data connecting spending outcomes to authorizing legislation. I find that most allocation formulas for spending programs involve five or fewer factors. Formulaic allocation imposes a tight constraint on targeting, eliminating more than 90% of congressional proposers’ degrees of freedom.

As markets evolve, new regulatory concerns emerge. In response, policy makers institute new requirements for private businesses. Because they impose costs and generate uncertainty, these requirements may deter firm investment. To reduce regulatory uncertainty and favor investment, a principal can choose a rule-based regulatory framework. However, unlike discretion, rules do not adapt to circumstances and are thus inefficient. Using a micro-founded model, we uncover circumstances under which the ex ante certainty provided by a rule dominates the ex post efficiency provided by delegation to an unbiased agent. We also establish when delegating to a biased agent is optimal for a policy maker. Our main results highlight that the anticipated economic responses of firms can indirectly influence the organization of the bureaucracy. As such, any attempt to evaluate firms’ direct influence in the rule-making process—through lobbying or information disclosure—needs to establish the proper counterfactual that accounts for the indirect effects this article identifies.

We study whether incumbents facing uncontested elections channel public spending toward co–partisan officials more than is the case of incumbents that are worried about reelection. We draw on data on capital transfers allocated by Spanish regions to local governments during 1995–2007. Using a regression discontinuity design, we document strong and robust effects. We find that a mayor belonging to the party of the regional president obtains twice the amount in grants received by an opposition’s mayor. This effect is much greater for regional incumbents that won the previous election by a large margin, but it disappears for highly competitive elections. (JEL D72, H76)

In this article we undertake a systematic analysis of why border enforcement backfired as a strategy of immigration control in the United States. We argue theoretically that border enforcement emerged as a policy response to a moral panic about the perceived threat of Latino immigration to the United States propounded by self-interested bureaucrats, politicians, and pundits who sought to mobilize political and material resources for their own benefit. The end result was a self-perpetuating cycle of rising enforcement and increased apprehensions that resulted in the militarization of the border in a way that was disconnected from the actual size of the undocumented flow. Using an instrumental variable approach, we show how border militarization affected the behavior of unauthorized migrants and border outcomes to transform undocumented Mexican migration from a circular flow of male workers going to three states into an eleven-million person population of settled families living in 50 states.

Particularly in developing countries, there is a gap between written law and behavior. Comparative research emphasizes that laws go unenforced due to resource constraints or inadequate control of the bureaucracy. I instead introduce the concept of forbearance , or the intentional and revocable nonenforcement of law, and argue that politicians often withhold sanctions to maximize votes as well as rents. Drawing on tools from price theory and distributive politics, I present several methods to separate situations when politicians are unable versus unwilling to enforce the law. I demonstrate the identification strategies with original data on the enforcement of laws against street vending and squatting in urban Latin America. In contexts of inadequate social policy, politicians use forbearance to mobilize voters and signal their distributive commitments. These illustrations thus suggest the rich, and largely neglected, distributive politics behind apparent institutional weakness.

This paper studies how the abolition of an elite recruitment system—China's civil exam system that lasted over 1,300 years—affects political stability. Employing a panel data set across 262 prefectures and exploring the variations in the quotas on the entry-level exam candidates, we find that higher quotas per capita were associated with a higher probability of revolution participation after the abolition and a higher incidence of uprisings in 1911 that marked the end of the 2,000 years of imperial rule. This finding is robust to various checks including using the number of small rivers and short-run exam performance before the quota system as instruments. The patterns in the data appear most consistent with the interpretation that in regions with higher quotas per capita under the exam system, more would-be elites were negatively affected by the abolition. In addition, we document that modern human capital in the form of those studying in Japan also contributed to the revolution and that social capital strengthened the effect of quotas on revolution participation.

Across the developed world, the last 50 years have seen a dramatic wave of municipal mergers, often motivated by a quest for economies of scale. Re-examining the theoretical arguments invoked to justify these reforms, we find that, in fact, there is no compelling reason to expect them to yield net gains. Potential savings in, for example, administrative costs are likely to be offset by opposite effects for other domains. Past attempts at empirical assessment have been bedeviled by endogeneity—which municipalities amalgamate is typically nonrandom—creating a danger of bias. We exploit the particular characteristics of a recent Danish reform to provide more credible difference-in-differences estimates of the effect of mergers. The result turns out to be null: cost savings in some areas were offset by deterioration in others, while for most public services jurisdiction size did not matter at all. Given significant transition costs, the finding raises questions about the rationale behind a global movement that has already restructured local government on almost all continents.

We present unique audit-study evidence on health care quality in rural India, and find that most private providers lacked medical qualifications, but completed more checklist items than public providers and recommended correct treatments equally often. Among doctors with public and private practices, all quality metrics were higher in their private clinics. Market prices are positively correlated with checklist completion and correct treatment, but also with unnecessary treatments. However, public sector salaries are uncorrelated with quality. A simple model helps interpret our findings: Where public-sector effort is low, the benefits of higher diagnostic effort among private providers may outweigh costs of potential overtreatment.

While experimental studies of local election officials have found evidence of racial discrimination, we know little about whether these biases manifest in bureaucracies that provide access to valuable government programs and are less tied to politics. We address these issues in the context of affordable housing programs using a randomized field experiment. We explore responsiveness to putative white, black, and Hispanic requests for aid in the housing application process. In contrast to prior findings, public housing officials respond at equal rates to black and white email requests. We do, however, find limited evidence of responsiveness discrimination toward Hispanics. Moreover, we observe substantial differences in email tone. Hispanic housing applicants were 20 percentage points less likely to be greeted by name than were their black and white counterparts. This disparity in tone is somewhat more muted in more diverse locations, but it does not depend on whether a housing official is Hispanic.

Does monitoring corrupt activities induce a sustained reduction in corruption? Using longitudinal data on audits of municipal governments in Puerto Rico, we show corruption is considerably lower in municipalities with timely audits—before elections. However, these municipalities do not exhibit decreased levels of corruption in subsequent audits, even while mayors in these benefit from higher reelection rates. Our results suggest that audits enable voters to select responsive but corruptible politicians to office. Audit programs must disseminate results when they are most relevant for voters—shortly before an election—and ensure that these programs are sustained, long-term commitments. (JEL D72, H83, K42, O17)

When do politicians prompt bureaucrats to provide effective services? Leveraging the uneven overlap of jurisdictions in India, we compare bureaucrats supervised by a single political principal with those supervised by multiple politicians. With an original dataset of nearly half a million villages, we find that implementation of India’s National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme , the largest employment program in the world, is substantially better where bureaucrats answer to a single politician. Regression discontinuity estimates help increase confidence that this result is causal. Our findings suggest that politicians face strong incentives to motivate bureaucrats as long as they internalize the benefits from doing so. In contrast to a large literature on the deleterious effects of political interventions, our results show that political influence may be more favorable to development than is commonly assumed.

Choice in public services is controversial. We exploit a reform in the English National Health Service to assess the effect of removing constraints on patient choice. We estimate a demand model that explicitly captures the removal of the choice constraints imposed on patients. We find that, post-removal, patients became more responsive to clinical quality. This led to a modest reduction in mortality and a substantial increase in patient welfare. The elasticity of demand faced by hospitals increased substantially post- reform and we find evidence that hospitals responded to the enhanced incentives by improving quality. This suggests greater choice can raise quality.

We estimate the effect of immigrant legalization on the crime rate of immigrants in Italy by exploiting an ideal regression discontinuity design: fixed quotas of residence permits are available each year, applications must be submitted electronically on specific “click days,” and are processed on a first come, first served basis until the available quotas are exhausted. Matching data on applications with individual-level criminal records, we show that legalization reduces the crime rate of legalized immigrants by 0.6 percentage points on average, on a baseline crime rate of 1.1 percent. (JEL J15, J61, K37, K42)

Existing evidence suggests that extra grant revenues lead to little improvements in public services in developing countries—but would governments spend tax revenues differently? This paper considers a program that invests in the tax capacity of Brazilian municipalities. Using variations in the timing of program uptake, I find that it raises local tax revenues and that the increase in taxes is used to improve both the quantity and quality of municipal education infrastructure. In contrast, increases in grants over which municipalities have the same discretion as taxes have no impact on any measure of local public infrastructure. These results suggest that the way governments are financed matters: governments spend increases in tax revenues more toward expenditures that benefit citizens than increases in grant revenues. (JEL H71, H75, H76, I21, I22, O15, R51)

Why do officials in some countries favor entrenched contractors, while others assign public contracts more impartially? This article emphasizes the important interplay between politics and bureaucracy. It suggests that corruption risks are lower when bureaucrats’ careers do not depend on political connections but on their peers. We test this hypothesis with a novel measure of career incentives in the public sector—using a survey of more than 18,000 public sector employees in 212 European regions—and a new objective corruption risk measure including over 1.4 million procurement contracts. Both show a remarkable subnational variation across Europe. The study finds that corruption risks are indeed significantly lower where bureaucrats’ career incentives exclusively follow professional criteria. In substantial terms, moving EU regions so that bureaucrats’ merit and effort would matter as much as in, for example, Baden-Wüttemberg (90th percentile) could lead to a 13–20 billion Euro savings per year.

We provide evidence of corruption in allocation of public procurement and assess its efficiency. Firms with procurement revenue increase tunneling around regional elections, whereas neither tunneling of firms without procurement revenue, nor legitimate business of firms with procurement exhibits a political cycle. Data are consistent with the corruption channel—cash is tunneled to politicians in exchange for procurement contracts—and inconsistent with alternative channels. Using the strength of correlation between procurement revenue and tunneling around elections as a proxy for local corruption, we reject the “efficient grease” hypothesis: in more corrupt localities, procurement contracts go to unproductive firms. (JEL D22, D72, H57, K42, P26, P31, P37)

Charter takeovers are traditional public schools restarted as charter schools. We develop a grandfathering instrument for takeover attendance that compares students at schools designated for takeover with a matched sample of students attending similar schools not yet taken over. Grandfathering estimates from New Orleans show substantial gains from takeover enrollment. In Boston, grandfathered students see achievement gains at least as large as the gains for students assigned charter seats in lotteries. A non-charter Boston turnaround intervention that had much in common with the takeover strategy generated gains as large as those seen for takeovers, while other more modest turnaround interventions yielded smaller effects. (JEL D44, H75, I21, I28)

Bureaucratic and patrimonial theories of organized crime tend to miss the history and mobility of crime groups integrating into and organizing with legitimate society. The network property of multiplexity—when more than one type of relationship exists between a pair of actors—offers a theoretical and empirical inroad to analyzing overlapping relationships of seemingly disparate social spheres. Using the historical case of organized crime in Chicago and a unique relational database coded from more than 5,000 pages of archival documents, we map the web of multiplex relationships among bootleggers, politicians, union members, businessmen, families, and friends. We analyze the overlap of criminal, personal, and legitimate networks containing 1,030 individuals and 3,726 mutual dyads between them. Multiplexity is rare in these data: only 10 percent of the mutual dyads contain multiplex ties. However, results from bivariate exponential random graph models demonstrate that multiplexity is a relevant structural property binding the three networks together. Even among our sample of criminals, we find dependencies between the criminal and personal networks and the criminal and legitimate networks. Although not pervasive, multiplexity glued these worlds of organized crime together above and beyond the personalities of famous gangsters, ethnic homophily, and other endogenous network processes.

This study shows that state efforts at child protection are structured by the policy regimes in which they are enmeshed. Using administrative data on child protection, criminal justice, and social welfare interventions, I show that children are separated from their families and placed into foster care far more frequently in states with extensive and punitive criminal justice systems than in states with broad and generous welfare programs. However, large welfare bureaucracies interact with welfare program enrollment to create opportunities for the surveillance of families, suggesting that extensive and administratively complex welfare states engage in “soft” social control through the surveillance and regulation of family behavior. The article further shows that institutionalization, a particularly restrictive form of foster care placement, is least common in states with broad and generous welfare regimes and generally more common under punitive regimes. Taken together, these findings show that policy regimes influence the interaction between families and the state through their proximate effects on family structure and well-being and through institutional effects that delimit the routines and scripts through which policymakers and street-level bureaucrats intervene to protect children.

The proliferation of big data makes it possible to better target city services like hygiene inspections, but city governments rarely have the in-house talent needed for developing prediction algorithms. Cities could hire consultants, but a cheaper alternative is to crowdsource competence by making data public and offering a reward for the best algorithm. A simple model suggests that open tournaments dominate consulting contracts when cities can tolerate risk and when there is enough labor with low opportunity costs. We also report on an inexpensive Boston-based restaurant tournament, which yielded algorithms that proved reasonably accurate when tested “out-of-sample” on hygiene inspections.

In an era of public-private partnerships, what role do nonprofit community-based organizations (CBOs) play in urban governance? Drawing on ethnographic fieldwork in Boston, this article presents a new way to understand CBOs’ political role in poor neighborhoods: CBOs as nonelected neighborhood representatives. Over the course of four years, I followed nine CBOs in six Boston neighborhoods as they planned community development projects. The CBOs in my study superseded elected politicians as the legitimate representatives of poor urban neighborhoods. Private funders and government agencies legitimated CBO leaders’ claims and treated them as the preferred representatives of neighborhoods’ interests. Elected district representatives, by contrast, exhibited limited influence over resources and were rarely involved in community development decision-making. By reconsidering CBOs’ political role in urban neighborhoods, this study uncovers a consequential realignment of urban political representation. It also identifies an important tradeoff between the urban poor’s access to resources and the ability to hold their leaders democratically accountable—a tradeoff that will remain so long as governments continue to rely on private actors in public governance.

By conditioning their support for political incumbents on observed performance outcomes, voters can motivate elected officials to represent their interests faithfully while in office. Whether elections serve this function in subnational US government remains unclear, however, because much of the existing research on retrospective voting in these contexts focuses on outcomes that are not obviously salient to voters or over which the relevant government officials have limited influence. In this study, we examine one outcome—the quality of local roads—that is both salient and unquestionably under the control of city government. Our analysis leverages within-city variation in the number of pothole complaints in one of America’s largest cities and shows that such variation can explain neighborhood-level differences in support for incumbents in two political offices—mayor and city council—across several electoral cycles.

We argue that state legislative politics is qualitatively different from national congressional politics in the extent to which it focuses on localized and geographically specific legislation salient to subconstituencies within a legislative district. Whereas congressional politics focuses on casework benefits for individual constituents, state legislative politics is more oriented to the delivery of localized benefits for groups of citizens in specific areas within a district, fostering a geographically specific group connection. A primary way to build such targeted geographical support is for members to introduce particularistic legislation designed to aid their specific targeted geographical area within the district. We argue that this is primarily a function of electoral rules. Using original sponsorship data from U.S. state houses, we demonstrate that greater district magnitude and more inclusive selection procedures such as open primaries are associated with more particularism. Our findings provide strong support for a voter-group alignment model of electoral politics distinct from the personal vote/electoral connection model that characterizes U.S. congressional politics and is more akin to patterns of geographically specific group-oriented electoral politics found in Europe and throughout the world.

Research on presidential power focuses almost exclusively on the modern era, while earlier presidents are said to have held office while congressional dominance was at its peak. In this article, I argue that nineteenth-century presidents wielded greater influence than commonly recognized due to their position as head of the executive branch. Using an original dataset on the county-level distribution of U.S. post offices from 1876 to 1896, I find consistent evidence that counties represented by a president’s copartisans in the U.S. House received substantially more post offices than other counties, and that these advantages were especially large under divided government and in electorally important states. These results are robust across model specifications and when examining the Senate. The findings challenge key components of the congressional dominance and modern presidency theses, and have important implications for scholarship on interbranch relations, bureaucratic politics, and American political development.

We study a program designed to encourage learning from coworkers among school teachers. In an experiment, we document gains in job performance when high- and low-skilled teachers are paired and asked to work together on improving their skills. Pairs are matched on specific skills measured in prior evaluations. Each pair includes a target teacher who scores low in one or more of 19 skills and a partner who scores high in (many of) the target’s deficient skills. Student achievement improved 0.12 standard deviations in low-skilled teachers’ classrooms. Improvements are likely the result of target teachers learning skills from their partner. (JEL I21, J24, J45, M53)

Different beliefs about how to achieve shared goals are common in political organizations such as government agencies, campaigns, and NGOs. However, the consequences of such conflicts have not yet been explored. We develop a formal model in which a principal and an agent disagree about the right policy for achieving their shared goals. Disagreement creates a motivational problem, but we show how both observing policy outcomes and experimenting with policies can ameliorate it. We also show that the principal often defers to the agent in order to motivate him, thereby generating more informative policy outcomes and building future consensus. Most surprisingly, she sometimes allows the agent to implement his desired policy even when she is sure it is wrong, to persuade him through failure that he is mistaken. Using the model, we generate empirical implications about performance measurement and Presidential appointments in U.S. federal agencies.

Existing evidence of educational effects on intergenerational mobility is associational. This study employs early compulsory schooling laws to approach a causal estimate of the relationship between education and mobility in the context of a large-scale policy change. Using IPUMS Linked Representative Samples (linked census data), regression discontinuity models exploit state differences in the timing of compulsory schooling laws to estimate an intent-to-treat effect on intergenerational occupational mobility among white males. Despite increasing equality of attendance, results reveal that compulsory laws initially reduced relative mobility for the first few cohorts affected by the laws. Among later cohorts, who were required to attend the maximum years of school, mobility was similar to prelaw levels. School funding and other data suggest that structural lag could explain this nonlinear relationship. It seems, therefore, that educational expansion inadvertently reduced mobility through institutional inertia rather than elite efforts to maintain advantage.

How can elected officials induce bureaucrats to invest in acquiring the expertise necessary to provide high-quality public services? To address this question, we test and extend aspects of Gailmard and Patty’s expertise model in the context of contemporary governance using a unique randomized controlled field experiment of school principals in Denmark. Consistent with the expertise model, we find that bureaucratic agents randomly assigned greater discretion in the allocation of personnel resources were more likely to acquire information on school performance. We extend the model in two ways. First, we show that discretion effects are stronger when the information available aligns with bureaucratic goal preferences. Second, we show that institutional design choices that improve the relative benefits of the information increase information acquisition.

It is often said that the only constant is change itself. As time passes, the population grows, new technologies are invented, and the skills, demographics, and norms of the populace evolve. These changes, whether in isolation or in aggregate, influence the effectiveness of policy. In particular, policies designed for today's world are unlikely to provide a perfect fit tomorrow. We develop a notion of policy decay that captures this impact formally. We introduce policy decay into a paradigmatic model of legislative policymaking and show that it leads to a starkly different perspective on legislative politics. Our results upend the classic notion of gridlock and bear implications more broadly for the practice of politics. We show how a changing world impacts the power of agenda control, how it drives the dynamic path of legislation, how it reveals a novel conception of policy expertise, and how it, ultimately, provides a foundational logic to the design of bureaucracy.

Abstract This article develops a theory of the administration and effectiveness of government programs. In the model, a bureaucrat chooses a mechanism for assigning a good to clients with uncertain qualifications. The mechanism applies a costly means test to verify the client's eligibility. A politician exercises oversight by limiting the bureaucrat's testing resources and the number of clients to be served. The model predicts the incidence of common administrative pathologies, including inefficient and politicized distribution of resources, inflexibility, program errors, and backlogs. When the politician favors marginally qualified clients, per capita spending is low and error rates are high. When the politician favors highly qualified clients, per capita spending is higher and error rates are lower. In the latter case, the bureaucrat may also use discriminatory testing, which allows the politician to target favored clients. Such targeted programs increase budgets and reduce backlogs, but they also increase error rates.

Over the last four decades, the Soviet Union, China, and the East European countries have each engaged in multiple efforts to reform their economic systems. In all cases the reforms have represented an attempt to move away from the extremely centralized, therefore highly bureaucratized, control of resource allocation to a more decentralized system relying more heavily on markets to allocate resources. But in each case the intention has been only to move in that direction, while retaining or enhancing strong central control over the general structure and direction of economic activity, and state ownership of the bulk of capital. The phrase market socialism -associated most prominently with Oskar Lange-captures the spirit of those reform efforts, although none of the Soviet, East European, or Chinese reformers have trusted markets in fact, as much as Lange did in theory. Most of these reform programs had no lasting impact, leaving intact the basic superstructure of the highly centralized, highly bureaucratized, systems. The problems they sought to address-falling growth rates in factor productivity, persistent imbalances in factor and product markets, chronically low-quality goods-have remained, leading, with time, to further reform initiatives. In those few cases where reforms were partially implemented, the results have been very disappointing. For example, in Hungary-frequently cited in East and West as a relative success case-the result of the 1968 reforms and subsequent measures has been an economic purgatory in which central control of the system has been somewhat fragmented, while markets remain severely constrained, therefore underdeveloped, and thus unable to play a significant role in guiding the system (Janos Kornai, 1986). In the last decade, against a backdrop of new reform initiatives in various East European countries (Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria), the two giants of socialism-China and the USSR-have launched reforms that signal the most concerted effort yet to implement a major transformation of socialist central planning. The fate of these two reforms will set the tone for all socialist reforms in the remainder of this century, and for that reason they deserve special attention. Yet those reforms are already exhibiting many of the early danger signs familiar from previous reforms. Some of the most elementary principles of economics are being ignored (when, for example, enterprises are given expanded decision-making powers before the price system is reformed). Governmental and party authorities continue to intervene where, formally, they have no right to do so, and this frequently with tacit or explicit approval of the country's leadership. Errors in economic policy (most notably a total lack of control over the money supply) lead to problems in economic performance which then are attributed to the reform, legitimizing calls for slowing the process. Behind the facade of ringing statements of reform goals, political leaders allow so many exceptions to the general principles of the reform-most notably, exceptions to the tDiscusants: Lawrence Krause, University of California-San Diego; Allen J. Lenz, U.S. Department of Commerce; Herbert S. Levine, University of Pennsylvania.

We study the impact of politicians' tenure in office on the outcomes of public procurement using a dataset on Italian municipal governments. To identify a causal relation, we first compare elections where the incumbent mayor barely won or barely lost another term. We then use the introduction of a two-term limit, which granted one potential extra term to mayors appointed before the reform. The main result is that an increase in tenure is associated with “worse” procurement outcomes. Our estimates are informative of the possibility that time in office progressively leads to collusion between government officials and local bidders. (JEL D72, H57, H76)

Do citizens respond to policy-based information signals about government performance? Using multiple big datasets—which link for the first time large-scale school administrative records and individual validated voting behavior—I show that citizens react to exogenous school failure signals provided by No Child Left Behind. These signals cause a noticeable increase in turnout in local school board elections and increase the competitiveness of these races. Additionally, I present evidence that school failure signals cause citizens to vote with their feet by exiting failing schools, suggesting that exit plays an underexplored role in democratic accountability. However, performance signals elicit a response unequally, with failure primarily mobilizing high propensity citizens and encouraging exit among those who are white, affluent, and more likely to vote. Hence, while performance signals spur a response, they do so only for a select few, leaving many others behind.

Despite diversity and intensity of Michael Todaro's comment (1986), essence of controversy reduces to differences in respective views of urban subsistence sector. Each view, in turn, depends upon a distinctive viewpoint. Observing from viewpoint of bureaucrat and other elite to whom he defers in his comment, Todaro sees large cityward flow of Third World humanity as a menace, destroying urban amenities. Todaro's focus being modern sector, his model only incorporates an urban subsistence sector indirectly, and then only as a way station on route to modern sector employment. His assumption is that every potential migrant has modern sector employment as an explicit goal.' Conceptually, he leaves no room for uneducated rural persons whose aspirations are keyed to modest employments of urban subsistence sector. We, on other hand, look from below, from subsistence sector. From there, we see both rural and urban welfare gains from observed spatial movement of labor. We grant that unpleasant externalities may be involved, especially from point of view of a discomfitted elite. However, those possible externalities should be studied in their own right and have no place in a debate between competing explanations of migration.2 The present debate, therefore, comes down to a straightforward empirical question. If, in fact, there are persons who move to city with intent of taking up permanent employment in urban subsistence sector, then their decisions cannot be explained by Todaro. If they are few in number, theorist may assume them away. If their numbers are significant, however, migration flows must be viewed as dual in nature and an alternative explanation for subsistence portion is required. Todaro's crucial point is that the ColeSanders' theory requires them to make an artificial separation of migration flows into those who go to modern sector and those who go to and remain in subsistence sector. This argument is effectively countered, we believe, by our crucial point that Todaro's view of an undifferentiated flow carries with it inappropriate assumption that all migrants deem themselves able to enter into modern sector employment.3

We present legislative, historical and statistical evidence of a substantial upward ratchet in transfers and taxes in the US due to World War II. This finding is explained within a political-economy framework with defense spending responding to a war threat and a median voter in the population who interacts with a (richer) agenda setter in Congress in setting redistribution. While the setter managed to cap redistribution before the War, the War itself raised the status quo tax burden and improved tax collection technology, strengthening the bargaining power of the median voter as defense spending receded. This permanently raised the level of redistribution. (JEL D72, H11, H23, H56, N32, N42)

Abstract Policy implementation is usually studied at the micro level by testing the short‐term effects of a specific policy on the behavior of government actors and policy outcomes. This study adopts an alternative approach by examining macro implementation—the cumulative effect of aggregate public policies over time. I employ a variety of methodological techniques to test the influence of macro criminal justice policy on new admissions to federal prison via three mediators: case filings by federal prosecutors, conviction rates in federal district courts, and plea bargaining behavior. I find that cumulative Supreme Court rulings influence the incarceration rate by altering conviction rates in district courts; however, I find only mixed evidence of congressional and presidential influence. The results suggest that U.S. macro policy influences bureaucratic outputs by altering the behavior of subordinate policy implementers; however, the Supreme Court may enjoy an advantage in shaping criminal justice policy.

The nature and spectrum of regulatory compliance is getting broader due to impact of globalisation and to expanding compliance expectations. Regulatory compliance governance (thereafter - RCG) is becoming a new emerging discipline that copes with the challenges of companies to follow all the rapid changes of regulatory requirements. Recently in European Union RCG often is understood as a tool for companies which are operating in regulated sectors. Higher education and research system is facing new challenges due to substantial changes in the business environment, as well as increasing regulatory impact. The strategic management process is becoming more complex, accordingly.&#13; Authors perform field research inquiring practice of HEIs management and paying particular attention to one part of it - regulatory compliance management. The research reveals the extent to which management apply RCG in the strategic management and proves that it is a component with growing importance. Several research methods, such as literature review, logical and comparative analysis and structured interviews, were applied in this research. NVivo, a qualitative data analysis computer software has been used for data organising and analysis. The triangulation method is applied – theoretical background is formed on systematic literature review (state of art method). Theoretical investigations are approved by field research using qualitative research.

Abstract Since the Coleman Report, many have questioned whether public school spending affects student outcomes. The school finance reforms that began in the early 1970s and accelerated in the 1980s caused dramatic changes to the structure of K–12 education spending in the United States. To study the effect of these school finance reform–induced changes in public school spending on long-run adult outcomes, we link school spending and school finance reform data to detailed, nationally representative data on children born between 1955 and 1985 and followed through 2011. We use the timing of the passage of court-mandated reforms and their associated type of funding formula change as exogenous shifters of school spending, and we compare the adult outcomes of cohorts that were differentially exposed to school finance reforms, depending on place and year of birth. Event study and instrumental variable models reveal that a 10% increase in per pupil spending each year for all 12 years of public school leads to 0.31 more completed years of education, about 7% higher wages, and a 3.2 percentage point reduction in the annual incidence of adult poverty; effects are much more pronounced for children from low-income families. Exogenous spending increases were associated with notable improvements in measured school inputs, including reductions in student-to-teacher ratios, increases in teacher salaries, and longer school years.

Using both qualitative longitudinal data collected 20 years after the original Unequal Childhoods study and interview data from a study of upwardly mobile adults, this address demonstrates how cultural knowledge matters when white and African American young adults of differing class backgrounds navigate key institutions. I find that middle-class young adults had more knowledge than their working-class or poor counterparts of the “rules of the game” regarding how institutions worked. They also displayed more of a sense of entitlement to ask for help. When faced with a problem related to an institution, middle-class young adults frequently succeeded in getting their needs accommodated by the institution; working-class and poor young adults were less knowledgeable about and more frustrated by bureaucracies. This address also shows the crucial role of “cultural guides” who help upwardly mobile adults navigate institutions. While many studies of class reproduction have looked at key turning points, this address argues that “small moments” may be critical in setting the direction of life paths.

We analyse the causal impact of competition on managerial quality and hospital performance. To address the endogeneity of market structure we analyse the English public hospital sector where entry and exit are controlled by the central government. Because closing hospitals in areas where the governing party is expecting a tight election race (“marginals”) is rare due to the fear of electoral defeat, we can use political marginality as an instrumental variable for the number of hospitals in a geographical area. We find that higher competition results in higher management quality, measured using a new survey tool, and improved hospital performance. Adding a rival hospital increases management quality by 0.4 standard deviations and increases survival rates from emergency heart attacks by 9.7%. We confirm the robustness of our IV strategy to “hidden policies” that could be used in marginal districts to improve hospital management and to changes in capacity that may follow from hospital closure.

We study the direct and spillover effects of local state capacity in Colombia. We model the determination of state capacity as a network game between municipalities and the national government. We estimate this model exploiting the municipality network and the roots of local state capacity related to the presence of the colonial state and royal roads. Our estimates indicate that local state capacity decisions are strategic complements. Spillover effects are sizable, accounting for about 50 percent of the quantitative impact of an expansion in local state capacity, but network effects driven by equilibrium responses of other municipalities are much larger. (JEL D85, H41, H77, O17, O18)

Organization scholars since Max Weber have argued that formal personnel systems can prevent discrimination. We draw on sociological and psychological literatures to develop a theory of the varied effects of bureaucratic reforms on managerial motivation. Drawing on self-perception and cognitive-dissonance theories, we contend that initiatives that engage managers in promoting diversity—special recruitment and training programs—will increase diversity. Drawing on job-autonomy and self-determination theories, we contend that initiatives that limit managerial discretion in hiring and promotion—job tests, performance evaluations, and grievance procedures—will elicit resistance and produce adverse effects. Drawing on transparency and accountability theories, we contend that bureaucratic reforms that increase transparency for job-seekers and hiring managers—job postings and job ladders—will have positive effects. Finally, drawing on accountability theory, we contend that monitoring by diversity managers and federal regulators will improve the effects of bureaucratic reforms. We examine the effects of personnel innovations on managerial diversity in 816 U.S. workplaces over 30 years. Our findings help explain the nation’s slow progress in reducing job segregation and inequality. Some popular bureaucratic reforms thought to quell discrimination instead activate it. Some of the most effective reforms remain rare.

Abstract We present experimental evidence on the impact of a school choice program in the Indian state of Andhra Pradesh that provided students with a voucher to finance attending a private school of their choice. The study design featured a unique two-stage lottery-based allocation of vouchers that created both student-level and market-level experiments, which allows us to study the individual and the aggregate effects of school choice (including spillovers). After two and four years of the program, we find no difference between test scores of lottery winners and losers on Telugu (native language), math, English, and science/social studies, suggesting that the large cross-sectional differences in test scores across public and private schools mostly reflect omitted variables. However, private schools also teach Hindi, which is not taught by the public schools, and lottery winners have much higher test scores in Hindi. Furthermore, the mean cost per student in the private schools in our sample was less than a third of the cost in public schools. Thus, private schools in this setting deliver slightly better test score gains than their public counterparts (better on Hindi and same in other subjects), and do so at a substantially lower cost per student. Finally, we find no evidence of spillovers on public school students who do not apply for the voucher, or on private school students, suggesting that the positive effects on voucher winners did not come at the expense of other students.

We estimate the effect of a large rural workfare program in India on private employment and wages by comparing trends in districts that received the program earlier relative to those that received it later. Our results suggest that public sector hiring crowded out private sector work and increased private sector wages. We compute the implied welfare gains of the program by consumption quintile. Our calculations show that the welfare gains to the poor from the equilibrium increase in private sector wages are large in absolute terms and large relative to the gains received solely by program participants. (JEL I38, J31, J45, J68, O15)

Do informal institutions, rules, and norms created and enforced by social groups promote good local governance in environments of weak democratic or bureaucratic institutions? This question is difficult to answer because of challenges in defining and measuring informal institutions and identifying their causal effects. In the article, we investigate the effect of lineage groups, one of the most important vehicles of informal institutions in rural China, on local public goods expenditure. Using a panel dataset of 220 Chinese villages from 1986 to 2005, we find that village leaders from the two largest family clans in a village increased local public investment considerably. This association is stronger when the clans appeared to be more cohesive. We also find that clans helped local leaders overcome the collective action problem of financing public goods, but there is little evidence suggesting that they held local leaders accountable.

Abstract Performance pay for tax collectors has the potential to raise revenues, but might come at a cost if it increases the bargaining power of tax collectors vis-à-vis taxpayers. We report the first large-scale field experiment on these issues, where we experimentally allocated 482 property tax units in Punjab, Pakistan, into one of three performance pay schemes or a control. After two years, incentivized units had 9.4 log points higher revenue than controls, which translates to a 46% higher growth rate. The scheme that rewarded purely on revenue did best, increasing revenue by 12.9 log points (64% higher growth rate), with little penalty for customer satisfaction and assessment accuracy compared to the two other schemes that explicitly also rewarded these dimensions. The revenue gains accrue from a small number of properties becoming taxed at their true value, which is substantially more than they had been taxed at previously. The majority of properties in incentivized areas in fact pay no more taxes, but instead report higher bribes. The results are consistent with a collusive setting in which performance pay increases collectors’ bargaining power over taxpayers, who have to either pay higher bribes to avoid being reassessed or pay substantially higher taxes if collusion breaks down.

This paper evaluates changes in fuel procurement practices by coal-and gas-fired power plants in the United States following state-level legislation that ended cost-of-service regulation of electricity generation. I find that deregulated plants substantially reduce the price paid for coal (but not gas) and tend to employ less capital-intensive sulfur abatement techniques relative to matched plants that were not subject to any regulatory change. Deregulation also led to a shift toward more productive coal mines. I show how these results lend support to theories of asymmetric information, capital bias, and regulatory capture as important sources of regulatory distortion. (JEL L51, L71, L94, L98, Q35, Q41, Q48)

All administrative processes contain points of entry for politics, and the U.S. president's use of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to review government regulations is no exception. Specifically, OMB review can open up a pathway for interest groups to lobby for policy change. We theorize that interest group lobbying can be influential during OMB review, especially when there is consensus across groups. We use a selection model to test our argument with more than 1,500 regulations written by federal agencies that were subjected to OMB review. We find that lobbying is associated with change during OMB review. We also demonstrate that, when only business groups lobby, we are more likely to see rule change; however, the same is not true for public interest groups. We supplement these results with illustrative examples suggesting that interest groups can, at times, use OMB review to influence the content of legally binding government regulations.

The responsiveness of government agencies to elected officials is a central question in democratic governance. A key source of variation in responsiveness is agency structure. Yet scholars often view agencies as falling into broad structural categories (e.g., cabinet departments or independent commissions) or fixate on some features of design (e.g., “for cause” protections). I develop new estimates of structural independence based on new data on 50 different structural features of 321 federal agencies in the federal executive establishment. Using a Bayesian latent variable model, I estimate independence on two dimensions: limits on the appointment of key agency decision makers and limits on political review of agency policy. I illustrate the value of this new measure by using it to examine how structure affects political influence and how agency independence can vary over time.

Dropouts have high crime rates, but is there a direct causal link? This study, utilizing administrative data for six cohorts of public school children in North Carolina, demonstrates that those born just after the cut date for enrolling in public kindergarten are more likely to drop out of high school before graduation and to commit a felony offense by age 19. We present suggestive evidence that dropout mediates criminal involvement. Paradoxically, these late-entry students outperform their grade peers academically while still in school, which helps account for the fact that they are less likely to become juvenile delinquents. (JEL H75, I21, J13, J24, K42)

This article advances a political theory of regulation that accounts for the choices of regulators and regulated entities when both are governments. Leading theories of regulation assume that governments regulate profit‐maximizing firms: Governments set rules, to which firms respond rationally in ways that constrain their behavior. But often the entities that governments regulate are other governments. We argue that government agencies and private firms often face different compliance costs, and that agencies have greater incentives than firms to appeal regulations through political channels. Simultaneously, the typical enforcement instruments that regulators use to influence firm behavior may be less effective against governments. Our empirical subjects are public and private entities’ compliance with the U.S. Clean Air Act and Safe Drinking Water Act. We find that, compared with private firms, governments violate these laws significantly more frequently and are less likely to be penalized for violations.

Government policies can activate a political constituency not only by providing material resources to, or altering the interpretive experiences of, individual citizens, but also by directly subsidizing established interest groups. We argue that state laws mandating collective bargaining for public employees provided organizational subsidies to public sector labor unions that lowered the costs of mobilizing their members to political action. Exploiting variation in the timing of laws across the states and using data on the political participation of public school teachers from 1956 to 2004, we find that the enactment of a mandatory bargaining law significantly boosted subsequent political participation among teachers. We also identify increased contact from organized groups seeking to mobilize teachers as a likely mechanism that explains this finding. These results have important implications for the current debate over collective bargaining rights and for our understanding of policy feedback, political parties and interest groups, and the bureaucracy.

Abstract This article explains why decentralization can undermine accountability and answers three questions: what determines if power should be centralized or decentralized when regions are heterogeneous? How many levels of government should there be? How should state borders be drawn? We develop a model of political agency in which voters differ in their ability to monitor rent-seeking politicians. We find that rent extraction is a decreasing and convex function of the share of informed voters, because voter information improves monitoring but also reduces the appeal of holding office. As a result, information heterogeneity pushes toward centralization to reduce rent extraction. Taste heterogeneity pulls instead toward decentralization to match local preferences. Our model thus implies that optimal borders should cluster by tastes but ensure diversity of information. We also find economies of scope in accountability that explain why multiplying government tiers harms efficiency. A single government in charge of many policies has better incentives than many special-purpose governments splitting its budget and responsibilities. Hence, a federal system is desirable only if information varies enough across regions.

We investigate institutional explanations for Congress's choice to fragment statutory frameworks for policy implementation. We argue that divided party government, which fuels legislative‐executive conflict over control of the bureaucracy, motivates Congress to fragment implementation power as a strategy to enhance its control over implementation. We develop a novel measure of fragmentation in policy implementation, collect data on it over the period 1947–2008, and test hypotheses linking separation‐of‐powers structures to legislative design of fragmented implementation power. We find that divided party government is powerfully associated with fragmentation in policy implementation, and that this association contributed to the long‐run growth of fragmentation in the postwar United States. We further find that legislative coalitions are more likely to fragment implementation power in the face of greater uncertainty about remaining in the majority.

When and how do third-party actors—most prominently electoral commissions, courts, and observers—contribute to the integrity of the electoral process? We approach these questions by studying how third-party actors shape politicians’ incentives to comply with the outcomes of elections. Third parties are most beneficial in close elections, when the threat of a post-election confrontation alone fails to ensure self-enforcing compliance with election outcomes. Our analysis highlights that third parties do not need to be impartial to be politically consequential, that it is third parties with a moderate pro-incumbent bias that will be acceptable to not only the opposition but also the incumbent, and that incumbents adopt politically consequential third-party institutions when they fear that their narrow victory might result in a costly post-election confrontation. Extensions of our model address the role of repression and urban bias, examine the differences between commissions, courts, and observers, and clarify not only the potential but also the limits to institutional solutions to the problem of electoral compliance in new and transitioning democracies.

We document the correlation between the workplace diversity in bureaucratic organizations and public service delivery. We do so in the context of Nigeria, where ethnicity is a salient form of self-identity. We thus expand the empirical management literature highlighting beneficial effects of workplace diversity, that has focused on private sector firms operating in high-income settings. Our analysis combines two data sources: (i) a survey to over 4,000 bureaucrats eliciting their ethnic identities; (ii) independent engineering assessments of completion rates for 4,700 public sector projects. The ethnic diversity of bureaucracies matters positively: a one standard deviation increase in the ethnic diversity of bureaucrats corresponds to 9 percent higher completion rates. In line with the management literature from private sector firms in high-income countries, this evidence highlights a potentially positive side of ethnic diversity in public sector organizations, in the context of Sub-Saharan Africa.

Public sector employees receive large fractions of their lifetime income in the form of deferred compensation. The introduction of the opportunity provided to Illinois public school employees to purchase additional pension benefits allows me to estimate employees' willingness-to-pay for benefits relative to the cost of providing them. The results show employees are willing to pay 20 cents on average for a dollar increase in the present value of expected retirement benefits. The findings suggest substantial inefficiency in compensation and cast doubt on the ability of deferred compensation schemes to attract employees. (JEL H75, I21, J26, J45)

Abstract Presidents become increasingly effective at managing the bureaucracy because of the information and expertise that they acquire from on‐the‐job experience. In their appointment choices, this theory predicts that presidents become better at reducing information asymmetries incurred from the bureaucracy (Agent Selection Learning), improve the vertical balance of leadership agent traits between top supervisory positions and subordinates directly beneath them (Agent Monitoring Learning), and place a greater relative premium on loyalty in response to horizontal policy conflict between the White House and the Senate (Common Agency Learning). This logic obtains empirical support from the analysis of bureaucratic agent traits for Senate‐confirmed presidential appointees serving in leadership positions covering 39 U.S. federal government agencies from 1977 to 2009. Presidents’ appointment strategies reflect their increasing effectiveness at managing the bureaucracy, thus complementing their increasing reliance on administrative mechanisms to achieve policy objectives as their tenure in office rises .

This paper examines the link between political control of government bureaucracies and citizens’ likelihood to stage disruptive protests. A public administration heavily controlled by politicians, and staffed to a large extent with political appointees, allows politicians to intervene in policy implementation and favor some groups over others in terms of access to public services. Such a system may induce citizens or civic associations to resort to disruptive actions to express demands and demonstrate political relevance, and thereby secure access to public goods. The effects are hypothesized to be more pronounced where civil society is stronger. We test the arguments empirically on data from 19 countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, and the findings are consistent with the hypotheses.

We investigate the distributional consequences of a corruption-fighting initiative in Romania targeting the endemic fraud in a high-stakes high school exit exam, which introduced CCTV monitoring of the exam and credible punishment threats for teachers and students. We find that the campaign was effective in reducing corruption and, in particular, that monitoring increased the effectiveness of the punishment threats. Estimating the heterogeneous impact for students of different poverty status we show that curbing corruption led to a worrisome score gap increase between poor and non-poor students. Consequently, the poor students have reduced chances to enter an elite university.

Abstract We find that regulators can implement identical rules inconsistently due to differences in their institutional design and incentives, and this behavior may adversely impact the effectiveness with which regulation is implemented. We study supervisory decisions of U.S. banking regulators and exploit a legally determined rotation policy that assigns federal and state supervisors to the same bank at exogenously set time intervals. Comparing federal and state regulator supervisory ratings within the same bank, we find that federal regulators are systematically tougher, downgrading supervisory ratings almost twice as frequently as do state supervisors. State regulators counteract these downgrades to some degree by upgrading more frequently. Under federal regulators, banks report worse asset quality, higher regulatory capital ratios, and lower return on assets. Leniency of state regulators relative to their federal counterparts is related to costly outcomes, such as higher failure rates and lower repayment rates of government assistance funds. The discrepancy in regulator behavior is related to different weights given by regulators to local economic conditions and, to some extent, differences in regulatory resources. We find no support for regulator self-interest, which includes “revolving doors” as a reason for leniency of state regulators.

We study the impact of a public school choice lottery in Charlotte-Mecklenburg schools on college enrollment and degree completion. We find a significant overall increase in college attainment among lottery winners who attend their first choice school. Using rich administrative data on peers, teachers, course offerings and other inputs, we show that the impacts of choice are strongly predicted by gains on several measures of school quality. Gains in attainment are concentrated among girls. Girls respond to attending a better school with higher grades and increases in college-preparatory course-taking, while boys do not.

Abstract This study examines the impact on student achievement of implementing a bundle of best practices from high-performing charter schools into low-performing, traditional public schools in Houston, Texas, using a school-level randomized field experiment and quasi-experimental comparisons. The five practices in the bundle are increased instructional time, more effective teachers and administrators, high-dosage tutoring, data-driven instruction, and a culture of high expectations. The findings show that injecting best practices from charter schools into traditional Houston public schools significantly increases student math achievement in treated elementary and secondary schools—by 0.15 to 0.18 standard deviations a year—and has little effect on reading achievement. Similar bundles of practices are found to significantly raise math achievement in analyses for public schools in a field experiment in Denver and program in Chicago.

Administrative data from a large and diverse community college are used to examine if underrepresented minority students benefit from taking courses with underrepresented minority instructors. To identify racial interactions, we estimate models that include both student and classroom fixed effects and focus on students with limited choice in courses. We find that the performance gap in terms of class dropout rates and grade performance between white and underrepresented minority students falls by 20 to 50 percent when taught by an underrepresented minority instructor. We also find these interactions affect longer-term outcomes such as subsequent course selection, retention, and degree completion. (JEL I23, J15, J44)

Do street-level bureaucrats discriminate in the services they provide to constituents? We use a field experiment to measure differential information provision about voting by local election administrators in the United States. We contact over 7,000 election officials in 48 states who are responsible for providing information to voters and implementing voter ID laws. We find that officials provide different information to potential voters of different putative ethnicities. Emails sent from Latino aliases are significantly less likely to receive any response from local election officials than non-Latino white aliases and receive responses of lower quality. This raises concerns about the effect of voter ID laws on access to the franchise and about bias in the provision of services by local bureaucrats more generally.

We show that isolated capital cities are robustly associated with greater levels of corruption across US states, in line with the view that this isolation reduces accountability. We then provide direct evidence that the spatial distribution of population relative to the capital affects different accountability mechanisms: newspapers cover state politics more when readers are closer to the capital, voters who live far from the capital are less knowledgeable and interested in state politics, and they turn out less in state elections. We also find that isolated capitals are associated with more money in state-level campaigns, and worse public good provision. (JEL D72, D73, H41, H83, K42, R23)

Education ministries worldwide have promoted community engagement through school committees. This paper presents results from a large field experiment testing alternative approaches to strengthen school committees in public schools in Indonesia. Two novel treatments focus on institutional reforms. First, some schools were randomly assigned to implement elections of school committee members. Another treatment facilitated joint planning meetings between the school committee and the village council (linkage). Two more common treatments, grants and training, provided resources to existing school committees. We find that institutional reforms, in particular linkage and elections combined with linkage, are most cost-effective at improving learning. (JEL H52, I21, I25, I28, O15)

Sociologists have examined gender inequalities across a wide array of social contexts. Yet, questions remain regarding how inequalities arise among autonomous groups pursuing economic goals. In this article, we investigate mixed-sex entrepreneurial teams to unpack the mechanisms by which gender inequality in leadership emerges, despite strong pressures toward merit-based organizing principles. We theorize the potentially competing relationships between merit and gender and explore the contingencies moderating their effects. Drawing on a unique, nationally representative dataset of entrepreneurial teams sampled from the U.S. population in 2005, we use conditional logistic regression to test our hypotheses. We demonstrate that merit’s effect becomes much larger when multiple merit-based criteria provide consistent predictions for which team member is superior to others, and when entrepreneurial founders adopt bureaucratic templates to construct new ventures. However, gender stereotypes of leaders pervasively constrain women’s access to power positions, and gender’s effect intensifies when spousal relationships are involved. Women have reduced chances to be in charge if they co-found new businesses with their husbands, and some family conditions further modify women’s chances, such as husbands’ employment and the presence of children.

Rent extraction by public sector workers may be limited by the ability of taxpayers to vote with their feet. But rent extraction may be higher in regions where high amenities mute the migration response. This paper develops a theoretical model that predicts such a link between public sector wage differentials and local amenities, and the predictions are tested by analyzing variation in these differentials and amenities across states. Public sector wage differentials are, in fact, larger in the presence of high amenities, with the effect stronger for unionized public sector workers, whose political power may allow greater scope for rent extraction. (JEL H75, H76, J31, J32, J45, J51)

Public sector unions are major interest groups in American politics, but they are rarely studied. New research would not only shed much-needed light on how these unions shape government and politics, but also broaden the way scholars think about interest groups generally: by highlighting interests that arise inside governments, drawing attention to long-ignored types of policies and decision arenas, and underlining the importance of groups in subnational politics. Here we explore the effects of public sector unions on the costs of government. We present two separate studies, using different datasets from different historical periods, and we examine several outcomes: salaries, health benefits, and employment. We find that unions and collective bargaining increase the costs of government and that the effects are especially large for benefits. We view this analysis as an opening wedge that we hope will encourage a more extensive line of new research—and new thinking about American interest groups.

Bureaucratic compliance is often crucial for political survival, yet eliciting that compliance in weakly institutionalized environments requires that political principals convince agents that their hold on power is secure. We provide a formal model to show that electoral manipulation can help to solve this agency problem. By influencing beliefs about a ruler's hold on power, manipulation can encourage a bureaucrat to work on behalf of the ruler when he would not otherwise do so. This result holds under various common technologies of electoral manipulation. Manipulation is more likely when the bureaucrat is dependent on the ruler for his career and when the probability is high that even generally unsupportive citizens would reward bureaucratic effort. The relationship between the ruler's expected popularity and the likelihood of manipulation, in turn, depends on the technology of manipulation.

This paper shows that the body of appointed officials that a new democracy inherits from the previous regime is a key determinant of the extent of electoral fraud and clientelistic spending in new democracies. I develop a model that predicts that appointed officials have stronger incentives to influence voters during national level elections because of their career concerns. I test the implications of the model using data from Indonesia's transition to democracy. Both the pattern of alignment of electoral results between village and district levels and the pattern of subsequent turnover of appointed village heads corroborate the predictions of the model. ( JEL D72, H77, H83, O17, O18)

The most desirable Kenyan secondary schools are elite government schools that admit the best students from across the country. We exploit the random variation generated by the centralized school admissions process in a regression discontinuity design to obtain causal estimates of the effects of attending one of these elite public schools on student progression and test scores in secondary school. Despite their reputations, we find little evidence of positive impacts on learning outcomes for students who attended these schools, suggesting that their sterling reputations reflect the selection of students rather than their ability to generate value-added test score gains. ( JEL H52, I21, I28, O15)

Scholars and pundits argue that women and minorities are more likely to lose their jobs in downsizing because of segregation or outright discrimination. In contrast, this article explores how the formalization and legalization of downsizing affect inequalities. According to bureaucracy theory and management practitioners, formalization constrains decision-makers’ bias, but neo-structural and feminist theories of inequality argue that formalization can itself be gendered and racially biased. Accountability theory advances this debate, pointing to organizational and institutional processes that motivate executives to minimize inequality. Building on these theories, and drawing on unique data from a national sample of 327 downsized establishments between 1971 and 2002, I analyze how layoff formalization and actors’ antidiscrimination accountability affect women’s and minorities’ representation in management after downsizing. Results demonstrate that, first, downsizing significantly reduces managerial diversity. Second, formalization exacerbates these negative effects when layoff rules rely on positions or tenure, but not when layoff rules require an individualized evaluation. Finally, antidiscrimination accountability generated by internal legal counsels or compliance awareness prods executives to override formal rules and reduce inequalities. I conclude that although downsizing has been increasingly managed by formal rules and monitored by legal experts, this has often meant the institutionalization of unequal, rather than equal, opportunity.

Most people interested in participating in the electoral process are registered to vote. This self-selection process creates two empirical puzzles. First, it is unclear whether voter registration drives introduce new voters into the electorate or simply facilitate a bureaucratic transaction that people registering would accomplish via other means in the absence of the drive. Second, estimating the causal effect of registration on turnout is difficult because the act of selection signals political interest and engagement that is correlated with turnout. This article utilizes field experiments to answer these two questions and the second question of the type of person mobilized by registration drives.1 Across six cities, 620 streets were randomly assigned to receive face-to-face visits encouraging voter registration or a control group that received no attention from the campaign. On average, 10 more newly registered people appeared on treatment streets than control streets—an increase of 4.4%. This suggests that registration is a burden for a portion of the eligible population. Comparing the number of ballots cast by newly registered voters, treatment streets averaged two more votes than control streets. That is, 24% of the people registered as a direct result of the experiment voted. Disaggregating the results by socioeconomic status, the increase in registration is largest on relatively poor streets, but this difference is counterbalanced by higher turnout among new registrants on relatively affluent streets. Thus, the results of these six experiments suggest that electoral reforms reducing the costs associated with voter registration will assist a nontrivial portion of the electorate but not alter the overall composition of the electorate.

Restrictions to media freedom, in the form of repressive defamation legislation, are thought to affect the amount of information about corruption that the media report. Exploiting variation in regulation of speech across states in a federal country, Mexico, and using a novel data set based on content analysis of the local press, I estimate the effect of lack of freedom on the coverage devoted to acts of malfeasance by public officials. Corruption receives significantly less attention in states with a more repressive defamation law. Instrumental variable models corroborate the interpretation of the negative association between regulation and coverage as a causal “chilling effect.”

We apply the regression kink design to the Swedish grant system and estimate causal effects of intergovernmental grants on local public employment. Our robust conclusion is that grants do not stimulate local public employment. We find no statistically significant effects on total local public employment, and we can exclude even moderate effects. When disaggregating the total effect by sector, we find that personnel in the traditional welfare sectors are unaffected, a conclusion which applies to both publicly and privately employed in these sectors. The only positive and statistically significant effect of grants is that on administrative personnel. (JEL H75, H77, J45)

As street-level bureaucrats, poll workers bear the primary responsibility for implementing voter identification requirements. Voter identification requirements are not implemented equally across groups of voters, and poll workers exercise substantial discretion in how they apply election law. In states with minimal and varying identification requirements, poll workers appear to treat especially minority voters differently, requesting more stringent voter identification. We explain why poll workers are different from other street-level bureaucrats and how traditional mechanisms of control have little impact on limiting poll-worker discretion. We test why many poll workers appear not to follow the law using a post-election survey of New Mexico poll workers. We find little evidence that race, training, or partisanship matters. Instead, poll worker attitudes toward photo-identification policies and their educational attainment influences implementation of voter-identification laws.

Unelected officials with coercive powers (e.g., police, prosecutors, bureaucrats) vary markedly in the extent to which citizens view their actions as legitimate. We explore the institutional determinants of legitimate authority in the context of a public goods laboratory experiment. In the experiment, an “authority” can target one “citizen” for punishment following citizen contribution choices. Untargeted citizens can then choose to help or hinder the authority. This latter choice may be interpreted as a behavioral measure of the authority's legitimacy. We find that legitimacy is affected by how authorities are compensated, the transparency with which their decisions are observed, and an interaction between these. When transparency is high, citizens are more willing to assist authorities who receive fixed salaries than those who personally benefit from collected penalties, even when citizens' material incentives are controlled for. Lower transparency reduces support, but only for salaried enforcers.

To what extent do presidents select appointees based upon campaign experience and connections? The answer to this question has important implications for our understanding of presidential management and political leadership. This article presents a theory explaining where presidents place different types of appointees and why, focusing on differences in ideology, competence, and non‐policy patronage benefits among potential appointees. We develop a formal model and test its implications with new data on 1,307 persons appointed in the first six months of the Obama administration. The empirical results broadly support the theory, suggesting that President Obama was more likely to place appointees selected for non‐policy patronage reasons in agencies off his agenda, in agencies that shared his policy views, and where appointees are least able to affect agency performance. We conclude that patronage continues to play an important role in American politics, with important consequences for campaigns, presidential politics, and governance.

According to the prevailing interpretation of “Politics as a Vocation,” the Weberian political leader is willing to leave morality behind and make hard-headed consequentialist calculations about political means. I argue that the Weberian political leader is more accurately described as someone who keeps calculation in its place—both in terms of assessing the consequences of pursuing certain means and, more fundamentally, in terms of a basic framework for viewing responsibility and the world. Indeed, inappropriate substitutions of “calculative” thinking for a broader, more responsive thoughtfulness about the world mark Weber's three paradigms of irresponsible political leadership: the morally absolutist politician, the bureaucratic politician, and the power politician. Further, foregrounding Weber's effort to corral calculation reveals that uncompromising ethical stands in politics need not amount to naïveté or reckless disregard for the consequences, and that morality has a continuing claim on his ideal leader.

We provide a novel model of executives in parliamentary democracies that accounts for key features of these institutions: decision-making authority is assigned to individual ministers; and policy relevant information is aggregated through communication between politicians. Politicians hold idiosyncratic biases and have private information relevant either to all policies or to a subset of them. When their information is relevant to all policies and communication takes place in private all decisions should be centralised to a single politician. A government that holds cabinet meetings, where any information communicated to one minister is made available to all, outperforms one where communication is private: a multi-member cabinet can then be optimal. We study the optimal form of authority allocation and find (i) that centralisation is non-monotonic in the degree of ideological divergence between politicians; and (ii) the cabinet need not be single peaked around the most moderate politician, and in fact may not even be ideologically connected. In a large cabinet, however, all power should be centralised to the most moderate politician. In the case where uncertainty is policy specific, and a single politician is informed on each policy, power should never be fully decentralised. In fact numerical simulations show that the optimal executive structure is no less centralized than in the common-state case. Our model provides a justification for centralised authority and the use of cabinet meetings to enhance the quality of policies implemented.

Comparative political economy offers a wealth of hypotheses connecting decentralization to improved public service delivery. In recent years, influential formal and experimental work has begun to question the underlying theory and empirical analyses of previous findings. At the same time, many countries have grown dissatisfied with the results of their decentralization efforts and have begun to reverse them. Vietnam is particularly intriguing because of the unique way in which it designed its recentralization, piloting a removal of elected people's councils in 99 districts across the country and stratifying the selection by region, type of province, and urban versus rural setting. We take advantage of the opportunity provided by this quasi experiment to test the core hypotheses regarding the decision to shift administrative and fiscal authority to local governments. We find that recentralization significantly improved public service delivery in areas important to central policy-makers, especially in transportation, healthcare, and communications.

Numerous developing countries have substantially increased their number of subnational administrative units in recent years. The literature on this phenomenon is, nonetheless, small and suffers from several theoretical and methodological shortcomings: in particular, a unit of analysis problem that causes past studies to mistakenly de-emphasize the importance of local actors. We posit that administrative unit proliferation occurs where and when there is a confluence of interests between the national executive and local citizens and elites from areas that are politically, economically, and ethnically marginalized. We argue further that although the proliferation of administrative units often accompanies or follows far-reaching decentralization reforms, it likely results in a recentralization of power; the proliferation of new local governments fragments existing units into smaller ones with lower relative intergovernmental bargaining power and administrative capacity. We find support for these arguments using original data from Uganda.

Members of Congress have long sought to combat assertions of presidential power and alleged executive misconduct through committee investigations. But are such investigations mere political theater, or do they have systematic effects on the course of politics? We argue that congressional investigations of the executive branch damage the president's support among the public, making investigations a useful tool in interbranch battles. Marshaling an original data set of more than 3,500 investigative hearings and over 50 years of public opinion data, we show that increased investigative activity in the hearing room significantly decreases the president’s job approval rating. A survey experiment both confirms our assertion that investigations decrease public support for the White House and shows that committee-led charges of misconduct have a greater influence on public opinion than identical charges not attributed to a congressional actor.

Fixed statutes and regulations often have variable consequences over time. If left unattended, such drift can severely erode the performance of government as an institution of representation. To better understand the mechanics of policy‐making in a changing world, we develop a positive theory that captures political drift in a dynamic separation‐of‐powers system. We show analytically that a distinctive combination of legislative supermajoritarianism and agency discretion—institutional features that, in isolation, elicit widespread criticism—can effectively ameliorate policies' susceptibility to the vicissitudes of exogenous change. The critical mechanism for governmental accommodation of drift is delegation, which increases all decision makers' well‐being by reducing fluctuations in outcomes. Although the complete smoothing of outcomes is attainable in a separation‐of‐ powers system, we show that this is typically not achieved in equilibrium. The presence of drift provides an opportunity for self‐interested legislators to extract a distributional benefit from their fellow legislators at the expense of overall policymaking efficiency.

This paper studies the policy impact of civil service regulations, exploiting reforms undertaken by US state governments throughout the twentieth century. These reforms replaced political patronage with a civil service recruited based on merit and protected from politics. I find that state politicians respond to these changes by spending relatively less through the reformed state-level bureaucracies. Instead, they allocate more funds to lower level governments. The reallocation of expenditures leads to reduced long-term investment by state governments. (JEL D73, H72, H77, H79)

This paper studies the effect of additional government revenues on political corruption and on the quality of politicians, both with theory and data. The theory is based on a political agency model with career concerns and endogenous entry of candidates. The data refer to Brazil, where federal transfers to municipal governments change exogenously at given population thresholds, allowing us to implement a regression discontinuity design. The empirical evidence shows that larger transfers increase observed corruption and reduce the average education of candidates for mayor. These and other more specific empirical results are in line with the predictions of the theory. (JEL D72, D73, H77, O17, O18)

We use variation in oil output among Brazilian municipalities to investigate the effects of resource windfalls on government behavior. Oil-rich municipalities experience increases in revenues and report corresponding increases in spending on public goods and services. However, survey data and administrative records indicate that social transfers, public good provision, infrastructure, and household income increase less (if at all) than one might expect given the higher reported spending. (JEL H41, H75, I31, O13, O15, O17, O18)

Abstract We study a recent recruitment drive for public sector positions in Mexico. Different salaries were announced randomly across recruitment sites, and job offers were subsequently randomized. Screening relied on exams designed to measure applicants’ intellectual ability, personality, and motivation. This allows the first experimental estimates of (1) the role of financial incentives in attracting a larger and more qualified pool of applicants, (2) the elasticity of the labor supply facing the employer, and (3) the role of job attributes (distance, attractiveness of the municipal environment) in helping fill vacancies, as well as the role of wages in helping fill positions in less attractive municipalities. A theoretical model of job applications and acceptance guides the empirical inquiry. We find that higher wages attract more able applicants as measured by their IQ, personality, and proclivity toward public sector work—that is, we find no evidence of adverse selection effects on motivation; higher wage offers also increased acceptance rates, implying a labor supply elasticity of around 2 and some degree of monopsony power. Distance and worse municipal characteristics strongly decrease acceptance rates, but higher wages help bridge the recruitment gap in worse municipalities.

This article develops an interactive and relational conception of infrastructural state power for studying the capacity of authoritarian regimes to absorb popular protests. Based on an ethnography of the grassroots state in moments of unrest in China, the authors identify three microfoundations of Chinese authoritarianism: protest bargaining, legal-bureaucratic absorption, and patron-clientelism. Adopting, respectively, the logics of market exchange, rule-bound games, and interpersonal bonds, these mechanisms have the effect of depoliticizing social unrest and constitute a lived experience of authoritarian domination as a non-zero-sum situation, totalizing and transparent yet permissive of room for maneuvering and bargaining. This heuristic framework calls for bringing the subjective experience of subordination back into the theorizing of state domination. © 2013 by The University of Chicago.

Abstract In many regulated markets, private, third-party auditors are chosen and paid by the firms that they audit, potentially creating a conflict of interest. This article reports on a two-year field experiment in the Indian state of Gujarat that sought to curb such a conflict by altering the market structure for environmental audits of industrial plants to incentivize accurate reporting. There are three main results. First, the status quo system was largely corrupted, with auditors systematically reporting plant emissions just below the standard, although true emissions were typically higher. Second, the treatment caused auditors to report more truthfully and very significantly lowered the fraction of plants that were falsely reported as compliant with pollution standards. Third, treatment plants, in turn, reduced their pollution emissions. The results suggest reformed incentives for third-party auditors can improve their reporting and make regulation more effective.

Ethnic quotas are often expected to induce distribution of material benefits to members of disadvantaged groups. Yet, the presence of an ethnic quota does not imply that political mobilization takes place along ethnic lines: Cross-cutting affiliations within multi-ethnic party organizations may lessen the tendency of politicians to target benefits to particular ethnic groups. In this article, we evaluate the impact of quotas for the presidencies of village councils in India, a subject of considerable recent research. Drawing on fine-grained information from surveys of voters, council members, presidents, and bureaucrats and using a natural experiment to isolate the effects of quotas in the states of Karnataka, Rajasthan, and Bihar, we find weak distributive effects of quotas for marginalized castes and tribes, but suggestive evidence of the importance of partisanship. We then use survey experiments to compare the influence of party and caste on voting preferences and expectations of benefit receipt. Our results suggest that especially when politicians have dynamic political incentives to allocate benefits along party lines, cross-cutting partisan ties can blunt the distributive impact of ethnic quotas.

Abstract We study the end of race-based busing in Charlotte-Mecklenburg schools (CMS). In 2001, school boundaries in CMS were redrawn dramatically, and half of students received a new assignment. Using addresses measured prior to the policy change, we compare students in the same neighborhood that lived on opposite sides of a newly drawn boundary. We find that both white and minority students score lower on high school exams when they are assigned to schools with more minority students. We also find decreases in high school graduation and four-year college attendance for whites and large increases in crime for minority males. We conclude that the end of race-based busing widened racial inequality, despite efforts by CMS to mitigate the effect of segregation through compensatory resource allocation.

The effect of competition on the quality of health care remains a contested issue. Most empirical estimates rely on inference from nonexperimental data. In contrast, this paper exploits a procompetitive policy reform to provide estimates of the impact of competition on hospital outcomes. The English government introduced a policy in 2006 to promote competition between hospitals. Using this policy to implement a difference-in-differences research design, we estimate the impact of the introduction of competition on not only clinical outcomes but also productivity and expenditure. We find that the effect of competition is to save lives without raising costs. (JEL H51, I11, I18, L32, L33)

Theoretical work on disciplining corrupt agents has emphasized the role of expected future rents—for example, efficiency wages. Yet taken seriously this approach implies that illicit future rents should also deter corruption. We study this “golden goose” effect in the context of a statutory wage increase in India's employment guarantee scheme, comparing official microrecords to original household survey data to measure corruption. We estimate large golden goose effects that reduced the total impact of the wage increase on theft by roughly 64 percent. In short, rent expectations matter. (JEL D73, D82, H83, J41, K42, O17, O21)

This paper is concerned with the development of national primary education regimes in Europe, North America, Latin America, Oceania, and Japan between 1870 and 1939. We examine why school systems varied between countries and over time, concentrating on three institutional dimensions: centralization, secularization, and subsidization. There were two paths to centralization: through liberal and social democratic governments in democracies, or through fascist and conservative parties in autocracies. We find that the secularization of public school systems can be explained by path-dependent state-church relationships (countries with established national churches were less likely to have secularized education systems) but also by partisan politics. Finally, we find that the provision of public funding to private providers of education, especially to private religious schools, can be seen as a solution to religious conflict, since such institutions were most common in countries where Catholicism was a significant but not entirely dominant religion.

Recent scholarship suggests that authoritarian leaders may use seemingly democratic institutions to strengthen their own rule. In this vein, China’s leaders attempted to rein in local governments by introducing new transparency regulations, with environmental transparency a key focus. However, implementing these requirements necessitates cooperation from the very actors who may be weakened by them. Surprisingly, more industrial or more polluted cities were no slower in implementing environmental transparency than cleaner ones, with pollution measured using satellite data in order to avoid relying on questionable official sources. However, cities dominated by large industrial firms lagged in implementing environmental transparency, and this effect appears strongest when a city’s largest firm is in a highly polluting industry. Our findings demonstrate that even institutional innovations designed to preserve authoritarian rule can face significant challenges of implementation.

Voters often dismantle constitutional checks and balances on the executive. If such checks and balances limit presidential abuses of power and rents, why do voters support their removal? We argue that by reducing politician rents, checks and balances also make it cheaper to bribe or influence politicians through non-electoral means. In weakly institutionalized polities where such non-electoral influences, particularly by the better organized elite, are a major concern, voters may prefer a political system without checks and balances as a way of insulating politicians from these influences. When they do so, they are effectively accepting a certain amount of politician (presidential) rents in return for redistribution. We show that checks and balances are less likely to emerge when the elite is better organized and is more likely to be able to influence or bribe politicians, and when inequality and potential taxes are high (which makes redistribution more valuable to the majority). We also provide case study evidence from Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela consistent with the model.

The effect of competition on the quality of health care remains a contested issue. Most empirical estimates rely on inference from non experimental data. In contrast, this paper exploits a pro-competitive policy reform to provide estimates of the impact of competition on hospital outcomes. The English government introduced a policy in 2006 to promote competition between hospitals. Patients were given choice of location for hospital care and provided information on the quality and timeliness of care. Prices, previously negotiated between buyer and seller, were set centrally under a DRG type system. Using this policy to implement a difference-in-differences research design we estimate the impact of the introduction of competition on not only clinical outcomes but also productivity and expenditure. Our data set is large, containing information on approximately 68,000 discharges per year per hospital from 160 hospitals. We find that the effect of competition is to save lives without raising costs. Patients discharged from hospitals located in markets where competition was more feasible were less likely to die, had shorter length of stay and were treated at the same cost.

The authors argue that taken-for-granted notions of deservingness and legitimacy among local government officials affect funding allocations for organizations serving disadvantaged immigrants, even in politically progressive places. Analysis of Community Development Block Grant data in the San Francisco Bay Area reveals significant inequality in grants making to immigrant organizations across central cities and suburbs. With data from 142 interviews and documentary evidence, the authors elaborate how a history of continuous migration builds norms of inclusion and civic capacity for public-private partnerships. They also identify the phenomenon of “suburban free riding” to explain how and why suburban officials rely on central city resources to serve immigrants, but do not build and fund partnerships with immigrant organizations in their own jurisdictions. The analysis affirms the importance of distinguishing between types of immigrant destinations, but argues that scholars need to do so using a regional lens.

Does the president or Congress have more influence over policymaking by the bureaucracy? Despite a wealth of theoretical guidance, progress on this important question has proven elusive due to competing theoretical predictions and severe difficulties in measuring agency influence and oversight. We use a survey of federal executives to assess political influence, congressional oversight, and the policy preferences of agencies, committees, and the president on a comparable scale. Analyzing variation in political influence across and within agencies reveals that Congress is less influential relative to the White House when more committees are involved. While increasing the number of involved committees may maximize the electoral benefits for members, it may also undercut the ability of Congress as an institution to collectively respond to the actions of the presidency or the bureaucracy.

Decentralization is argued to create incentives for local and regional politicians to be more responsive and accountable to their constituents, but few studies have directly tested this claim. We use survey data from Colombia to examine individual‐level evaluations of the degree to which decentralization prompts citizens to view department government as more accountable. We estimate the effect of administrative, fiscal, and political decentralization, controlling for participation, political knowledge, confidence in government, education, and income on perceptions of accountability. Our results indicate that administrative and fiscal decentralization improve perceptions of accountability, while political decentralization does not.

Scholarship on race- and class-based disparities in regulatory outcomes has failed to provide a theoretically grounded account of this bias’ origin. We address this shortcoming by providing a microlevel explanation of how demographics influence compliance bias or the failure to detect noncompliant firms. We argue that regulatory compliance is best understood as a dual-agent—firm and regulatory officer—production function, and that community mobilization and agency decision-making authority shape bureaucrats’ incentives to report noncompliance. We test our argument with an original dataset on community mobilization and agency structure that delineates the political costs and benefits of state regulatory officers implementing the U.S. Clean Air Act. Using detection-controlled estimation, we find that while certain communities are vulnerable to compliance bias, such bias is mitigated in the presence of either politically mobilized communities or decentralized enforcement authority within the implementing agency.

This paper studies Comprehensive Performance Assessment, an explicit incentive scheme for local government in England. Motivated by a theoretical political agency model, we predict that CPA should increase service quality and local taxation, but have an ambiguous effect on the efficiency of service provision. We test these predictions using Welsh local governments as a control group: CPA increased the property tax, and our index of service quality, but had no significant effect on efficiency overall. There is evidence of a heterogenous effect of CPA: it impacted more on councils where electoral competition was initially weak, in line with our theory. (JEL H71, H72, H75, H76, R51)

In the presence of imperfect information, voluntary certification can provide an important complement to mandatory inspections as a basis for environmental regulation in low income countries. Using data from Mexico's Clean Industry Program, we show that patterns of compliance and certification by sector are consistent with a model in which selection into the voluntary program permits more efficient targeting of regulator effort. As expected given the informational role played by certification in the model, we also find evidence, for a sample of publicly traded firms, of positive stock price deviations linked to the announcement of certification.

Contract theory claims that renegotiation prevents attainment of the efficient solution that could be obtained under full commitment. Assessing the cost of renegotiation remains an open issue from an empirical viewpoint. We fit a structural principal-agent model with renegotiation on a set of contracts for urban transport services. The model captures two important features of the industry as only two types of contracts are used (fixed price and cost-plus) and subsidies are greater following a cost-plus contract than following a fixed-price one. We conclude that the welfare gains from improving commitment would be significant but would accrue mostly to operators. (JEL D82, D86, L51, L92, R42, R48)

As the global financial crisis has shown, regulatory agencies can at times spectacularly fail to fulfill their regulatory mandates. Yet, the conditions under which governments respond to regulatory failures by terminating and replacing their regulatory agencies have so far remained largely unclear. This article offers an explanation for the significant variation in governments’ propensities to dismantle and replace their banking regulatory agencies. Failures to ensure financial stability or international competitiveness make it electorally profitable for governments to replace their incumbent banking regulators. However, governments’ incentives to respond to regulatory failures by replacing their regulatory agencies are significantly conditioned by the extent of private or public ownership in the domestic banking sector. The analysis of an original data set of 65 banking regulatory agencies in 29 OECD countries between 1975 and 2010 supports these theoretical predictions.

This paper analyzes the magnitude and sources of long-term earnings declines associated with graduating from college during a recession. Using a large longitudinal university-employer-employee dataset, we find that the cost of recessions for new graduates is substantial and unequal. Unlucky graduates suffer persistent earnings declines lasting ten years. They start to work for lower paying employers, and then partly recover through a gradual process of mobility toward better firms. We document that more advantaged graduates suffer less from graduating in recessions because they switch to better firms quickly, while earnings of less advantaged graduates can be permanently affected by cyclical downgrading. (JEL E32, I23, J22, J23, J31)

Abstract Tropical deforestation accounts for almost one-fifth of greenhouse gas emissions and threatens the world’s most diverse ecosystems. Much of this deforestation is driven by illegal logging. We use novel satellite data that tracks annual deforestation across eight years of Indonesian institutional change to examine how local officials’ incentives affect deforestation. Increases in the number of political jurisdictions lead to increased deforestation and lower timber prices, consistent with Cournot competition between jurisdictions. Illegal logging and local oil and gas rents are short-run substitutes, but this effect disappears over time with political turnover. The results illustrate how local officials’ incentives affect deforestation and show how standard economic theories can explain illegal behavior.

Teacher performance evaluation has become a dominant theme in school reform efforts. Yet, whether evaluation changes the performance of teachers, the focus of this paper, is unknown. Instead, evaluation has largely been studied as an input to selective dismissal decisions. We study mid-career teachers for whom we observe an objective measure of productivity—value-added to student achievement—before, during, and after evaluation. We find teachers are more productive in post-evaluation years, with the largest improvements among teachers performing relatively poorly ex-ante. The results suggest teachers can gain information from evaluation and subsequently develop new skills, increase long-run effort, or both.

This article examines how the effect of education on institutional trust varies cross-nationally as a function of the pervasiveness of public-sector corruption. We approach institutional trust as a performance-based evaluation of political institutions. Given their greater capacity to accurately assess the level of corruption coupled with their stronger commitment to democratic values, we hypothesize that higher-educated citizens should react differently to corruption from those with less education. Employing multilevel models we find that education has both a conditional and a conditioning effect on institutional trust. First, education is negatively related to institutional trust in corrupt societies and positively related to institutional trust in clean societies. Second, the corrosive effect of corruption on institutional trust worsens as education improves. The article ends with a discussion of the implications of these findings for the functioning of contemporary democracies.

We use a randomized experiment and a structural model to test whether monitoring and financial incentives can reduce teacher absence and increase learning in India. In treatment schools, teachers' attendance was monitored daily using cameras, and their salaries were made a nonlinear function of attendance. Teacher absenteeism in the treatment group fell by 21 percentage points relative to the control group, and the children's test scores increased by 0.17 standard deviations. We estimate a structural dynamic labor supply model and find that teachers respond strongly to financial incentives. Our model is used to compute cost-minimizing compensation policies. (JEL I21, J31, J45, O15)

Coalition lobbying is one of the most frequently employed influence tactics used by interest groups today. Yet, surprisingly, the existing literature measuring its policy effects finds either no relationship or a negative association between coalition lobbying and policy change. We theorize the conditions under which coalition lobbying will influence policy and then test for its policy effects. We expect greater influence when there is consensus across the messages sent from coalitions and when coalitions are larger and mobilize new participants. Using a multilevel model, we assess the argument with survey data from lobbying entities and a content analysis of regulations promulgated by seven U.S. federal agencies. In contrast to the existing literature measuring policy effects, we find evidence that coalition participants hold important influence during regulatory policymaking. We also demonstrate that both consensus and coalition makeup are critical factors for policy change. These findings suggest that groups employing coalition lobbying—under certain conditions—can, and do, affect the content of government policy outputs.

Institutional changes associated with the rise of shareholder value capitalism have had seemingly contradictory effects on managers and managerialism in the United States economy. Financial critiques of inefficient corporate bureaucracies and the resulting wave of downsizing, mergers, and computerization subjected managers to unprecedented layoffs during the 1980s and 1990s as firms sought to become lean and mean. Yet the proportion of managers and their average compensation continued to increase during this period. How did the rise of anti-managerial investor ideologies and strategies oriented toward reducing companies’ labor costs coincide with increasing numbers of ever more highly paid managerial employees? This article examines the paradoxical relationship between shareholder value and managerialism by analyzing the effects of shareholder value strategies on the growth of managerial employment and managerial earnings in 59 major industries in the U.S. private sector from 1984 to 2001. Results from industry-level dynamic panel models show that layoffs, mergers, computerization, deunionization, and the increasing predominance of publicly traded firms all contributed to broad-based increases in the number of managerial positions and the valuation of managerial labor. Results are generally consistent with David Gordon’s (1996) fat and mean thesis.

We examine how employers learn about worker productivity in a randomized pilot experiment which provided objective estimates of teacher performance to school principals. We test several hypotheses that support a simple Bayesian learning model with imperfect information. First, the correlation between performance estimates and prior beliefs rises with more precise objective estimates and more precise subjective priors. Second, new information exerts greater influence on posterior beliefs when it is more precise and when priors are less precise. Employer learning affects job separation and productivity in schools, increasing turnover for teachers with low performance estimates and producing small test score improvements. (JEL D83, I21, J24, J45)

We examine whether low-skilled immigration to the United States has contributed to immigrants' residential isolation by reducing native demand for public schools. We address endogeneity in school demographics using established Mexican settlement patterns in California and use a comparison group to account for immigration's broader effects. We estimate that between 1970 and 2000, the average California school district lost more than 14 non-Hispanic households with children to other districts in its metropolitan area for every 10 additional households enrolling low-English Hispanics in its public schools. By disproportionately isolating children, the native reaction to immigration may have longer-run consequences than previously thought. (JEL H75, I21, J15, J24, J61, R23)

The article extends the multi-institutional model of power and change through an analysis of the American Indian Sovereignty Movement. Drawing upon cultural models of the state, and articulating institutionalist conceptions of political opportunities and resources, the analysis demonstrates that this framework can be applied to challenges addressing the state as well as nonstate fields. The rational-legal diminishment of tribal rights, bureaucratic paternalism, commonsense views of tribes as racial/ethnic minorities, and the binary construction of American and Indian as oppositional identities diminished the appeal of "contentious" political action. Instead, to establish tribes' status as sovereign nations, tribal leaders aggressively enacted infrastructural power, transposed favorable legal rulings across social fields to legitimize sovereignty discourses, and promoted a pragmatic coexistence with state and local governments. Identifying the United States as a settler colonial society, the study suggests that a decolonizing framework is more apt than racial/ethnicity approaches in conceptualizing the struggle of American Indians.

What determines whether policy environments attract or deter investment? Scholars worried about the vulnerability of market-supporting institutions to political manipulation have identified delegation to independent actors as way to increase policy environments’ predictability. Extant arguments, however, risk overgeneralizing from the experience of developed democracies. I argue that investors’ response to bureaucratic discretion—agents’ leeway to make decisions and act independently of political bodies—depends upon the broader institutional context. Where robust political institutions are lacking, bureaucratic discretion acts as a source of unpredictability that deters investors; conversely, political institutions that share the cost of monitoring help to mitigate uncertainty about how bureaucrats will use discretion in applying regulatory rules. Using survey data from over 600 enterprises in Russia, I find that perceptions of bureaucratic discretion are negatively associated with firm managers’ willingness to invest; this effect is particularly pronounced in regions where the institutional environment discourages political competition.

This paper examines the effect of peers on an individual's likelihood of retirement using an administrative dataset of all retirement-eligible Los Angeles teachers for the years 1998–2001. We use two large unexpected pension reforms that differentially impacted financial incentives within and across schools to construct an instrument for others' retirement decisions. Controlling for individual and school characteristics, we find that the retirement of an additional teacher in the previous year at the same school increases a teacher's own likelihood of retirement by 1.5–2 percentage points. We then explore some possible mechanisms through which this effect operates. (JEL H75, I21, J14, J26, J45)

I examine changes in the city-suburban housing price gap in metropolitan areas with and without court-ordered desegregation plans over the 1970s, narrowing my comparison to housing units on opposite sides of district boundaries. Desegregation of public schools in central cities reduced the demand for urban residence, leading urban housing prices and rents to decline by 6 percent relative to neighboring suburbs. Aversion to integration was due both to changes in peer composition and to student reassignment to nonneighborhood schools. The associated reduction in the urban tax base imposed a fiscal externality on remaining urban residents.

This study documents and explains historical variation in U.S. criminal deportations. Results from time-series analyses suggest that criminal deportations increase during times of rising unemployment, and this effect is partly mediated by an elevated discourse about immigration and labor. An especially strong association between deportations and unemployment emerges from 1941 through 1986, a period in which the federal law enforcement bureaucracy and deportation laws were well established and judges retained substantial discretion. After 1986, changes in criminal deportation rates mirror the trend in incarceration rates. The study connects the burgeoning sociological literatures on immigration and punishment, revealing a historically contingent effect of labor markets on the criminal deportation of noncitizen offenders.

Among Alfred E. “Fred” Kahn's many accomplishments, none is better remembered than his pivotal role in deregulation of the US airline industry. Kahn's commitment to marry core microeconomic principles with institutional analysis, willingness as Chairman of the Civil Aeronautics Board to step outside the “regulation as usual box,” and appealing wit made him the face of the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, one of the great microeconomic policy triumphs. Lessons drawn from Kahn's work and the airline deregulation experience remain instructive for current academic research and regulatory policy design across broad sectors of the economy.

This article develops a theory of bureaucratic influence on distributive politics. Although there exists a rich literature on the effects of institutions such as presidents, electoral systems, and bicameralism on government spending, the role of professional bureaucrats has yet to receive formal scrutiny. In the model, legislators bargain over the allocation of distributive benefits across districts. The legislature may either “politicize” a program by bargaining directly over pork and bypassing bureaucratic scrutiny, or “professionalize” it by letting a bureaucrat approve or reject project funding in each district according to an underlying quality standard. The model predicts that the legislature will professionalize when the expected program quality is high. However, politicization becomes more likely as the number of high-quality projects increases and under divided government. Further, more competent bureaucrats can encourage politicization if the expected program quality is low. Finally, politicized programs are larger than professionalized programs.

To the extent that students benefit from high-achieving peers, tracking will help strong students and hurt weak ones. However, all students may benefit if tracking allows teachers to better tailor their instruction level. Lower-achieving pupils are particularly likely to benefit from tracking when teachers have incentives to teach to the top of the distribution. We propose a simple model nesting these effects and test its implications in a randomized tracking experiment conducted with 121 primary schools in Kenya. While the direct effect of high-achieving peers is positive, tracking benefited lower-achieving pupils indirectly by allowing teachers to teach to their level. (JEL I21, J45, O15)

We show that political institutions affect corruption levels. We use audit reports in Brazil to construct new measures of political corruption in local governments and test whether electoral accountability affects the corruption practices of incumbent politicians. We find significantly less corruption in municipalities where mayors can get reelected. Mayors with reelection incentives misappropriate 27 percent fewer resources than mayors without reelection incentives. These effects are more pronounced among municipalities with less access to information and where the likelihood of judicial punishment is lower. Overall our findings suggest that electoral rules that enhance political accountability play a crucial role in constraining politician's corrupt behavior. (JEL D72, K42, O17)

We present results from a randomized evaluation of a teacher performance pay program implemented across a large representative sample of government-run rural primary schools in the Indian state of Andhra Pradesh. At the end of 2 years of the program, students in incentive schools performed significantly better than those in control schools by 0.27 and 0.17 standard deviations in math and language tests, respectively. We find no evidence of any adverse consequences of the program. The program was highly cost effective, and incentive schools performed significantly better than other randomly chosen schools that received additional schooling inputs of a similar value.

We provide a new compilation of data on ethnic, linguistic, and religious composition at the subnational level for a large number of countries. Using these data, we measure segregation of groups within the country. To overcome the endogeneity problem that arises because of mobility and endogenous internal borders, we construct an instrument for segregation. We find that more ethnically and linguistically segregated countries, i.e., those where groups live more spatially separately, have a lower quality of government; there is no relationship between religious segregation and governance. Trust is an important channel of influence; it is lower in more segregated countries. (JEL H11, H77, J15, O17, Z12, Z13)

We use student assignment lotteries to estimate the effect of charter school attendance on student achievement in Boston. We also evaluate a related alternative, Boston's pilot schools. Pilot schools have some of the independence of charter schools but are in the Boston Public School district and are covered by some collective bargaining provisions. Lottery estimates show large and significant score gains for charter students in middle and high school. In contrast, lottery estimates for pilot school students are mostly small and insignificant, with some significant negative effects. Charter schools with binding assignment lotteries appear to generate larger gains than other charters.

I estimate the impact of attending a first-choice middle or high school on adult crime, using data from public school choice lotteries in Charlotte-Mecklenburg school district (CMS). Seven years after random assignment, lottery winners had been arrested for fewer serious crimes and had spent fewer days incarcerated. The gain in school quality as measured by peer and teacher inputs was equivalent to moving from one of the lowest-ranked schools to one at the district average. The reduction in crime comes largely from years after enrollment in the preferred school is complete. The impacts are concentrated among high-risk youth, who commit about 50% less crime across several different outcome measures and scalings of crime by severity. I find suggestive evidence that school quality explains more of the impact in high school, whereas peer effects are more important in middle school.

In public sector procurement, social welfare often depends on the time taken to complete the contract. A leading example is highway construction, where slow completion times inflict a negative externality on commuters. Recently, highway departments have introduced innovative contracting methods based on scoring auctions that give contractors explicit time incentives. We characterize equilibrium bidding and efficient design of these contracts. We then gather an extensive data set of highway repair projects awarded by the California Department of Transportation between 2003 and 2008 that includes both innovative and standard contracts. Comparing similar con-tracts in which the innovative design was and was not used, we show that the welfare gains to commuters from quicker completion substantially exceeded the increase in the winning bid. Having argued that the current policy is effective, we then develop a structural econometric model that endogenizes participation and bidding to examine counterfactual policies. Our estimates suggest that while the current policy raised com-muter surplus relative to the contractor's costs by $359M (6.8% of the total contract value), the optimal policy would raise it by $1.52B (29%).

Government agencies service interest groups, advocate policies, provide advice to elected officials, and create and implement public policy. Scholars have advanced theories to explain the role of agencies in American politics, but efforts to test these theories are hampered by the inability to systematically measure agency preferences. We present a method for measuring agency ideology that yields ideal point estimates of individual bureaucrats and agencies that are directly comparable with those of other political actors. These estimates produce insights into the nature of the bureaucratic state and provide traction on a host of questions about American politics. We discuss what these estimates reveal about the political environment of bureaucracy and their potential for testing theories of political institutions. We demonstrate their utility by testing key propositions from Gailmard and Patty's (2007) influential model of political control and endogenous expertise development.

We construct measures of the extent to which the four main newspapers in Argentina report government corruption on their front page during the period 1998–2007 and correlate them with government advertising. The correlation is negative. The size is considerable—a one standard deviation increase in monthly government advertising is associated with a reduction in the coverage of the government's corruption scandals of 0.23 of a front page per month, or 18 percent of a standard deviation in coverage. The results are robust to the inclusion of newspaper, month, newspaper × president and individual-corruption scandal fixed effects, as well as newspaper × president specific time trends. (JEL D72, K42, L82, M37, O17)

This paper examines the residential location and school choice responses to the desegregation of large urban public school districts. We decompose the well documented decline in white public enrollment following desegregation into migration to suburban districts and increased private school enrollment, and find that migration was the more prevalent response. Desegregation caused black public enrollment to increase significantly outside of the South, mostly by slowing decentralization of black households to the suburbs, and large black private school enrollment declines in southern districts. Central district school desegregation generated only a small portion of overall urban population decentralization between 1960 and 1990.

We document how manipulation of a targeting system for social welfare programs evolves over time. First, there was strategic behavior of some local politicians in the timing of the household interviews around local elections. Then, there was corrupt behavior with the sudden emergence of a sharp discontinuity in the score density, exactly at the eligibility threshold, which coincided with the release of the score algorithm to local officials. The discontinuity at the threshold is larger where mayoral elections are more competitive. While cultural forces are surely relevant for corruption, our results also highlight the importance of information and incentives. (JEL D72, I32, I38, O15, O17).

Does control of patronage jobs significantly increase a political party's chances of winning elections in U.S. states? We employ a differences-in-differences design, exploiting the considerable variation in the dates that different states adopted civil service reforms. Our evidence suggests that political parties in U.S. states were able to use state-level patronage to increase the probability of maintaining control of state legislatures and statewide elective offices. We also find that an “entrenched” party, in power for a longer time, can use patronage more effectively. We consider several alternative hypotheses that might plausibly account for the patterns in the data, but find no evidence to support them.

To illuminate how race affects the usage of punitive tools in policy implementation settings, we analyze sanctions imposed for noncompliant client behavior under welfare reform. Drawing on a model of racial classification and policy choice, we test four hypotheses regarding client race, local context, and sanctioning. Based on longitudinal and cross-sectional multilevel analyses of individual-level administrative data, we find that race plays a significant role in shaping sanction implementation. Its effects, however, are highly contingent on client characteristics, local political contexts, and the degree to which state governments devolve policy control to local officials.

Public agencies have discretion on the time domain, and politicians deploy numerous policy instruments to constrain it. Yet little is known about how administrative procedures that affect timing also affect the quality of agency decisions. We examine whether administrative deadlines shape decision timing and the observed quality of decisions. Using a unique and rich dataset of FDA drug approvals that allows us to examine decision timing and quality, we find that this administrative tool induces a piling of decisions before deadlines, and that these “just-before-deadline” approvals are linked with higher rates of postmarket safety problems (market withdrawals, severe safety warnings, safety alerts). Examination of data from FDA advisory committees suggests that the deadlines may impede quality by impairing late-stage deliberation and agency risk communication. Our results both support and challenge reigning theories about administrative procedures, suggesting they embody expected control-expertise trade-offs, but may also create unanticipated constituency losses.

Critics of legislative delegation to the bureaucracy worry that delegation undermines the accountability of politicians to voters. This article provides microfoundations for such concerns by examining a model of electoral agency in which legislators can either determine policy directly or delegate policymaking authority to an expert bureaucrat. In our model, when deciding whether to delegate, a politician must consider not only the policy consequences of his delegation decision but also the electoral consequences. We identify conditions under which delegation can provide politicians with an element of plausible deniability which they lack when they determine policy directly. In some circumstances, therefore, voters can be better off when legislators’ ability to delegate is restricted.

This paper utilizes a Norwegian experiment with exogenous wage changes to study teachers' turnover decisions. Within a completely centralized wage setting system, teachers in schools with a high degree of teacher vacancies in the past got a wage premium of about 10 percent during the period 1993–94 to 2002–03. The empirical strategy exploits that several schools switched status during the empirical period. In a fixed effects framework, I find that the wage premium reduces the probability of voluntary quits by six percentage points, which implies a short run labor supply elasticity of about 1¼.

Work on bureaucratic representation suggests that minority citizens benefit when the programs that serve them are administered by bureaucrats with similar characteristics. This literature has not sufficiently dealt with the long-standing concern that minority benefits may come at the expense of citizens from other groups, which some critics argue makes representative bureaucracy irreconcilable with democratic values. This article suggests distributional equity as a potential moderator of bureaucratic representation and as a potential source of reconciliation. It tests for the effects of representation under different distributional conditions in a policy area in which outcomes approach a zero-sum game. Analyses of a nationally representative sample of public organizations find a relationship between bureaucratic representation and citizen outcomes only in those instances where program benefits are being inequitably distributed to the relevant group. The article concludes with a discussion of the significance of these findings for the democratic legitimacy of representative bureaucracy.

When can presidents direct bureaucrats to allocate government expenditures for electoral purposes? To address this question, I exploit a scandal concerning the General Services Administration (GSA), an agency that contracts with private vendors to provide supplies and real estate to other agencies. Shortly after Republican losses in 2006, a White House deputy gave a presentation to GSA political appointees identifying potentially vulnerable congressional districts. I find that vendors in prioritized Republican districts experienced unusually large new contract actions from the GSA's Public Buildings Service following the presentation relative to unmentioned districts, a discrepancy that disappeared once the Washington Post broke the story. Contracts supervised by the agency's Federal Acquisition Service, by contrast, were largely unresponsive to the briefing and media scrutiny. My findings suggest that the extent to which executives succeed in politicizing discretionary allocation decisions depends upon key features of the implementing agency's tasks and its informational environment.

Most scholars think state administrations vary because rulers attempt to maximize resource extraction given pressure from interstate competition and as constrained by the social structure of the societies they govern. This perspective cannot account for variations in British colonial tax administration in India, circa 1770 to 1855. The British organized land revenue collection and administration as a whole through two different schemes. Both systems initially adopted a rhetoric of revenue maximization, but neither was decisively better matched to Indian social structure. Instead, administrators interpreted a seemingly opaque Indian society by understanding themselves as fundamentally similar to or different from Indians.

This paper explores the conditions under which descriptive and bureaucratic representation translate into policy outcomes. In particular, it investigates the role of managerial networking in providing a conduit for black political power to influence policy outcomes for black clients. Using administrative data, survey data, and parish-level contextual data on new participants to Louisiana’s welfare to work program from April 2004 through September 2006, results from a logit analysis predicting placement in vocational education indicate that minority clients benefit from black political power and that the effect of black political power is conditioned by whether or not program managers are involved in community networking. All clients, regardless of race, are more likely to receive vocational education when the program manager is black, supporting arguments by proponents of representational bureaucracy.

We examine the sex differences in the pay of school teachers in Missouri. In Missouri school districts, pay is determined by a salary schedule that maps teaching experience and education level of an individual to a salary level. In spite of this apparently mechanical rule for determining pay, female teachers earn less than male teachers, after controlling for experience and education. We explore how such a difference could arise from differential job mobility and find some evidence to support this idea. However, within district differences in pay are a more important source of differences in pay between men and women.

Estimates using admissions lotteries suggest that urban charter schools boost student achievement, while charter schools in other settings do not. We explore student-level and school-level explanations for these differences using a large sample of Massachusetts charter schools. Our results show that urban charter schools boost achievement well beyond ambient non-charter levels (that is, the average achievement level for urban non-charter students), and beyond non-urban achievement in math. Student demographics explain some of these gains since urban charters are most effective for non-whites and low-baseline achievers. At the same time, non-urban charter schools are uniformly ineffective. Our estimates also reveal important school-level heterogeneity in the urban charter sample. A non-lottery analysis suggests that urban schools with binding, well-documented admissions lotteries generate larger score gains than under-subscribed urban charter schools with poor lottery records. We link the magnitude of charter impacts to distinctive pedagogical features of urban charters such as the length of the school day and school philosophy. The relative effectiveness of urban lottery-sample charters is accounted for by over-subscribed urban schools' embrace of the No Excuses approach to education.

We document that, in a cross section of countries, government regulation is strongly negatively correlated with measures of trust. In a simple model explaining this correlation, distrust creates public demand for regulation, whereas regulation in turn discourages formation of trust, leading to multiple equilibria. A key implication of the model is that individuals in low-trust countries want more government intervention even though they know the government is corrupt. We test this and other implications of the model using country- and individual-level data on trust and beliefs about the role of government, as well as on changes in beliefs during the transition from socialism.

Scholarship on distributive politics focuses almost exclusively on the internal operations of Congress, paying particular attention to committees and majority parties. This article highlights the president, who has extensive opportunities, both ex ante and ex post , to influence the distribution of federal outlays. We analyze two databases that track the geographic spending of nearly every domestic program over a 24-year period—the largest and most comprehensive panels of federal spending patterns ever assembled. Using district and county fixed-effects estimation strategies, we find no evidence of committee influence and mixed evidence that majority party members receive larger shares of federal outlays. We find that districts and counties receive systematically more federal outlays when legislators in the president's party represent them.

Participation of beneficiaries in the monitoring of public services is increasingly seen as a key to improving their quality. We conducted a randomized evaluation of three interventions to encourage beneficiaries' participation to India: providing information on existing institutions, training community members in a testing tool for children, and training volunteers to hold remedial reading camps. These interventions had no impact on community involvement, teacher effort, or learning outcomes inside the school. However, in the third intervention, youth volunteered to teach camps, and children who attended substantially improved their reading skills. This suggests that citizens face constraints in influencing public services. (JEL H52, I21, I28, O15)

An increasingly popular practice for student assignment to public schools in the United States is the use of school choice systems. The celebrated Gale-Shapley student-optimal stable mechanism (SOSM) has recently replaced two deficient student assignment mechanisms that were in use in New York City and Boston. We provide theoretical evidence that the SOSM outcome may produce large welfare losses. Then we propose an efficiency-adjusted deferred acceptance mechanism (EADAM) that allows a student to consent to waive a certain priority that has no effect on his or her assignment. Under EADAM, consenting students cause themselves no harm, but may help many others benefit as a consequence. We show that EADAM can recover any welfare losses due to SOSM while also preserving immunity against strategic behavior in a particular way. It is also possible to use EADAM to eliminate welfare losses due to randomly breaking ties in student priorities. (c) 2010 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology..

In many sectors, pay is regulated to be equal across heterogeneous geographical labor markets. When the competitive outside wage is higher than the regulated wage, there are likely to be falls in quality. We exploit panel data from the population of English hospitals in which regulated pay for nurses is essentially flat across the country. Higher outside wages significantly worsen hospital quality as measured by hospital deaths for emergency heart attacks. A 10 percent increase in the outside wage is associated with a 7 percent increase in death rates. Furthermore, the regulation increases aggregate death rates in the public health care system.

When do government agencies invite public review for their policy decisions, and when do they maintain secrecy? Scholarship has long focused on procedures elected officials impose on bureaucrats to induce transparency and to encourage democratic participation in agency work. Yet, models of elected officials’ decisions largely overlook bureaucrats’ preferences and choices for public participation. Building on theories of bureaucratic reputation, I argue bureaucrats actively pursue publicity and public participation for tasks that risk implementation failure. I test these claims through models of FDA advisory committee agenda setting and subsequent policy implementation from 1985 to 2006. Consistent with bureaucratic reputation hypotheses, the FDA seeks public advice for its riskiest tasks. Such advice is associated with a lower probability of subsequent Congressional oversight and with a greater probability of subsequent agency information campaigns. Publicity, this suggests, complements secrecy as a source of bureaucratic power.

The notion that some high stakes need to be attached to direct measures of teachers’ class-room performance as a control for quality in the work force is an idea gaining traction in public education. One such proposal prescribes low-ering the barriers to entry into teaching while simultaneously being more selective about which teachers are retained when they become eligible for tenure (Robert Gordon, Thomas J. Kane, and Douglas O. Staiger 2006; Eric A. Hanushek 2009).

Limitation riders, which allow the U.S. Congress to forbid agencies from spending money for specific uses, enable congressional majorities to exert greater influence over bureaucratic policy decisions than is appreciated by research on policy making in the United States. I develop a theory of limitation riders, explaining why they lead to policy outcomes that are preferable to a majority of legislators compared to outcomes that would occur if this tool did not exist. I assess this perspective empirically by analyzing the volume of limitation riders reported in bills from 1993 to 2002 and all limitation riders forbidding regulatory actions from 1989 to 2009. In addition to supporting the conclusion that Congress possesses more leverage over agencies’ decisions than is currently appreciated, the findings have implications for advancing theories of delegation.

This paper presents empirical evidence of a positive effect of council size on government spending using a dataset of 2,056 municipalities in the German state of Bavaria over a period of 21 years. We apply a regression discontinuity design to avoid an endogeneity bias. In particular, we exploit discontinuities in the legal rule that relate population size of a municipality in order to council size to identify a causal relationship between council size and public spending, and find a robust positive impact of council size on spending. Moreover, we show that municipalities primarily adjust current expenditure in response to a rise in council size. (JEL D72, H72, R51)

This paper examines how a large conditional grants program influenced school desegregation in the American South. Exploiting newly collected archival data and quasi-experimental variation in potential per-pupil federal grants, we show that school districts with more at risk in 1966 were more likely to desegregate just enough to receive their funds. Although the program did not raise the exposure of blacks to whites like later court orders, districts with larger grants at risk in 1966 were less likely to be under court order through 1970, suggesting that tying federal funds to nondiscrimination reduced the burden of desegregation on federal courts. (c) 2010 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology..

We examine Democrats’ decline in the House of Representatives from the mid-1930s to the late 1940s. Debates over American exceptionalism in the realm of social policy pay surprisingly little attention to a profound transformation that occurred during and after World War II: on the international stage, the United States emerged as the hegemon; at home, the Pentagon became the largest and most powerful agency in the federal bureaucracy. In modeling electoral losses suffered by Democrats, we show that World War II mobilization played an important role. First, Democrats lost ground in congressional districts where the nascent military-industrial complex was created, specifically in aircraft manufacturing centers. Second, the impact of aircraft manufacturing intersected with wartime in-migration of non-whites. Democrats suffered significantly greater losses where both non-white population and aircraft manufacturing employment increased. Our findings corroborate accounts of the social welfare state that stress partisan control and path dependence. Conservative congresses of the immediate postwar years left an imposing legacy, making it difficult to establish social welfare reforms for decades to come. Whereas most accounts of the rise and fall of the New Deal emphasize different aspects of domestic processes, we demonstrate that militarism and expansion of national security agencies undermined congressional support at a critical juncture. This intersection of wartime mobilization and social policy—and not an inherent and enduring institutional impediment to social welfare—contributed to underdevelopment of the welfare state and abandonment of universal social welfare programs in the United States.

This paper provides microlevel evidence of how past institutions impact present economic outcomes. It looks at the impact of colonial land tenure institutions on local governance and education outcomes in northern India. Outcomes are worse in villages that belong to areas with a history of concentration of power with the elites. Such areas continue to retain a greater political presence of socially and economically dominant classes. Future research should examine the success of policies that attempt to break such persistence through empowerment of nonelite groups. (JEL D02, H70, I20, N35, N45, O15, O18)

We derive a formula to determine the degree to which a school choice program may harm public school stayers by luring the best students to other schools. The “cream skimming” effect is increasing in the degree of heterogeneity within schools, the school choice take-up rate of strong students relative to weak students, and the dependence of school outcomes on student body quality. We use the formula to investigate the cream skimming effect of hypothetical voucher programs on the high school graduation rate and other outcomes of the students who would remain in public school. We find small effects across a wide variety of model specifications and types of modest voucher programs.

This paper argues that distributive politics operates in a variety of contexts in which governments seek to check the behavior of other governments. We provide a novel theoretical account of performance measurement systems as political discipline mechanisms even when measures are compiled by formally independent administrative agencies. We test the implications of our theory using a dataset of performance ratings in English local government assessed between 2002 and 2006. Results suggest that political influence favors swing voters, and local authorities sharing party affiliation with the incumbent central government are favored over those controlled by the opposition. Evidence further suggests that the independent rater in our empirical case is influenced through ties between its membership and the local authorities that it regulates. Our theoretical argument and findings have implications for many national and international contexts.

We study the effects of private school competition on public school students' test scores in the wake of Florida's Corporate Tax Credit Scholarship program, now known as the Florida Tax Credit Scholarship Program, which offered scholarships to eligible low-income students to attend private schools. Specifically, we examine whether students in schools that were exposed to a more competitive private school landscape saw greater improvements in their test scores after the introduction of the scholarship program, than did students in schools that faced less competition. The degree of competition is characterized by several geocoded variables that capture students' ease of access to private schools, and the variety of nearby private school options open to students. We find that greater degrees of competition are associated with greater improvements in students' test scores following the introduction of the program; these findings are robust to the different variables we use to define competition. These findings are not an artifact of pre-policy trends; the degree of competition from nearby private schools matters only after the announcement of the new program, which makes nearby private competitors more affordable for eligible students. We also test for several moderating factors, and find that schools that we would expect to be most sensitive to competitive pressure see larger improvements in their test scores as a result of increased competition.

We propose a distinction between active and passive waste as determinants of the cost of public services. Active waste entails utility for the public decision maker, whereas passive waste does not. We analyze purchases of standardized goods by Italian public bodies and exploit a policy experiment associated with a national procurement agency. We find that: (i) some public bodies pay systematically more than others for equivalent goods; (ii) differences are correlated with governance structure; (iii) the variation in prices is principally due to variation in passive rather than active waste; and (iv) passive waste accounts for 83 percent of total estimated waste. (JEL H11, H57, H83)

This article examines the political budget cycles in Chinese counties. The shift to a more performance‐based cadre evaluation and mobility system during the reform era has created an incentive structure for local leaders to increase government spending at strategically important time points during their tenure to enhance the prospect of official promotion. Such expenditures help local leaders to impress their superiors with economic and political achievements, especially those visible and quantifiable large‐scale development projects. At the same time, economic and fiscal decentralization increased the capacity of local leaders to influence government budget expenditures as the need rises. The hypothesized curvilinear relationship between a leader's time in office and increased spending was tested using a comprehensive data set of all Chinese counties from 1997 through 2002. The panel data analysis shows that growth in local government spending per capita is the fastest during a leader's third and fourth years in office.

We examine regularities and differences in public budgeting in comparative perspective. Budgets quantify collective political decisions made in response to incoming information, the preferences of decision makers, and the institutions that structure how decisions are made. We first establish that the distribution of budget changes in many Western democracies follows a non‐Gaussian distribution, the power function. This implies that budgets are highly incremental, yet occasionally are punctuated by large changes. This pattern holds regardless of the type of political system—parliamentary or presidential—and for level of government. By studying the power function's exponents we find systematic differences for budgetary increases versus decreases (the former are more punctuated) in most systems, and for levels of government (local governments are less punctuated). Finally, we show that differences among countries in the coefficients of the general budget law correspond to differences in formal institutional structures. While the general form of the law is probably dictated by the fundamental operations of human and organizational information processing, differences in the magnitudes of the law's basic parameters are country‐ and institution‐specific .

Drawing on original qualitative research, this article investigates how natives and institutions in rural America's “new immigrant destinations” are adapting, if at all, to Hispanic newcomers and whether corresponding interaction should be viewed as substantively responsive. In contrast to predictions made by traditional political incorporation theories, results based on semi-structured interviews and ethnographic fieldwork suggest that Hispanic newcomers are undergoing a process of bureaucratic incorporation whereby public service bureaucrats, rather than elected politicians, are initiating substantive responsiveness. Yet I also identify a continuing interaction between immigrant bureaucratic and political incorporation in rural America. I conclude by connecting my findings to more general sociological perspectives regarding population needs, electoral bodies, and public bureaucracies in democratic societies.

This study shows that the organization of work, particularly the structure of jobs, can sustain or erode gender and racial disadvantage. Restructuring work around team work and weaker job boundaries can improve women’s and minorities’ visibility and reduce stereotyping and thus should reduce their career disadvantage. Proponents of bureaucratic formalization argue, in contrast, that relaxing formal job definitions and emphasizing social relations at work will deepen ascriptive disadvantage. The reorganization of work in corporate America over the last two decades provides a test case. Using unique data on the life histories of more than 800 organizations, the author examines whether alleviating job segregation leads to better career outcomes for women and minorities. This study finds that when employers adopt popular team and training programs that increase cross‐functional collaboration, ascriptive inequality declines. Similar programs that do not transcend job boundaries do not lead to such increases. The results point to different effects at the intersection of gender and race.

Since 1930, areas of state-managed forest in the central Himalayas of India have increasingly been devolved to management by local communities. This article studies the long-run effects of the devolution on the cost of forest management and on forest conservation. Village council-management costs an order of magnitude less per unit area and does no worse, and possibly better, at conservation than state management. Geographic proximity and historical and ecological information are used to separate the effects of management from those of possible confounding factors.

This paper studies a recent British reform that allowed public high schools to opt out of local authority control and become autonomous schools funded directly by the central government. Schools seeking autonomy had only to propose and win a majority vote among current parents. Almost one in three high schools voted on autonomy between 1988 and 1997, and using a version of the regression discontinuity design, I find large achievement gains at schools in which the vote barely won compared to schools in which it barely lost. Despite other reforms that ensured that the British education system was, by international standards, highly competitive, a comparison of schools in the geographic neighborhoods of narrow vote winners and narrow vote losers suggests that these gains did not spill over.

The link between government performance and support for incumbents is a key mechanism of accountable government. We model the vote share of incumbent administrations in local government as proportional and nonproportional responses to public service performance. We evaluate the models using a panel data set covering performance and elections from 2001 to 2007 in English local governments where an incumbent party or coalition was up for reelection. We control for the previous vote, whether the incumbent administration is of the national governing party, and local economic conditions. We find evidence for a nonproportional, performance threshold hypothesis, which implies that voters’ behavior is affected by clear gradations of performance. Only the difference between low performance and at least mediocre performance matters. There is no reward for high performance. Instead our findings suggest negativity bias in the relationship between performance and electoral support for incumbents.

This paper develops a model in which a desire to avoid criticism prompts otherwise public-spirited bureaucrats to behave inefficiently. Decisions are taken to keep interest groups quiet and to keep mistakes out of the public eye. The policy implications of this “minimal squawk” behavior are at odds with the view that agencies should be structured to minimize the threat of “capture.” An empirical test using data from US State Public Utility Commissions rejects the capture hypothesis and is consistent with the squawk hypothesis: longer PUC terms of office are associated with a higher incidence of rate reviews and lower household electricity bills. (JEL D73, L51, L97, L98)

This study assesses the impact of an increase in funding for public community colleges on the market for two-year college education, considering both the effect on community college enrollments and on the number of proprietary schools in a market. I draw on a new administrative dataset of for-profit colleges in California and votes on local community college bond referenda to implement a unique regression discontinuity design. The results suggest that bond passage diverts students from the private to the public sector and causes a corresponding decline in the number of proprietary schools in the market. (JEL H75, I22, I23)

Why have economic reforms aimed at reducing the role of the state been successful in some cases but not others? Are reform failures the consequence of leviathan states that hinder private economic activity, or of weak states unable to implement policies effectively and provide a supportive institutional environment? We explore these questions in a study of privatization in postcommunist Russia. Taking advantage of large regional variation in the size of public administrations, and employing a multilevel research design that controls for preprivatization selection in the estimation of regional privatization effects, we examine the relationship between state bureaucracy and the impact of privatization on firm productivity. We find that privatization is more effective in regions with relatively large bureaucracies. Our analysis suggests that this effect is driven by the impact of bureaucracy on the postprivatization business environment, with better institutional support and less corruption when bureaucracies are large.

In this paper, I investigate the impact of a programme in Tel-Aviv, Israel, that terminated an existing inter-district busing integration programme and allowed students free choice among public schools. The identification is based on difference-in-differences and regression discontinuity designs that yield various alternative comparison groups drawn from untreated tangent neighbourhoods and adjacent cities. Across identification methods and comparison groups, the results consistently suggest that choice significantly reduces the drop-out rate and increases the cognitive achievements of high-school students. It also improves behavioural outcomes such as teacher-student relationships and students' social acclimation and satisfaction at school, and reduces the level of violence and classroom disruption.

I develop a formal model to investigate why Congress would choose to delegate authority to an agency whose actions can be controlled, ex post, by a President with divergent policy preferences. Because the President and the Congress might find different policies to be salient to their constituencies, I demonstrate that executive review of agency rulemaking can benefit both branches of government, relative to legislative delegation without the possibility of such review. In trying to undermine the impacts of executive oversight, agencies propose policies that could benefit Congress if the President chose not to intervene in agency policymaking. If the President does intervene, it will establish policy outcomes that can be more desirable than what would ensue absent such review. This joint-desirability of executive review is more likely when congressional and presidential policy preferences are relatively aligned and when congressional and agency policy preferences are relatively divergent. Executive review can increase social welfare depending on the relative effectiveness of the President's oversight of agency policymaking. These results provide insight for why institutions such as the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) continue to survive in a separation of powers system despite their potential to advantage one branch of government at the expense of the other.

Why do some interest groups lobby politicians and others lobby bureaucrats? We theorize lobbying venue choices and intensity as a function of contract enforceability with policy makers, politicians, or bureaucrats. We argue that organizational structures of interest groups, in particular, whether they are centralized or decentralized, substantially affect their lobbying strategies because they are associated with different ability to monitor and enforce contracts with policy makers and punish them when they fail. We further demonstrate that the effect of centralized versus decentralized structure on venue choices is conditional on the types of electoral system: majoritarian, semiproportional (single, nontransferable vote: SNTV), or proportional representation systems. We test this argument using longitudinal survey data on lobbying which span two decades and cover around 250 interest groups in various sectors and issue areas in Japan. The results lend strong support to our argument about contract enforceability under alternative electoral systems.

In the public sector, employment may be inefficiently high because of patronage, and wages may be inefficiently high because of public employee interest groups. This paper explores whether the initiative process, a direct democracy institution of growing importance, ameliorates these political economy problems. In a sample of 650+ cities, I find that when public employees cannot bargain collectively and patronage could be a problem, initiatives appear to cut employment but not wages. When public employees bargain collectively, driving up wages, the initiative appears to cut wages but not employment. The employment-cutting result is robust; the wage-cutting result survives some but not all robustness tests. (JEL D72, J31, J45, J52)

The effects of any important political decision are always to some degree uncertain. This uncertainty may be ameliorated by the collection of policy-relevant information. Predictably, if such information is biased, then political decisions based on that information will be biased as well. This paper explores the converse of this statement: if the policymaker is biased, will the information provided to him or her also be biased? It is shown in this paper that, in equilibrium, information provided to a sufficiently biased policymaker will inherit the policymaker's bias. Accordingly, the provision of biased policy-relevant information is not evidence of an attempt to produce biased policy decisions. The implications of the theory are examined within the context of modern administrative policymaking within the United States Federal Government.

Scholars have focused attention toward congressional influence over distributive grant allocations, but they have less frequently examined the extent to which administrative agencies play a role in that process. We present a new theory of ideology-contingent executive decision making within a multiple-principals framework to explain the geographic distribution of policy benefits. Our theory is novel in that it locates interbranch ideological conflict and confluence at the center of bureaus’ allocational strategies. Discretionary Department of Labor (DOL) grants and Department of Defense (DOD) contracts from 1991 to 2002 are examined to provide evidence that agencies deliver more grants to senators with proximate ideologies. To measure bureaucratic ideology, we generate comparable ideology estimates for cabinet secretaries, presidents, and members of the U.S. Senate via an item-response model. Our findings suggest that ideological congruence between senators and DOL or DOD is associated with significantly larger amounts of grants or contracts, respectively. These findings are important as they recast our understanding of distributive politics into ideological terms.

There are two main forms of government in U.S. cities: council-manager and mayor-council. This paper develops a theory of fiscal policy determination under these two forms. The theory predicts that expected public spending will be lower under mayor-council, but that either form of government could be favored by a majority of citizens. The latter prediction means that the theory is consistent with the co-existence of both government forms. Support for the former prediction is found in both a cross-sectional analysis and a panel analysis of changes in government form.

Recent articles have reported a large and growing financial crisis associated with retiree health plans offered by state and local governments, and have expressed alarm over their impact on the financial status of these governmental units (Goldman Sachs 2007; David Zion and Amit Varshney 2007). The concern about the unfunded liabilities of retiree health plans follows from a change in the public accounting rules issued by the Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB). GASB Statement No. 45 requires state and local governments to report unfunded accrued liabilities and annual required contributions needed to fully fund the retiree health promises. The GASB 45 statements produced by state governments indicate that unfunded liabilities for state employees and retirees total approximately $500 billion. This does not include additional liabilities associated with retiree health plans for local governments and public school teachers with plans that are not managed at the state level. The explicit acknowledgement of these liabilities and their absolute and relative size has created considerable concern and debate among economists, policymakers, and voters. This article presents data from state actuarial reports on the size of retiree health liabilities, examines the key assumptions used to determine the unfunded liabilities, and then assesses the potential future of retiree health plans in the public sector.

In studies of innovation, policy entrepreneurs recognize latent demand for new policies and then expend resources to promote them. But studies of policy entrepreneurs have generally focused on the demand for innovation, while neglecting the supply side of policy entrepreneurship. This article argues that bureaucratic labor markets affect the emergence of policy entrepreneurs, and so affect the diffusion of policy innovations across local governments in the United States. Analysis of a survey of municipal police chiefs and water utility managers relates governments' hiring and promotion policies to their adoption of professionally fashionable innovations. Agency heads who advanced to their current positions diagonally (arriving from another organization) are more likely to initiate these innovations than are agency heads who were promoted from within. Bureaucratic policy entrepreneurs emerge where government demand for innovation meets a supply of mobile administrators, who carry the priorities of their professions into the agencies that they serve.

Students of American politics rarely study public sector unions and their impacts on government. The literature sees bureaucratic power as rooted in expertise, but largely ignores the fact that bureaucrats often join unions to promote their own interests, and that the power of their unions may affect government and its performance. This article focuses on the public schools, which are among the most numerous government agencies in the country, and investigates whether collective bargaining by teachers—the key bureaucrats—affects the schools' capacity to educate children. Using California data, analysis shows that, in large school districts, restrictive labor contracts have a very negative impact on academic achievement, particularly for minority students. The evidence suggests, then, that public sector unions do indeed have important consequences for American public education. Whether they are consequential in other areas of government remains to be seen, but it is an avenue well worth pursuing.

This article argues that the institutional mandates of central banks have an important influence on inflation outcomes in the advanced industrialized countries. Central banks that are also responsible for bank regulation will be more sensitive to the profitability and stability of the banking sector and therefore less likely to alter interest rates solely on the basis of price stability objectives. When bank regulation is assigned to a separate agency, the central bank is more likely to enact tighter monetary policies geared solely toward maintaining price stability. An econometric analysis of inflation in 23 industrial countries from 1975 to 1999 reveals that inflation is significantly higher in those countries with central banks that are vested with bank regulatory responsibility, although this effect is conditional on the choice of exchange rate regime and the relative size of the banking sector. We also conduct a case study of the Bank of England, which lost its bank regulatory authority to a new agency in 1998. We find that the new Labour government under Tony Blair imposed the institutional change on the Bank of England in part to remove the bank stability bias from its monetary policymaking. These findings suggest that the mandates of central banks not only have important influences on macroeconomic outcomes, but may also be modified in the future by governments seeking to impose their own monetary policy preferences.

This paper examines the politics of higher education diversity for both African Americans and Latinos, by investigating how the structure of the bureaucracy affects the relationship between descriptive and substantive representation. The key theoretical determinants of minority college enrollments are legislative representation, bureaucratic structure, university-level policies, and restrictions on affirmative action. A hierarchical linear model of 500+ universities over an 11-year period shows that each of these factors affects minority enrollments.

This article investigates causes of the legislative choice to mobilize private litigants to enforce statutes. It specifies the statutory mechanism, grounded in economic incentives, that Congress uses to do so, and presents a theoretical framework for understanding how certain characteristics of separation of powers structures, particularly conflict between Congress and the president over control of the bureaucracy, drive legislative production of this mechanism. Using new and original historical data, the article presents the first empirical model of the legislative choice to mobilize private litigants, covering the years 1887 to 2004. The findings provide robust support for the proposition that interbranch conflict between Congress and the president is a powerful cause of congressional enactment of incentives to mobilize private litigants. Higher risk of electoral losses by the majority party, Democratic control of Congress, and demand by issue‐oriented interest groups are also significant predictors of congressional enactment of such incentives.

This study finds that Congress removes court jurisdiction, and does so with increasing frequency over time. Institution-based models predict that Congress should strategically remove court review to control the judiciary's influence over policy when congressional and court preferences differ. Administrative realities suggest that jurisdiction removals may be aimed at controlling litigation, not judicial ideology. Denying courts’ review denies litigants court access, an action with ramifications for litigation driven costs, delays, and caseload pressures. Using a new database of all public laws containing jurisdiction stripping provisions from the 78th through the 108th Congresses, this study tests for relations between jurisdiction stripping and either federal case filings or ideological distances among the courts, Congress, and agencies. The findings indicate that administrative concerns related to litigation in which the government is a defendant influence jurisdiction stripping, but ideology does not.

Alesina and Tabellini (2007) investigate the normative criteria for allocating policy tasks to bureaucrats versus politicians. While they establish criteria with respect to a number of parameters, they do not give a criterion with respect to the degree of imperfect monitoring. We establish an unambiguous criterion about imperfect monitoring. (JEL D72, D73)

This article identifies for the first time systematic performance differences between younger and older democracies and argues that these are driven by the inability of political competitors to make broadly credible preelectoral promises to voters. Younger democracies are more corrupt; exhibit less rule of law, lower levels of bureaucratic quality and secondary school enrollment, and more restrictions on the media; and spend more on public investment and government workers. This pattern is exactly consistent with the predictions of Keefer and Vlaicu (n.d.) . The inability of political competitors to make credible promises to citizens leads them to prefer clientelist policies: to underprovide nontargeted goods, to overprovide targeted transfers to narrow groups of voters, and to engage in excessive rent seeking. Other differences that young democracies exhibit, including different political and electoral institutions, greater exposure to political violence, and greater social fragmentation, do not explain, either theoretically or empirically, these policy choices .

Why would government officials in authoritarian and transitional systems where formal democratic and bureaucratic institutions of accountability are often weak ever provide more than the minimum level of public goods needed to maintain social stability? Findings from a unique combination of in-depth case study research and an original survey of 316 villages in rural China indicate that even when formal accountability is weak, local officials can be subject to unofficial rules and norms that establish and enforce their public obligations. These informal institutions of accountability can be provided by encompassing and embedding solidary groups. Villages where these types of groups exist are more likely to have better local governmental public goods provision than villages without these solidary groups, all other things being equal.

This paper investigates the normative criteria that guide the allocation of a policy task to an elected politician versus an independent bureaucrat. The bureaucrat is preferable for technical tasks for which ability is more important than effort, or if there is great uncertainty about whether the policymaker has the required abilities. The optimal allocation of redistributive tasks is ambiguous, and depends on how the bureaucrat can be instructed. But irrespective of the normative conclusion, the politician prefers not to delegate redistributive policies. (JEL D72, D73, D82)

We study the allocation of driver's licenses in India by randomly assigning applicants to one of three groups: bonus (offered a bonus for obtaining a license quickly), lesson (offered free driving lessons), or comparison. Both the bonus and lesson groups are more likely to obtain licenses. However, bonus group members are more likely to make extralegal payments and to obtain licenses without knowing how to drive. All extralegal payments happen through private intermediaries ("agents"). An audit study of agents reveals that they can circumvent procedures such as the driving test. Overall, our results support the view that corruption does not merely reflect transfers from citizens to bureaucrats but distorts allocation.

We investigate how aspects of “civil service” systems of personnel management interact with bureaucratic discretion to create expert bureaucracies populated by policy‐motivated agents. We construct a dynamic model in which bureaucrats may invest in (relationship‐specific) policy expertise and may or may not be interested in policy choices per se. The legislature makes sequentially rational grants of discretion, which serve as incentives for expertise investment and continued service only for policy‐motivated bureaucrats. Bureaucratic policy preferences and the legislature's agency problem vis‐à‐vis bureaucracies develop endogenously in the model. Bureaucratic expertise can be supported in equilibrium only at a cost of its politicization; “neutral competence” is inconsistent with strategic incentives of bureaucrats. We identify several conditions that support the development of an expert bureaucracy in equilibrium, including security of job tenure and control over policy issues for policy‐motivated bureaucrats.

Many individuals are motivated to exert effort because they care about their jobs, rather than because there are monetary consequences to their actions. The intrinsic motivation of bureaucrats is the focus of this paper, and three primary results are shown. First, bureaucrats should be biased. Second, sometimes this bias takes the form of advocating for their clients more than would their principal, while in other cases, they are more hostile to their interests. For a range of bureaucracies, those who are biased against clients lead to more efficient outcomes. Third, self-selection need not produce the desired bias. Instead, selection to bureaucracies is likely to be bifurcated, in the sense that it becomes composed of those who are most preferred by the principal, and those who are least preferred. (JEL D64, D73, D82)

This article considers how local firm histories influence individual turnover rates in organizations. We argue that position imprints—the legacies left by the first incumbents of particular functional positions—constrain subsequent position holders. We show that the functional experience of the person who creates a position influences the turnover rate of successors who later occupy that position. When the first position holder has an atypical background, all successors experience high turnover rates. Individuals who are both typical with respect to the normative environment and similar to the position imprint have the lowest turnover rates. Surprisingly, we find lower turnover rates among individuals who match the position imprint even if they violate normative expectations. Thus, contrary to institutional theory predictions, we find that local firm histories dominate. In revealing how social structures emerge within firms and affect individual outcomes, our research revisits core topics of bureaucratization and organizational stratification including idiosyncratic jobs, occupational segregation, and differential mobility. In addition, we integrate structuralist and interactionist perspectives on role theory by considering how roles are created. Finally, in demonstrating the effects of position imprints on successor mobility we add a temporal dimension to theories of turnover.

Most employers installed sexual harassment grievance procedures and sensitivity training by the late 1990s. It was personnel experts, not courts, legislatures, or lawyers, who promoted these antiharassment strategies, drawn from the profession's tool kit. Personnel succeeded because it was executives, not public officials, who defined professional jurisdiction, and executives proved susceptible to personnel's argument that bureaucratic routines could reduce legal risk. With each landmark in harassment law, more employers adopted the grievance procedures personnel advocated despite negative reviews from lawyers. Employers who consulted personnel experts were more likely to join the bandwagon; those who consulted lawyers were less likely. The case holds lessons for the evolution of professions, because executives play an increasing role in defining professional jurisdiction.

In this paper I use the Bush Administration's Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART) scores—a numerical measure of federal program performance—to analyze the relationship between political appointees and management. I find that federal programs administered by politically appointed bureau chiefs get systematically lower PART evaluations than programs run by bureau chiefs drawn from the civil service. I find that career managers have more direct bureau experience and longer tenures, and these characteristics are significantly related to performance. Political appointees have higher education levels, more private or not-for-profit management experience, and more varied work experience than careerists but these characteristics are uncorrelated with performance. I conclude that reducing the number of appointees or increased sensitivity to appointee selection based upon certain background characteristics could improve federal bureau management.

This article uses the case of Chinese lawyers, their professional troubles, and their coping strategies to build on and develop the concept of political embeddedness. Data from a first‐of‐its‐kind 25‐city survey suggest that political embeddedness, defined broadly as bureaucratic, instrumental, or affective ties to the state and its actors, helps Chinese lawyers survive their everyday difficulties, such as routine administrative interference, official rent seeking, and police harassment and intimidation. The article draws the ironic conclusion that legal practice in China reveals at least as much about the enduring salience of socialist institutions as it does about incipient capitalist and “rule of law” institutions. Lawyers' dependence on state actors both inside and outside the judicial system preserves the value of political connections inside the very institutions that some sociologists have argued are responsible for obviating the need for such guanxi.

This article examines how the values espoused by social movements become entrenched in political culture and spawn many new kinds of institutions, which in turn shape organizations far from movements' original targets. We demonstrate the diffuse and indirect effects of social movements, and also show that the diffusion of social-movement values is often selective—some are retained, while others are discarded. Our empirical site is the Progressive movement and the early thrift industry in California. We draw on social-movement research and organizational theory to argue that a new ideal of thrift, bureaucratized cooperation among strangers, replaced the original idea of thrift, friendly cooperation among neighbors. This shift was possible only after the modernizing temper of Progressivism gave rise to two institutions, the news media and role-model organizations, that made bureaucracy culturally appropriate. The bureaucratization of thrift occurred even though it resulted in a centralization of power, which clashed with the Progressive ideal of equitably distributing power. Our study provides a compelling example of the fundamental revolution in American social organization in the twentieth century: the replacement of community-based groups by bureaucracies.

Under what conditions do politicians emphasize patronage allocations over the provision of public goods? Building upon research on democratic policy management, this paper aims to improve our understanding of patronage politics by focusing upon the political incentives influencing the ability and willingness of politicians to target public sector allocations to political supporters. Drawing upon data on spending priorities at the provincial level in post-1983 Argentina, the statistical analysis provides evidence that the relative importance of patronage allocations fluctuates with partisanship, electoral cycles, revenue sources, and public sector investment in economic development. The findings underline important and largely neglected parallels between clientelistic and programmatic politics and thereby have important implications for the study of the political economy of democracy.

Recent policy research has turned from the testing of static, cross‐sectional theories to time‐serial analyses of dynamic processes. This attention has renewed interest in the debate over incrementalism in policy development. Recent efforts have suggested that policy histories involve a series of short periods of instability followed by extended periods of stability. These theories are collectively known as punctuated equilibrium theories of policy. Efforts to test these models of policy have been limited to descriptive analyses of samples of policy budgets or univariate hypothesis testing. This article presents a strategy for multivariate hypothesis testing of punctuated equilibrium models based on the foundations of punctuated equilibrium theory. The strategy is illustrated with a test of the effects of organization size and centralization on the budgetary process.

This article makes a case for bringing the concept of charismatic authority back into the study of social movements. Three decades ago, with the paradigmatic shift from psychological to strategic explanations, Weber's concept virtually disappeared from scholarship about collective action. Based on an investigation of the Chinese Cultural Revolution, I examine the distinctive structure and capacities of charismatic mobilization. During the Cultural Revolution, Mao Zedong called on students, workers, and peasants to attack the officials of his own party. Because Mao employed both bureaucratic and charismatic methods of mobilization, this movement offers an opportunity to compare the structural characteristics of the two and evaluate their distinctive capacities. Through a case study of the most prominent Cultural Revolution rebel organization, I demonstrate that the informal structure of charismatic mobilization gave the movement a rule-breaking power that made it highly effective in undermining bureaucratic authority. I then suggest how the concepts of charismatic and bureaucratic mobilization might be used to analyze other social movements and to clarify issues in long-standing debates about the tendency of social movement organizations to become conservative.

We analyze the positive and normative implications of regulatory oversight when the policymaking agency can improve the quality of regulation through effort, but only some kinds of effort are observable by the overseer, and the overseer's only power is the ability to veto new regulation. Such oversight can increase the quality of agency regulation, but it also introduces inefficiencies—the agency underinvests in unobservable effort and overinvests in observable effort. Agencies have no incentive to conceal their activities from the overseer; the reforms that are likely to reduce inefficiency are therefore those that improve overseer expertise or lower the costs of agency disclosure, not those that compel disclosure. The normative implications depend on the relative severity of bureaucratic drift and slack problems. When slack is paramount, an overseer that is more anti-regulation than the agency or society improves social welfare, as long as it does not deter the agency from regulating entirely. When drift is paramount, oversight improves social welfare only when it deters regulation. In this case, regulatory oversight is weakly dominated by one of two alternatives: eliminating oversight or banning regulation.

Industries face collective action and commitment problems when attempting to influence Congress. At the same time, an individual firm's political investments can yield reduced bureaucratic scrutiny by indicating that firm's willingness to contest agency decisions. We develop a model in which the desirability of maintaining a political footprint for this reason enables individual firms to commit to rewarding elected officials who maintain laws benefiting an entire industry. Our “dual forbearance” model anticipates that corporate political investments will be larger on average when statutes are stringent and that even pro-industry legislative coalitions will benefit politically from the existence of a minimal regulatory state.

In his first four years as Chief Justice of the United States, William Howard Taft convinced Congress to pass two reform bills that substantially enhanced the power of the federal courts, the Supreme Court, and the Chief Justice. In this article, I explore the causes and the consequences of those reforms. I detail how Taft's political entrepreneurship—specifically the building of reputations, the cultivation of networks, and the pursuit of change through measured action—was instrumental in forging judicial autonomy and, subsequently, how that autonomy was employed to introduce judicial bureaucracy. By asking both how judicial reform was accomplished and what judicial reform accomplished, I offer an analytically grounded and historically rich account of the politics surrounding two of the most substantively important legislative actions relating to the federal judiciary in American history. In the process, I also draw attention to a largely neglected story of political development: the politics surrounding the building of the federal judiciary as an independent and autonomous institution of governance in American politics.

Many countries have recently enacted or proposed reforms aimed at increasing citizens’ information on the quality of some public sector services. Disclosure of schools’and teachers’ quality is the case that has generated the biggest public debate. In the US, the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB) requires learning progress to be measured for every child and results from students’tests be made available in annual report cards, so that parents can evaluate schools’ performances. Similar reforms have also been proposed for many other public services. In the UK, legislation introduced in the year 2000 now requires that the performance of each Local Government is reviewed and made public with regards to provision of services such as …re, police, housing, social services and education, but also like the condition of roads, the

We offer a theory of intertemporal bureaucratic decision making which proposes that an agency's forecast optimism is related to the extent to which it discounts future reputation costs associated with bureaucratic incompetence. Agency forecasts of the distant future are more likely to be optimistic than short-term forecasts. We claim that unstable organizations will discount reputation costs at a steeper rate than stable organizations, and therefore will produce more optimistic forecasts. We test our theory using macroeconomic forecasts produced by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the Social Security Administration (SSA) across six forecast horizons from 1979 to 2003. The statistical results are generally consistent with our theory: OMB generates more optimistic long-term forecasts than SSA. Further, differences in forecast optimism between these executive branch agencies widen as the forecast horizon increases. Our evidence suggests that more stable agencies place a premium on minimizing reputation costs. Conversely, less stable agencies are more likely to accommodate political pressures for forecast optimism. These findings underscore the importance of institutional design for understanding how executive agencies balance the conflicting goals of political responsiveness and bureaucratic competence within the administrative state.

This paper studies the association between regulation and the organizational form of new life insurers between 1900 and 1949. The mutual form was popular in states with low initial capital requirements for mutual companies and differentially higher requirements for stock companies, but was rarely used elsewhere. This suggests that entrepreneurs took a “path of least resistance” when choosing organizational form and that the mutual's disadvantage in raising capital contributed to its decline–a decline that accelerated as states raised requirements and eliminated the aforementioned differentials. Contrary to previous analysis, the paper finds little evidence connecting other regulations to mutual decline. (JEL G21, L51, N21, N22)

This article examines the effects of an uncertain legal status on the lives of immigrants, situating their experiences within frameworks of citizenship/belonging and segmented assimilation, and using Victor Turner's concept of liminality and Susan Coutin's legal nonexistence. It questions blackandwhite conceptualizations of documented and undocumented immigration by exposing the gray area of liminal legality and examines how this inbetween status affects the individual's social networks and family, the place of the church in immigrants' lives, and the broader domain of artistic expression. Empirically, it draws on ethnographic fieldwork conducted among Salvadoran and Guatemalan immigrants in San Francisco, Los Angeles, Washington, D.C., and Phoenix from 1989 to 2001. The article lends support to arguments about the continued centrality of the nationstate in the lives of immigrants.

It has long been recognized that the media play an essential role in government accountability. Even in the absence of censorship, however, the government may influence news content by maintaining a “cozy” relationship with the media. This paper develops a model of democratic politics in which media capture is endogenous. The model offers insights into the features of the media market that determine the ability of the government to exercise such capture and hence to influence political outcomes.

Scholarship on executive politics provides conflicting views about whether staffing administrative agencies through politicized or (politically) autonomous means is the best method for maximizing bureaucratic competence. We offer a theoretical account which maintains that obtaining a proper balance between both types of personnel systems across the supervisory and subordinate levels of an organization will best foster bureaucratic competence. We evaluate our organizational balancing thesis using data on executive branch general revenue fund forecasts in the American states from 1987 to 2002. States with a combination of politically appointed agency executives and merit‐selected subordinates generally provide more accurate revenue forecasts than states that possess uniformly politicized personnel selection systems. Conversely, states with a combination of department head–appointed executives and subordinates chosen from an at‐will system (i.e., nonmerit) produce more accurate forecasts than states with uniformly autonomous personnel selection systems. Our statistical findings underscore the positive consequences associated with balancing politicized and autonomous means of selecting personnel within hierarchies of political organizations.

This paper examines the struggle between the legislative and judicial branches by focusing specifically on congressional influences on the behavior of federal judges. We argue that Congress may constrain individual judicial behavior by passing statutes containing detailed language. To test this thesis we borrow from the bureaucratic politics literature to introduce and test a new measure of statutory constraint. Using data from the U.S. Courts of Appeals we find that appellate court behavior is constrained significantly by statutory language, although this constraint is asymmetric across ideology. We discover substantial differences between Democratic and Republican appointees both in terms of statutory constraint and ideological voting. The data indicate judges appointed by Democratic presidents are constrained by statutory language in criminal cases. Similarly, Republican appointees are constrained by statutes in civil rights cases. Yet, neither Democrats nor Republicans are constrained in economic cases.

Though organizationally driven geographic mobility is a distinguishing feature of modern careers, accounts of its origin are murky. Drawing on various theories of organization, the authors show how a merger wave exposed competing institutional logics and triggered the elaboration of the modern, mobile, bureaucratic career. Using organizational data and employment records, the authors model the association between organizational merger and the introduction of career‐migration among employees at Lloyds Bank over a 45‐year period. The pattern of mobility they find suggests that agency problems associated with the loyalties of newly acquired workers dominated early experiments with lateral transfers. As the merger wave matured, geographic mobility became a general feature of all bank workers’ careers. The implications of this pattern of mobility for organizations, career structures, and stratification systems more generally are examined.

Water utilities are reminiscent of network industries and are characterized by important fixed costs. These factors contribute to a single firm serving an area justifying public intervention on pricing. About one-fourth of U.S. water utilities are private and subject to regulation. Regulators are unlikely to be perfectly informed and regulation is unlikely to be costlessly implemented. These inherent imperfections have led economists to consider the incentive properties of regulatory procedures using the economics of information (see David Baron, 1989). The empirical literature on regulation has focused on evaluating the effects of regulation on prices, firms’ costs, efficiency, and innovation in such sectors as airlines, electricity, and energy, as surveyed by Paul L. Joskow and Nancy L. Rose (1989). Few of these empirical studies rely on the so-called theory of regulation. Regarding the water industry, there is an abundant literature on residential water demand, firms’ cost, and their efficiency, given their public-versusprivate nature. Relying on a model with asymmetric information and a sample of California water utilities, Frank A. Wolak (1994) assesses the consumer welfare loss due to asymmetric information and shows that the model with asymmetric information provides a superior description of the cost and demand data to the model under perfect information. Analyzing pricing for residential water is an important policy issue as the sector recently experienced price increases. The problem is even more acute in California because of a high residential demand for water along with population growth, water scarcity, and the probability of severe droughts. Relying on a new dataset of 32 districts in California over the 1995–2000 period, we analyze regulation of private water utilities. For every district, the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) chooses a price for water, an access fee per meter, and a rate of return on capital to satisfy firms’ revenue requirements. We assume that the CPUC is imperfectly informed about firms’ labor efficiency. Following David Besanko (1984) and Wolak (1994), we develop a model in which the firm’s capital is used as a screening variable. In particular, the model has the features of a rate-of-return regulation. We show how the rate of return and the access fee can be determined optimally to control firms’ rents. We then adopt a structural approach to analyze the data. A multistep estimator allows us to estimate the key parameters of the model. The empirical results show price inelasticity, an income effect, slightly decreasing returns to scale, and a concentration of efficient firms. The computation of the optimal rate of return and access fee shows that the CPUC would tend to be cautious by allowing a lower-than-optimal rate and access fee. Relying on the estimated parameters, a first experiment evaluates the cost of asymmetric information. The price would be significantly lower, resulting in a gain of consumer surplus. A second experiment consists of simulating the outcome of an optimal price cap following the Farid Gasmi et al. (2002) model. The price cap became a popular regulatory tool in the 1980s such as for electricity, though the incentives resulting in price cap regulation have been questioned by economists. The counterfactual simulations show a price increase, which results in a significant loss in consumer surplus. The increase in firms’ profit does not, however, counterbalance this loss supporting the relevance of the actual rate-of-return mechanism.

A wide range of costly government policies are designed to extend citizens ’ lives and to reduce the risk of premature death. Using economic reasoning, one can evaluate such policies on the basis of efficiency. Life-saving policies pass a cost-benefit test if and only if their costs fall below the beneficiaries ’ willingness-to-pay for the reduced fatality risk (W. Kip Viscusi, 1993). Some government agencies have now adopted this standard for evaluating the cost-effectiveness of various life-saving policies (Viscusi, 1993; Jim Holt, 2004). One important case of government tradeoffs between dollars and fatalities is military procurement of armored vehicles. Troop-intensive units, while relatively inexpensive, place large numbers of soldiers ’ lives at risk. By replacing some troop-intensive units with tank-intensive units, an army can achieve the same level of mission accomplishment as it did before, but with fewer fatalities. Doing so, however, requires that the government make costly capital purchases. Military policymakers have known about the usefulness of armored vehicles in reducing fatalities since their initial use in World War I (J.F.C. Fuller, 1928; B.H. Liddell Hart, 1925). This issue also motivates contemporary discussions regarding vehicle procurement in Iraq (Lisa

We test the proposition that the federal bureaucracy exhibits a “bias toward business” during notice and comment rulemaking. We analyze over 30 bureaucratic rules and almost 1,700 comments over the period of 1994 to 2001. We find that business commenters, but not nonbusiness commenters, hold important influence over the content of final rules. We also demonstrate that as the proportion of business commenters increases, so too does the influence of business interests. These findings contrast with previous empirical studies and generally suggest that notice and comment procedures have not succeeded in “democratizing” the agency policymaking process to the extent sometimes suggested in the normative rulemaking literature.

Regulatory agencies impose costs and benefits tailored to individual firms through their discretionary enforcement activities. We propose that corporations use political expenditures in part to “flex their muscles” to regulators and convey their willingness to fight an agency's specific determinations in the political arena. Because the signaling function of political expenditures is strategically complex, we derive a formal model wherein we demonstrate the existence of an equilibrium in which (1) large political donors are less compliant than smaller ones, but the bureaucracy monitors them less , and (2) firms with publicly observable problems reduce their political expenditures. We test the empirical implications of the model using plant-level data from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission on the inspection of 63 privately operated nuclear power plants and the political expenditures of their parent companies. We find strong evidence for the first prediction and qualified support for the second.

I examine how the legislature and the president sequentially enable and constrain agencies in a tug-of-war over the exercise of bureaucratic discretion, partly in response to past political interventions. I provide evidence from a duration analysis of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's enforcement of hazard waste law for the acceleration and deceleration of policy implementation in response to sequential interventions by multiple, competing principals. I document the use of agenda-setting and solution-forcing statutes by Congress and case clearance mechanisms by the president. Sequenced political control means that agencies face shifting political expectations, caused in part by how the agency responds to past control attempts. While previous empirical research has portrayed a largely static world in which Congress and the president have influence, this study reveals a dynamic portrayal in which there is move and countermove from these principals.

A unifying theme in the literature on organizations such as public bureaucracies and private nonprofits is the importance of mission, as opposed to profit, as an organizational goal. Such mission-oriented organizations are frequently staffed by motivated agents who subscribe to the mission. This paper studies incentives in such contexts and emphasizes the role of matching the mission preferences of principals and agents in increasing organizational efficiency. Matching economizes on the need for high-powered incentives. It can also, however, entrench bureaucratic conservatism and resistance to innovations. The framework developed in this paper is applied to school competition, incentives in the public sector and in private nonprofits, and the interdependence of incentives and productivity between the private for-profit sector and the mission-oriented sector through occupational choice.

The institutionalization of distinct collective memories of hate and cultural traumas as law and bureaucracy is examined comparatively for the case of hate crime law. A dehistoricized focus on individual victimization and an avoidance of major episodes of domestic atrocities in the United States contrast with a focus on the Holocaust, typically in the context of the destruction of the democratic state, in Germany. Such differences, in combination with specifics of state organization and exposure to global scripts, help explain particularities of law and law enforcement along dimensions such as internationalization, coupling of minority and democracy protection, focus on individual versus group rights, and specialization of control agencies.

Despite a growing interest in corruption, the topic has been absent from democratic theory. The reason is not a lack of normative issues, but rather missing links between the concepts of corruption and democracy. With few exceptions, political corruption has been conceived as departures by public officials from public rules, norms, and laws for the sake of private gain. Such a conception works well within bureaucratic contexts with well‐defined offices, purposes, and norms of conduct. But it inadequately identifies corruption in political contexts, that is, the processes of contestation through which common purposes, norms, and rules are created. Corruption in a democracy, I argue, involves duplicitous violations of the democratic norm of inclusion. Such a conception encompasses the standard conception while complementing it with attention to the dynamics of inclusion and exclusion within democratic politics. By distinguishing the meanings of inclusion and exclusion within the many institutions, spheres, and associations that constitute contemporary democracies, I provide a democratic conception of corruption with a number of implications. The most important of these is that corruption in a democracy usually indicates a deficit of democracy.

We analyze a model of delegation and policymaking in polities where bureaucratic capacity is low. Our analysis suggests that low bureaucratic capacity diminishes incentives for bureaucrats to comply with legislation, making it more difficult for politicians to induce bureaucrats to take actions that politicians desire. Consequently, when bureaucratic capacity is low, standard principles in the theoretical literature on delegation no longer hold. We also use the model to examine the issue of political reform in polities with low bureaucratic capacity. The model indicates that politicians in such polities will be trapped in a situation whereby they have little incentive to undertake reforms of either the bureaucracy or other institutions (such as courts) that are crucial for successful policymaking.

Few dispute that secure property rights are critical to economic development. But if secure property rights are so beneficial, then why are they so rare? More precisely, what factors promote secure property rights? Do rightholders view private or state agents as a greater threat to property? Do they value bureaucratic commitment or discretion? I use evidence from two original surveys of company managers in Russia to assess the institutional, social, and political determinants of secure property rights. Most managers said that state arbitration courts did not work badly in disputes with other businesses, but few expected these courts to protect their rights in disputes with state officials. More importantly, managers who expressed confidence that state arbitration courts could constrain state officials invested at higher rates, even controlling for the perceived effectiveness of state institutions. Ironically, increasing constraints on state agents can increase the security of property and bolster state capacity. These results generate insights into debates on the role of state in the economy, the origins of secure property rights, the nature of state capacity, the importance of informal institutions, and the process of legal reform.

This article explores the impact of the race of individual clients and of the local racial context on the implementation of sanctions for recipients of Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) in a Midwestern state. We find that although nonwhites are sanctioned at lower rates than whites overall, nonwhites are sanctioned more compared to whites in each local area. This paradox occurs because nonwhites tend to live in areas with lower sanction rates. Consistent with the literature on race and policy, we find that sanction rates increase as the nonwhite population increases until a threshold is reached where nonwhites gain political power .

Political bureaucracies make the overwhelming majority of public policy decisions in the United States. To examine the extent to which these agency actions are responsive to the preferences of elected officials, in particular, Congress, I develop a spatial model of oversight. The most important insight of this theory is that agencies make policy decisions within given regimes and may be constrained by the preferences of different political actors at different times. To test the theory, I collect and analyze data on the monitoring activities of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). I find that under certain conditions, the FDA is responsive to the preferences of committees and floors in Congress, but under other conditions the agency can act autonomously.

In a separation of powers political system, effective bureaucratic control may be undermined by the fact that the power to appoint bureaucrats is controlled by a different set of principals from those that may control them through statutory or budgetary means. In particular, executives have proposal power over bureaucratic appointments and removals while legislators have proposal power over laws. In this article, I explore the consequences of this division of authority for bureaucratic outcomes. I argue that this pattern of authority often produces outcomes inferior to those generated when appointment, removal, and legislative powers are centralized as is the case in many parliamentary systems. The model reveals that restricting executive removal power can mitigate these problems. Finally, I discuss the relevance of this appointments dilemma for bargaining over bureaucratic structures with a focus on removal powers, independent commissions, and civil service rules .

Many questions remain about the causes and implications of state government reorganization. Using an original data set on agency consolidation in the states between 1950 and 1992, we show that executive branch restructuring occurs incrementally as well as through better recognized comprehensive reorganization. With continuous state-space modeling we show that these different reform paths are related and driven by distinct political and economic conditions. We also show that, contrary to previous findings, state attempts to alter their administrative organizations do impact long-term employment growth rates. Although smaller in magnitude, incremental as well as comprehensive reforms can enhance administrative efficiency. Further, unlike the Baumgartner and Jones (1993, 2002) punctuated-equilibrium model, we do not find evidence that incrementalism gives way to bursts of nonincremental change. Rather, incremental adjustments to the status quo may be sufficient to reduce the possibility the possibility of comprehensive reorganization at any point in the future.

We explore the effectiveness of matching grants when lower levels of government can expropriate some of the funds for other uses. Using data on the Medicaid Disproportionate Share program, we identify states that were most able to expropriate funds. Payments to public hospitals in these states were systematically diverted and had no significant impact on patient mortality. Payments that were not expropriated were associated with significant declines in patient mortality. Overall, subsidies were an effective mechanism for improving outcomes for the poor, but the impact was limited by the ability of state and local governments to divert the targeted funds.

The reallocation of authority upward, downward, and sideways from central states has drawn attention from a growing number of scholars in political science. Yet beyond agreement that governance has become (and should be) multi-level, there is no consensus about how it should be organized. This article draws on several literatures to distinguish two types of multi-level governance. One type conceives of dispersion of authority to general-purpose, nonintersecting, and durable jurisdictions. A second type of governance conceives of task-specific, intersecting, and flexible jurisdictions. We conclude by specifying the virtues of each type of governance.For comments and advice we are grateful to Christopher Ansell, Ian Bache, Richard Balme, Arthur Benz, Tanja Börzel, Renaud Dehousse, Burkard Eberlein, Peter Hall, Edgar Grande, Richard Haesly, Bob Jessop, Beate Kohler-Koch, David Lake, Patrick Le Galés, Christiane Lemke, David Lowery, Michael McGinnis, Andrew Moravcsik, Elinor Ostrom, Franz U. Pappi, Thomas Risse, James Rosenau, Alberta Sbragia, Philippe Schmitter, Ulf Sverdrup, Christian Tusschoff, Bernhard Wessels, the political science discussion group at the University of North Carolina, and the editor and three anonymous reviewers of APSR. We received institutional support from the Center for European Studies at the University of North Carolina, the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation, and the Wissenschaftszentrum für Sozialforschung in Berlin. Earlier versions were presented at the European Union Studies Association meeting, the ECPR pan-European Conference in Bordeaux, and Hannover Universität, Harvard University, Humboldt Universität, Indiana University at Bloomington, Mannheim Universität, Sheffield University, Sciences Po (Paris), Technische Universität München, and the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam. The authors' names appear in alphabetical order.

Using surveys conducted in sixteen mature and newly established democracies around the globe, this study examines the effect of corruption on people's attitudes toward government. The analysis demonstrates that citizens in countries with higher levels of corruption express more negative evaluations of the performance of the political system and exhibit lower levels of trust in civil servants. However, the results also show that the negative effect of corruption on evaluations of the political system is significantly attenuated among supporters of the incumbent political authorities. These findings provide strong and systematic evidence that informal political practices, especially those that compromise important democratic principles, should be considered important indicators of political system performance. Moreover, they imply that, while corruption is a powerful determinant of political support across widely varying political, cultural, and economic contexts, it does not uniformly diminish support for political institutions across all segments of the electorate.

This paper uses a unique data set on corruption containing quantitative information on bribe payments of Ugandan firms. The data have two striking features: not all firms report that they need to pay bribes, and there is considerable variation in reported graft across firms facing similar institutions/policies. We propose an explanation for these patterns, based on differences in control rights and bargaining strength across firms. Consistent with the control rights/bargaining hypotheses, we find that the incidence of corruption can be explained by the variation in policies/regulations across industries. How much must bribe-paying firms pay? Combining the quantitative data on corruption with detailed financial information from the surveyed firms, we show that firms' "ability to pay" and firms' "refusal power" can explain a large part of the variation in bribes across graft-reporting firms. These results suggest that public officials act as price (bribe) discriminators, and that prices of public services are partly determined in order to extract bribes.

We develop an algorithm for detecting teacher cheating that combines information on unexpected test score fluctuations and suspicious patterns of answers for students in a classroom. Using data from the Chicago public schools, we estimate that serious cases of teacher or administrator cheating on standardized tests occur in a minimum of 4–5 percent of elementary school classrooms annually. The observed frequency of cheating appears to respond strongly to relatively minor changes in incentives. Our results highlight the fact that high-powered incentive systems, especially those with bright line rules, may induce unexpected behavioral distortions such as cheating. Statistical analysis, however, may provide a means of detecting illicit acts, despite the best attempts of perpetrators to keep them clandestine.

This paper argues that long-run trends in geographic segregation are inconsistent with models where residential choice depends solely on local public goods (the Tiebout hypothesis). We develop an extension of the Tiebout model that predicts as mobility costs fall, the heterogeneity across communities of individual public good preferences and of public good provision must (weakly) increase. Given the secular decline in mobility costs, these predictions can be evaluated using historical data. We find decreasing heterogeneity in policies and proxies for preferences across (i) a sample of U.S. municipalities (1870–1990); (ii) all Boston-area municipalities (1870–1990); and (iii) all U.S. counties (1850–1990).

Bureaucracies tend to be used when consumers cannot be trusted to choose outcomes efficiently. But a primary means of bureaucratic oversight is consumer complaints. But this can give bureaucrats an incentive to inefficiently accede to consumer demands to avoid a complaint. I show that when this incentive is important, bureaucracies (efficiently) respond by (i) ignoring legitimate consumer complaints, (ii) monitoring more in situations in which it is not needed, (iii) delaying decision making “too long,” and (iv) biasing oversight against consumers. I also show that bureaucracies are used only when consumers cannot be trusted. As a result, observed bureaucracies are always inefficient.

Do redundant bureaucratic arrangements represent wasteful duplication or a hedge against political uncertainty? Previous attempts at addressing this question have treated agency actions as exogenous, thus avoiding strategic issues such as collective action problems or competition. I develop a game‐theoretic model of bureaucratic policy making in which a political principal chooses the number of agents to handle a given task. Importantly, agents have policy preferences that may be opposed to the principal's, and furthermore may choose their policy or effort levels. Among the results are that redundancy can help a principal achieve her policy goals when her preferences are not aligned with the agents'. But redundancy is less helpful if even a single agent has preferences relatively close to the principal's. In this environment collective action problems may cause multiple agents to be less effective than a single agent. Redundancy can also be unnecessary to the principal if the agent's jurisdiction can be terminated.

Debates about the appropriate mix between autonomy and accountability of bureaucrats are relevant to numerous areas of government action. I examine whether there is evidence of a tradeoff between transparency, democratic accountability, and the gains from monetary delegation. I begin by presenting a simple theoretical model which suggests that central banks that are transparent, in the sense of publishing their macroeconomic forecasts, will find it easier to acquire a reputation. Despite making central banks more subject to outside scrutiny then, monetary transparency can lead to improved economic outcomes. I also consider arguments about the effect of accountability provisions involving parliamentary oversight and control over central bankers. The article then uses a new data set to examine these issues empirically, focusing on a natural experiment involving disinflation costs under different central banking institutions during the 1990s. Results suggest that countries with more transparent central banks face lower costs of disinflation while accountability provisions have no clear effect on disinflation costs. My results also concord with earlier findings that the effect of monetary institutions is conditional on other features of the political environment.

Why did a partially bureaucratized administrative system develop in Qin China about two millennia before it did in European states? In this paper, comparative historical arguments about war and state-making are combined with agency theory to answer this question. The Spring and Autumn and Warring States eras that preceded the Qin unification of China created the necessary conditions for bureaucratization by weakening the aristocracy, creating a bureaucratic model, facilitating the development of roads, and providing trained and disciplined personnel. Comparative analysis shows that the main factor differentiating Qin China from other states and empires was the extreme weakness of the aristocracy produced by an unusually long period of severe warfare. Although Qin China was more bureaucratic than any other state or empire prior to the seventeenth century, it was far from completely bureaucratic. The persistence of monitoring problems prevented its full development, necessitating deviations such as the use of severe negative sanctions, the creation of redundant positions, and limiting bureaucratization to the top of the administrative system. The further development of the bureaucratic administrative system in the Han dynasty is also discussed.

I delineate necessary conditions for the ideological composition of the federal courts to influence bureaucratic decisions independently of lawsuits and test for the relationship with data on the implementation of wetlands policy. Examining 18,331 decisions by the Army Corps of Engineers over whether to issue a permit for the development of wetlands between 1988 and 1996, I analyze whether these decisions were influenced by the composition of the appellate and district courts. The results indicate that judicial ideology significantly affects bureaucratic decision making. Specifically, a standard deviation increase in the liberalism of the lower courts decreases the probability that the Corps will grant a permit by 14%, which is comparable to the effects of long‐recognized determinants of administrative behavior.

This paper develops a framework for conceptualizing preferences for different job properties in terms of a tradeoff between risk and return in the pursuit of economic welfare. Following portfolio theory, job properties are viewed as having mean-variance properties with respect to the distribution of rates of growth in economic welfare. Actors may pursue a high-return, high-risk “entrepreneurial” strategy, or a low-return, low-risk “bureaucratic” strategy. An actor's choice is determined by “entrepreneurial ability” and risk preferences, which in turn are rooted in the major dimensions of family and schooling background, cognitive ability, and gender. This theory is tested by anchoring it in the Wisconsin status attainment model and then fitting rank-ordered logit models to data from the 1957 and 1992 Wisconsin Longitudinal Survey. The findings support the theory: Actors who are “advantaged” with respect to family background, schooling, cognitive ability, and gender express a preference for “entrepreneurial” as opposed to “bureaucratic” job properties. Findings also highlight the strong parallels between the process generating adult job values and the process of socioeconomic achievement itself.

Students of public organizations acknowledge that administrative agencies make decisions in an uncertain policy environment. Existing research on public bureaucracy either makes simplifying a priori assumptions about such behavior or completely ignores this fundamental issue. This study proposes a statistical test of agency risk-bearing behavior to shed light on bureaucratic decision making under conditions of uncertainty. An analysis of Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) agency budget requests for the 1949–97 period yields risk coefficients that are compatible with analytically derived results. The empirical findings indicate that the SEC exhibits relatively greater concern about organizational maintenance when the type of uncertainty that it experiences is external to the decision-making purview of the organization than when it is internal to the agency. However, mixed statistical evidence is obtained that the SEC places comparatively greater value on organizational maintenance, as reflected in its budgetary decisions, during an era of greater political instability induced by divided party government than under unified government.An earlier version of this paper was presented at the annual meetings of the 1999 Public Choice Society, March 12–14, 1999, Hotel Monteleone, New Orleans, Louisiana. The author wishes to thank Janice Boucher Breuer, Charles Cameron, Brandice Canes–Wrone, Dan Carpenter, Jeffrey Cohen, Stephen Dilworth, Jim Douglas, David Epstein, Brad Gomez, Chris Kam, David Lewis, Ken Meier, Tom Romer, Andy Whitford, B. Dan Wood, LeeAnne Krause, and seminar participants at Columbia University and the University of South Carolina, and the anonymous APSR reviewers for their helpful suggestions and comments at various stages of this project. I thank Tim Groseclose and Dan Ponder for providing some of the ADA voting score data used in this paper. This paper is dedicated to the memory of Sherry Ann Krause. Any errors that remain are my own.

Critics of foreign aid programs argue that these funds often support corrupt governments and inefficient bureaucracies. Supporters argue that foreign aid can be used to reward good governments. This paper documents that there is no evidence that less corrupt governments receive more foreign aid. On the contrary, according to some measures of corruption, more corrupt governments receive more aid. Also, we could not find any evidence that an increase in foreign aid reduces corruption.

Economists have long warned about the pernicious impacts of corruption, arguing that it increases transaction costs, reduces investment incentives, and ultimately results in reduced economic growth. Political scientists, on the other hand, ever the realists, have had a much more ambivalent view of the problem. Indeed, much classic literature focusing on the Third World saw corruption as functional for political development, enabling citizens to overcome intransigent, inefficient bureaucracies while increasing loyalty to the political system. More recent research, however, points in the opposite direction toward an erosion of public support for corrupt regimes. A series of serious methodological problems has prevented the testing of these contradictory assertions about the impact of corruption. This article uses national sample survey data, with a total N of over 9,000, from four Latin American countries to test the effect of corruption experiences on belief in the legitimacy of the political system. It finds that independent of socioeconomic, demographic, and partisan identification, exposure to corruption erodes belief in the political system and reduces interpersonal trust. The evidence seems clear, at least for these four countries, that corruption carries with it important political costs.

According to the theory of representative bureaucracy, passive representation among public employees will lead to active representation in bureaucratic outputs. Existing research demonstrates that the link between passive and active representation exists for race but not for sex. Past research on this topic has not, however, taken into account the contextual environment that affects whether sex will translate into gender and lead to active representation in the bureaucracy. In this paper, we create a framework that specifies the conditions that affect whether passive representation results in active representation for sex and then test this framework using the case of education. We find that passive representation of women in education leads to active representation and that the institutional context affects the extent to which this link between passive and active representation occurs.

political control of the bureaucracy, drug approval times appear insensitive to shifts in the partisanship or ideology of congressional majorities, oversight committees, and presidents. Controlling for numerous clinical factors, FDA review times are decreasing in (1) the wealth of the richest organization representing the disease treated by the drug, (2) me? dia coverage given to this disease, and (3) a nonlinear function of the number of groups representing this disease. Political influence over drug approval operates primarily through salience signals transmitted by groups and the media.

perceived policy costs are high, trust affects white parents' support for education quotas but not white nonparents' support. The prolonged and dramatic drop in Americans' political trust over the past thirty-five years has prompted intense academic and jour? nalistic inquiry. While scholars have offered various explanations for the decline (e.g., Citrin 1974; Miller 1974), they have offered little em? pirical investigation into its consequences. Of the few that do, one con? cludes: [there is] little indication that distrust is having dangerous con? sequences for the country. ... It has not diminished Americans' sense of patriotism, nor has it created a climate ... conducive to acceptance of ille? gal anti-government activities (Pew Research Center 1998,12). Somewhat ironically, even as evidence of Americans' distrust mounts, evidence of its relevance remains virtually nonexistent. While distrust may not portend a legitimacy crisis, it may have less dra? matic, yet still important, consequences for the American polity. One such consequence may be a truncated policy agenda. If people distrust the gov? ernment, other things being equal, they will likely distrust the policies it formulates. Suggestive of trust's causal importance, politicians often engage citizens' distrust when arguing against expansive government programs. For example, many opponents of health care reform in the mid-1990s predicated their attacks on public concern about a new federal bureaucracy, while advocates of welfare reform emphasized existing bureaucratic failures and excesses. Though public opposition to government programs certainly reflects distaste for government action, it may also indicate public condem? nation of the federal government itself. Just as parents who distrust their teenagers may wish to restrict their activities, those who distrust government may wish to restrict its activities.

There has been a resuscitation of the view that the state can play an important role in the industrialization process. But, for states to be successful in fostering development, they need a considerable degree of internal cohesiveness, which is generally supplied by the presence of a robust, Weberian bureaucratic corps. This article argues that, while internal cohesiveness is indeed critical, bureaucratic rule following can produce results in the opposite direction, depending on the interagency relations that obtain within the state. The effect of interagency relations is demonstrated through an examination of India and Korea. Both have worked to foster industrialization, and both are endowed with relatively healthy bureaucracies. However, the Indian state was paralyzed and fragmented, while its Korean counterpart did secure the requisite internal coherence. Not only did the culture of rule following fail to generate a cohesive state in India, but it, in fact, worked against such an outcome.

Scholars have largely ignored one of the most important ways in which presidents influence the administrative state in the modern era, that is, by creating administrative agencies through executive action. Because they can act unilaterally, presidents alter the kinds of administrative agencies that are created and the control they wield over the federal bureaucracy. We analyze the 425 agencies established between 1946 and 1995 and find that agencies created by administrative action are significantly less insulated from presidential control than are agencies created through legislation. We also find that the ease of congressional legislative action is a significant predictor of the number of agencies created by executive action. We conclude that the very institutional factors that make it harder for Congress to legislate provide presidents new opportunities to create administrative agencies on their own, and to design them in ways that maximize executive control.

What determines the allocation of tasks among government agencies? This paper develops a formal model of task allocation that argues that jurisdictions are strategically designed to achieve legislative goals. In the model, agencies choose unobservable policies, and political outcomes are a noisy indicator of these choices. The legislature therefore faces a compliance issue when the agencies’ policy preferences are different from its own. The legislature exerts control by defining agency jurisdictions, setting ex ante budgets and choosing ex post contractual inducements. The principal result is that tasks will be consolidated under a single roof when that agency prefers lower levels of policy than the legislature. In other cases, separating tasks prevents resources from being allocated in a manner undesirable for the legislature.

This article extends the empirical literature on bureaucratic behavior by modeling the strategic interactions between an enforcement agency, its clients, and its political principals. Specifically, the study focuses on the joint analysis of IRS enforcement decisions and taxpayer compliance behavior in order to fully explore the extent of political controls over the agency. The results suggest that there is a very strong reciprocal relationship between IRS audit levels and taxpayer compliance levels across states and over time and that taxpayer compliance behavior is also influenced by partisan changes in national politics.

Political scientists normally discuss sovereign immunity in the context of international law and relations. The domestic effects of sovereign immunity are almost never examined, even though those effects are profound and implicate a range of issues of interest to political scientists. The Federal Tort Claims Act (FCTA) (1946) is a main waiver of federal sovereign immunity and is designed to allow people injured by government employees to sue for money damages. The FTCA has a number of exceptions, the most prominent of which is known as the “discretionary function exception.” This exception retains sovereign immunity for the United States when a federal employee acts “based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty…whether or not the discretion involved be abused.” This simple exception expanded into a comprehensive tool of government that now confounds justice and federal governmental accountability.

In 1946, Congress passed the Administrative Procedure and Legislative Reorganization Act. In this legislation, Congress purposefully provided for itself a prominent role in the administration of the federal government. David Rosenbloom writes that the “… purpose of this book is to explain how and why Congress adopted that role, its underlying coherence, [and] its durability … for seemingly ever-increasing congressional involvement in federal administration …” (p. ix). The author maintains that Congress was uneasy about this endeavor but was forced by the “federal administrative state” to reposition itself. Some even believed that Congress' place in the constitutional scheme-of-things had been altered. For example, it was asserted that Congress was abandoning constitutional principle if it allowed unelected governmental administrators to make rules (i.e., administrative law). The 1946 legislation has resulted in a merger between Congress and the federal bureaucracy. The author contends that federal agencies became “extensions” of Congress' authority to make law. In addition, this legislation resulted in the view that the administration of the bureaucracy was no longer to be seen as the private preserve of the executive branch of government. The concept of “legislative-centered public administration” is used to describe the results of this legislation.

Kenneth T. Andrews, Social Movements and Policy Implementation: The Mississippi Civil Rights Movement and the War on Poverty, 1965 to 1971, American Sociological Review, Vol. 66, No. 1 (Feb., 2001), pp. 71-95

This article develops a model that describes the growth of the public sector as a joint result of the process of economic development and the political institutions in place. The model is tested using panel data for about sixty five developing and developed nations for the period 195090. Economic modernization leads to the growth of the public sector through two mechanisms: first, the state intervenes to provide certain collective goods such as regulatory agencies and infrastructures; second, industrialization and an ageing population translate into higher demands for transfers in the form of unemployment benefits, health insurance, and pensions. Still, the impact of e-conomic development is strongly conditional on the political regime in place as well as on the level of electoral participation. Whereas in a democratic regime, where politicians respond to voters' demands, the public sector grows parallel to the structural changes associated with economic development, in authoritarian countries the size of the public sector remains small. wo stylized facts describe the evolution of the public sector across the world during the last century: first, its steady growth; second, the presence of persistent cross-national differences in its size. Excluding war times, government expenditure remained constant around 10 percent of GDP during the nineteenth century. Yet after 1914 the size of the public sector expanded dramatically. In OECD nations, total current public revenue had risen to 24 percent of GDP in the early 1950s. Thirty years later it had stabilized at around 44 percent. Among developing countries, current public revenue grew from 14 percent of GDP in 1950 to around 27 percent from the late 1970s onward. Despite the steady growth of the public sector, differences across nations have remained substantial. In the mid-1980s, public revenue ranged from less than 10 percent of GDP in Sierra Leone and Paraguay to over 60 percent in Botswana, Kuwait, Reunion, and Sweden. Cross-national variation has become especially acute in the developing world over time. Whereas in the early 1950s the standard deviation of public revenue in non-OECD nations was 4 percent, by the mid1980s it had reached 15 percent of GDP. The growth of the public sector in the last century has spawned a vigorous literature on its causes.1 Three families of explanations stand out. Demand-side explanations, conceiving the government as a provider of public goods, attribute the growth of the public sector either to social progress and demographic transformations (Wagner 1883; Wilensky 1975) or to different rates of productivity growth in the public and private sectors (Baumol 1967). Political or redistributive theories model the government as an agency that, responding to social conflict, redistributes income among citizens (Meltzer and Richards 1981; Esping-Andersen 1990). Finally, institutional models have stressed the impact of different structures of government, such as bureaucracies (Niskanen 1971), the structure of the legislative branch (Shepsle and Weingast 1981) or federalism, on the size of the public sector.

Existing theories of legislative delegation to bureaucracies typically focus on a single legislature, often the U.S. Congress. We argue that this parochial focus has important limitations. If one contends that politicians respond rationally to their political environment when adopting strategies for controlling bureaucrats, then theories of control should be able to explain how differences in the political environment-and in particular in the democratic institutional arrangements that shape this environment-influence strategies for controlling bureaucrats. We offer such a theory about the conditions under which legislatures should rely on statutory control (i.e., detailed legislation) in order to limit the discretion of agencies. The theory focuses on the interactions of four factors: conflict between legislators and bureaucrats, the bargaining costs associated with choosing the institutions for controlling bureaucrats, the professional capacity of legislators to create institutions for control, and the impact of political institutions on the relative costs and benefits of statutory and nonstatutory strategies of control. We test our argument using legislation from 1995 and 1996 that affects Medicaid programs. The results show that legislatures are more likely to make use of statutory controls when control of government is divided between the two parties, the two chambers of the legislature are unified in their opposition to the executive, the legislature is more professionalized, and the legislature does not have easily available options for nonstatutory control. ureaucratic involvement in policymaking is a pervasive condition of modern political life. Bureaucracies implement policies that legislatures have enacted, and they create policies where legislatures have avoided doing so. They can act to regulate industries, to distribute benefits and costs, and to redistribute wealth. They tackle policy areas as disparate as telecommunications, the environment, transportation, and public health. Given the pervasiveness of bureaucratic activity, it is not surprising that political scientists long have sought to understand the relationship between legislatures and agencies. Understanding this relationship is essential to democratic theory, as it focuses attention on the legitimacy of the role played by unelected policymakers in a representative democracy. Furthermore, it sheds light on the actions, abilities, and motivations of legislators. Thus, scholars have attempted to ascertain whether, to what extent, and under what conditions legislators influence the actions of agencies. Much of the focus of this research has been on the U.S. Congress, and much of the debate has centered on the question of whether in fact Congress controls the bureaucracy. This is a difficult question to answer, as it requires fairly precise information on legislator preferences and agency outputs. But while settling the empirical issue has been difficult, in addressing this question scholars have clarified several strategies for control, including the use of budget processes (e.g., Banks 1989; Bendor, Taylor, and Van Gaalen 1987), ongoing oversight (e.g., Aberbach 1990), and statutory control, whereby legislators use legislation to influence agency decisions.

(NDWAC), an advisory committee within the Environmental Protection Agency, to test whether the active interests in the legislative debate over drinking water are represented on the advisory committee, and thus in the EPA's policymaking process. Although agency officials are responsible for appointing the members of NDWAC, we find that public endorsements by interest groups are influential in the agency's selection process. These groups provide reliable information to Congress about applicants' true policy preferences. ne of the persistent power struggles in American national politics is that between Congress and the bureaucracy. Scholars have theorized that the outcome of this struggle depends significantly on which institution has superior information about the costs and consequences of policy implementation (Banks and Weingast 1992; Bendor, Taylor, and Van Gaalen 1985; Miller and Moe 1984). When agencies have an informational advantage, they can often implement programs at higher costs and with different beneficiaries than intended by Congress. limit bureaucratic discretion in policy making, Congress must control the information available to agencies. The information available to agencies depends, among other factors, on the number and kind of interested parties that participate in agency proceedings. Through formal comments, ex parte communications, hearings, stakeholder meetings, and other forums, agencies collect information about the costs and consequences of policy options in some of the same ways as Congress collects information. Policy information across the two institutions is likely to correspond when both Congress and agencies collect information from the same parties. If policy decisions depend on available information, then the more closely information corresponds between institutions, the more likely policy decisions will correspond as well. Our question in this article is To what extent, and by what means, do interests that realize representation in Congress also realize representation in the bureaucracy? Our explanation parallels the structure and process argument of McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast (1987, 1989) and the informational theories of Gilligan and Krehbiel (1987) and others. We propose that Congress controls the flow and content of information to the bureaucracy

The networks of interfirm relations that developed in business groups during economic transition are central to China's reform and are becoming an important part of the country's emergent economic structure. Using a recent and original data set that includes direct observations of economic choices made by firms, the process by which these interfirm lending and trade ties emerged and evolved in the early stages of reform is explored. Initially, information from sources external to the network dominated the formation and direction of exchange relations. Firms turned to their prior connections, took advantage of market position, and drew on bureaucratic power to develop alliances. Over time, internal influences gained importance, and managers increasingly drew on internal nontrade relations and other indicators inside the business group to identify lending and trade partners. The results demonstrate the central but changing role that social relations and environmental cues played in the creation of economic structure during China's transition. This study also contributes to an understanding of the processes of organizational adaptation to a major economic transition and interfirm alliance formation more generally. The findings reveal that firms select exchange partners of known reputation and solicit relations that reduce uncertainty, even when there is a cost involved

In his path-breaking 1937 article, Ronald Coase first identified the determinants of a firm's scope as an important research question. Although Coase's question initially attracted little attention, it has emerged over the last 25 years as a central issue in industrial organization. Much of the literature on firm scope since Coase uses the transaction-cost economics approach (henceforth, the TCE) pioneered by Oliver Williamson (1975, 1979, 1985) and Benjamin Klein et al. (1978). The TCE starts with the assumption that market transactions are plagued by incomplete contracts and the development of lock-in among trading partners. Lock-in leads the value of the relationship to exceed the value of the trading partners' outside alternatives creating what Klein et al. called quasi-rents. Contractual incompleteness gives contracting parties the ability to engage in opportunistic behavior to increase their share of these quasi-rents, leading to efficiency losses in market transactions. Internal procurement, on the other hand, involves its own inefficiencies, most notably the costs of bureaucracy and lowpowered incentives. According to the TCE, the optimal organizational form is found by comparing the efficiencies of these distinct transactional modes. Its primary prediction is that, as market transactions become characterized by increasing levels of quasi-rents and incompleteness in contracts, the likelihood of integration should increase. More recently, a great deal of attention has focused on an alternative theory of firm scope, the property-rights theory (henceforth, the PRT), pioneered by Sanford Grossman and Oliver Hart (1986) and Hart and John Moore (1990) (see also Hart, 1995). Like the TCE, the PRT starts with the assumption that contracts are incomplete and that lock-in often develops among trading partners. It then focuses on how ownership of physical assets, which confers residual rights of control over the assets, alters the efficiency of trading relations. In the process of doing so, the PRT produces a theory that differs from the TCE in three ways. The first is methodological rather than substantive: the PRT is substantially more formal than the (largely verbal) TCE. Second, the PRT focuses on distortions in ex ante investments, in contrast to the ex post haggling costs that are a major focus of the TCE.1 Third, the PRT assumes that efficiency losses are of the same nature in all ownership structures. That is, ownership of physical assets affects the parties' abilities to engage in opportunistic behavior not only in market transactions, but also within the firm. A very large empirical literature exists lending support to the TCE (for one survey, see Howard A. Shelanski and Peter G. Klein [1995]). In a typical study, some measure of lock-in, such as the specificity of the product procured or investments made, is related to the choice of whether to integrate. The strong association that this literature has found between specificity and integration has made the TCE

This article explores the relationship between revolution and the bureaucratization of tax administration in early modern England and France. Revolution produces bureaucratization only when the monitoring capacity of states is developed enough to make bureaucratic organization more efficient than alternatives such as tax farming and collection by local notables. As monitoring capacity varies across types of taxes and levels of administration, states also bureaucratize at different paces and are differentially affected by revolution. This explains why the revolutions in England and France had greater effects on indirect taxes than on direct taxes and at top levels of tax administration compared to lower levels. Thus, revolution is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for bureaucratization, but it contributes to the process by sweeping away impediments to reform.

Public firms in a reforming socialist economy face two problems: the old soft‐budget constraint syndrome and new principal‐agent problems. China's township‐village government‐owned enterprises (TVEs) outperform state‐owned enterprises (SOEs) in growth rate and productivity. Three explanations are proposed in the literature: (1) TVEs represent informal or ambiguous private property rights, which are most efficient in partial reform. (2) The small size and scale of township‐village governments as industrial corporations allows officials to monitor TVEs directly and to limit their wherewithal for cross‐subsidizing. (3) Strict market disciplines facing TVEs render indirect market monitoring to mitigate agency problems effectively. Analyses of Jiangyin data show that (a) while both superior to local SOEs, village and township enterprises share similar productivity and (b) the scale of township‐village corporations slightly increases productivity. I conclude that local state corporatism should be revised to include market discipline as an effective governance mechanism.

In most parliamentary democracies, two things are true: cabinet ministers delegate to bureaucrats and coalition governments replace cabinet ministers with little advance notice. Many people claim that cabinet instability (i.e., uncertainty about the timing of ministerial replacements) allows bureaucrats to ignore ministerial orders. To evaluate this claim, we present a delegation model that introduces cabinet instability as a variable. We discover numerous cases in which instability has no effect on bureaucratic behavior. We also identify circumstances in which instability causes bureaucrats not to choose policies that would otherwise make both them and their ministers better off. Such outcomes are caused by the bureaucrats' dilemma-the fear that a bureaucrat's efforts will be unrewarded, or even punished, if the incumbent minister is replaced unexpectedly. In general, we find that instability's effects on delegation are usually taken for granted and often misunderstood. With this model, we seek to improve on both counts.

In an article in the November 1999 issue of this journal, Meier, Wrinkle, and Polinard reach the tantalizing conclusion that increases in the representation of minority teachers in the public school bureaucracy actually enhance the academic achievement of both minority and Anglo groups of students. However, diagnostic and statistical tests on their data suggest that their analysis may suffer from specification, selection, and categorization limitations. When corrections for these problems are introduced into the analysis, the results that are the basis for the Meier, Wrinkle, and Polinard conclusions change significantly, thereby undermining our confidence in the validity of their claims.

Recent disclosures about the Cuban missile crisis suggest that organizational routines and plans did not significantly constrain U.S. government choices. Rather than constituting fixed barriers to innovation, routines and plans can be relatively plastic and subject to strategic alterations or misrepresentations. Although this can be partly understood in terms of organizational processes, plans and routines are both a response to and the context for strategic interaction by organizational participants. I present evidence of this and suggest why decision makers may not plan even when planning is possible and why plans may not be implemented even when they already exist.

Recent calls for public sector reform advocate reinvention, deregulation, reengineering, outsourcing, and privatization to address deficiencies in the classic bureaucratic model and to improve government performance. Reform efforts that seek to capitalize on the advantages offered by the three sectors-public, private, and voluntary-include experiments in public-private policy partnerships. Experience with coop- erative undertakings between the state and for-profit or third-sector service providers spans the last three decades. This book examines the pros and cons of these public-private policy partnerships, isolates the determinants of success or failure across policy spheres, and identifies the circumstances under which cross-sector partnering should be promoted or avoided.